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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the diffusion of performance-based funding policy in higher 
education based on the conceptual framework of policy innovation and diffusion.  After 
examining the two waves of state adoption of this policy, 1979-2002 and 2003-2014, I 
argue that during the first period, regional influence, state fiscal condition, educational 
attainment, tuition change, and higher education governance are the main factors that 
lead to state adoption of the policy.  States with higher probability of adoption tend to 
have more adopting neighbors, better fiscal condition, higher educational attainment 
rates, tuition decreases, and an absence of a consolidated governing board.  From 2003 
through 2014, states with declined college enrollment and conservative governments 
appear to be more likely adopters.  Further, evidence suggests that the non-adoption of 
performance funding is not simply attributed to the perceived image of the policy or the 
level of knowledge of the innovation.  State higher education finance requires collective 
efforts from the higher education governing agency, the executive, and the legislature.  
Finally, higher education institutions also partially determine the budgetary decisions by 
providing their inputs.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
1. Research Question and Motivation 
This dissertation addresses the question: why does policy diffusion succeed in 
some states but fail in others.  I became interested in this topic after learning about 
states’ experimentations with performance-based funding in higher education.  
Performance-based funding is a strategy that connects state funding directly to 
institutional performance on public campuses through indicators such as student 
retention, graduation rates, and cost efficiency (Burke, Rosen, Minassians, and Lessard 
2000).  Traditionally, states finance public higher education institutions according to the 
number of student enrolled and the faculty, staff, and other resources needed for 
delivering an education.  This financing model does little to address the outputs and 
outcomes higher education produces.  Performance funding uses financial incentives to 
motivate institutions to improve student outcomes and college completion.  Generally 
speaking, under performance-based funding, a university will be eligible to receive a 
designated amount of state funding only if it meets required institutional performance 
criteria.  Performance-based funding policy was first introduced by the Tennessee 
Higher Education Commission in 1978 and adopted in 1979.  Since this first enactment, 
many states have experimented with measures that attempt to finance higher education 
based on university performance.  As of January 2017, 32 states have a performance 
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funding formula in place and five states are transitioning to performance funding 
(Figure 1).  The remaining 13 states61 do not have the policy.  
Figure 1.1: Map of Performance-Based Funding Adoption and Non-Adoption (source: 
NCSL 2017) (Note: Alaska and Hawaii are excluded due to their non-contiguity to the 
mainland states) 
 
 
States have constitutional authority over higher education.  State lawmakers, 
along with campus governing bodies, have jurisdiction over foundational higher 
education policies.  Higher education policy making is largely decentralized and states 
have autonomy to regulate higher education based on internal needs; therefore, states 
bear primary responsibility for the governance and finance of public higher education 
(McLendon 2003; Gittell and Kleiman 2000).   Studies have noted that state political 
institutions and processes have notable influence on higher education (McLendon 2003; 
                                                          
61 The 13 states are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and West Virginia (NCSL 2017). 
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McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006).   McLendon and associates (McLendon, Hearn, 
and Deaton 2006) investigated factors influencing the adoption of performance 
accountability policies for public higher education from 1979-2002; they observe that 
legislative party strength and higher education governance arrangements are the driving 
forces of states’ adoption of performance accountability programs in public higher 
education.   States’ reaction to performance funding poses a host of unanswered 
questions: why do some states refuse to enact performance funding?  What are the 
causes of the non-adoption decisions?  Are there any political reasons that lead to non-
adoption?  To explore these questions, I refer to policy innovation and diffusion theory 
as my theoretical guidance in this dissertation.  
2. Conceptual Framework: Innovation and Diffusion Theory 
In 1969, Jack Walker investigated how policy innovations spread across space 
and time.   He argued that geographic proximity enables policymakers to obtain 
information from nearby states; thusly the efforts of policymakers in pioneering states 
could be emulated by their neighboring states (Walker 1969).  Policy innovation occurs 
whenever a government—a national legislature, a state agency, a city—adopts a new 
policy (Mintrom 1997; Walker 1969).  When a policy innovation comes from outside 
the polity, with the spread of innovations from one government to another, the process 
is defined as policy diffusion.  The diffusion literature seeks to explain the reasons why 
states adopt a certain policy innovation and how policy ideas spread across states.  Two 
general models have been developed to explain policy diffusion: internal determinants 
models and regional diffusion models (Berry and Berry 1990).  Internal determinants 
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models focus on the pre-existing features a state has that favor policy adoption such as 
political environment (Walker 1969; Berry and Berry 1990; Haider-Markel 2001; 
Shipan and Volden 2008), legislative professionalism (King 2000; Tandberg 2010), 
citizen ideology (Lamothe 2005; Matisoff 2008), and fiscal health (Walker 1969; Karch 
2007a; Shipan and Volden 2008).  Regional diffusion models suggest that the number 
of adopting neighbors is positively associated with a state’s likelihood of adopting the 
innovation. 
Policy diffusion processes can be further portrayed by four underlying 
mechanisms: imitation, emulation, competition, and coercion.  First of all, states that 
have similar policy-relevant characteristics such as political environment, demographic 
features, or economic development are likely to mimic each other in policy making.  
This mechanism reflects one of the essential assumptions of innovation and diffusion 
framework: state policy decisions can be swayed by horizontal influences (Lowry 
1992).  Horizontally, states learn from each other on policy issues and borrow policy 
ideas from other jurisdictions (Berry and Berry 1990).  Traditionally, imitation occurs 
when states observe a neighboring state and copy a successful program, which explains 
why a state has higher likelihood of adopting a policy if its neighboring states have 
already enacted the same program (Berry and Berry 1990; Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, 
and Miller 2016).  In addition to imitation, legislators also want to meet their political 
objectives by pursuing successful examples of policy.  Further, keeping up with the 
colleagues in other states and competing for economic benefits also incentivize policy 
diffusion (Karch 2007b).  Lastly, coercion is another reason that drives policy diffusion. 
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This vertical assumption posits that the national government has power over state 
legislation through monetary incentives (Welch and Thompson 1980; Balla 2001) or 
sending strong and clear signal about rewards or punishment on certain policy issues 
(Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004). 
3. Significance and Contribution 
As much as the literature explains policy diffusion, it fails to address four 
important issues.  First, research on policy diffusion overlooks the causes of policy non-
diffusion.  Most diffusion studies assume that policies diffuse automatically.  Rogers 
(1983) terms this research preference “pro-adoption bias,” which assumes that a certain 
policy should be picked up for adoption considerations.  One of the key reasons for this 
bias is the lower visibility and accessibility of diffusion failure (Rogers 1983).  Among 
the few studies that recognize policy non-diffusion, Ingle and associates conclude that 
less policy-adoption friendly environments and lack of interactions with policy 
entrepreneurs are two main reasons of policy adoption failure (Ingle, Cohen-Vogel, and 
Hughes 2007).  Recently published diffusion studies continue the inquiry of causes of 
diffusion in domestic and international contexts (e.g., Bradford and Bradford 2016; 
Clayton 2016; Rury 2016; Sewordor and Sjoquist 2016), neglecting diffusion failure. It 
has remained unclear why policy non-diffusion occurs.  While some studies 
acknowledge the lack of research on policy non-diffusion (Barth and Parry 2009; 
Heiden and Strebel 2012), to the best of my knowledge, policy non-diffusion is rather 
insufficiently studied in a systematic and conceptual manner.  
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Second, methodologically speaking, in diffusion studies, quantitative methods 
are the dominating approach (Starke 2013).  Most studies apply Event History Analysis 
(EHA) introduced by Berry and Berry back in 1990.  EHA has become a standard 
approach in studying policy diffusion in studies published in the past 28 years62.  
Although scholars have refined EHA63 and identified additional critical independent 
variables that drive policy diffusion, the method largely remains the same.  The 
dependent variable in diffusion studies is usually the state adoption decision.  Because 
there are two types of decisions—adoption and non-adoption, the dependent variable is 
usually binary, which leads to logit regression being the main statistical technique in the 
field.  Some scholars have incorporated qualitative research in data collection.  For 
example, in 1997 Michael Mintrom conducted surveys to identify policy entrepreneurs 
and their level of activeness in state school choice policy approval.  Little qualitative 
research has been done to investigate policy diffusion in the more general sense.  
Third, while geographic proximity may have played a critical role in the past, 
the advent of new communications and transportation technology might have rendered 
mediums such as regional policy networks and media forums less influential.  Further, 
the claim of geographic proximity driving policy diffusion overlooks the fact that 
governments are not equally-weighted units.  Teodoro and Gonzalez (2015) use the 
metaphor “being like the cool kids” to demonstrate that governments tend to learn from 
                                                          
62 I have collected and read all the publications I can obtain on policy innovation and diffusion. To the 
best of my knowledge, EHA is applied in most of these studies.  
63 Volden (2006) and Gilardi (2010) introduced directed-dyad event history analysis, in which the unit of 
analysis is the dyad-year—meaning a pair of jurisdictions—and the dependent variable measures whether 
one jurisdiction in the pair emulates the policy of the other. 
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more advanced counterparts rather than less competitive ones.  For example, Nevada is 
more likely to learn from California (or other states with similar status as itself) than 
from Idaho because the former is in a better economic shape than the latter.  The 
traditional regional influence assumption also fails to capture the diffusion pattern for 
performance funding.  For example, Alabama has never adopted performance funding 
policy despite that all its neighbors (Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi) having 
enacted the program.  
Fourth, it is unclear how nonprofit organizations, especially philanthropic 
foundations, are involved in policymaking and policy diffusion (Vaughan and Arsneault 
2015).  In the past two decades, private foundations have expanded substantially both in 
size and financial capacity.  In 1999, philanthropic foundations have assets of 
approximately $450 billion (Roelofs 2003).  According to Foundation Center (2017) 
data, the over 86,720 private foundations now possess total assets of over $865 billion.  
While the growth in numbers has been widely noted, there been less public and political 
discussion of what this trend means in terms of these foundations’ impact on politics 
and society as a whole (Anheier and Leat 2013).  It has become increasingly difficult to 
understand nonprofits or public policy independently of one another because nonprofits 
make policy and influence policy (Vaughan and Arsneault 2014; Vaughan and 
Arsneault 2015).  The inquiry of how foundations influence policymaking is important 
because empirical evidence suggests that wealthy private foundations have a major 
influence on higher education legislation (Parry, Field, and Supiano 2013; Mangan 
2015).  Further, scholars observe that private foundations at both the national (e.g., the 
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Lumina Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and the state level (e.g., 
the Texas Public Policy Foundation) have been aggressively promoting performance 
funding by encouraging governors and state legislators to commit to this type of 
measure (Dougherty and Natow 2015; Fryar 2011).   
4. Research Design 
To address these above understudied elements, this dissertation proposes a 
qualitative solution to answer policy diffusion questions and reports causes of policy 
diffusion failure by closely scrutinizing performance funding hold-out states through 
case studies.  To approach my research question “why does policy diffusion occur in 
some states but not in others,” mixed methods with both quantitative and qualitative 
analyses are employed.  The design of this research is multi-method in nature.  Multi-
method research involves combining data-gathering and -analyzing techniques from 
two or more methodological traditions (Seawright 2016).  Multi-method applications 
are appropriate here because they produce more grounded inferences and richer 
information than studies using a single method.   
The quantitative section applies the standard method for studying policy 
diffusion, Event History Analysis, to investigate how the previously identified 
determinants perform in the case of performance funding diffusion.  Based on the 
quantitative analysis, I then match adopters and non-adopters that share similar features 
and conduct an in-depth qualitative analysis of these identified states to reveal the 
factors beyond visible features that lead to non-adoption.  
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The qualitative case study section takes a close examination of Alabama and 
Mississippi—a close pair of states that share resemblance on the scales of statistically 
significant variables.  I test my hypotheses by drawing and analyzing information from 
in-depth interviews, official websites, and news documents.  The qualitative portion 
dives deep into the decision-making process of states to either adopt or reject 
performance funding. 
5. Chapters 
This dissertation proceeds in the following order: 
Chapter I presents the introduction, key research question, purpose, significance, 
and summary of research design of this dissertation. 
Chapter II describes the history of performance management reform and 
explains how it spurs the popularity of performance funding in higher education.  The 
discussion begins with the definition of performance accountability and how 
performance management fulfills the objective of performance accountability.  Then the 
chapter reviews performance funding in higher education, the mechanisms of such a 
strategy, the adoption of performance funding among states, and empirical evidence on 
the effectiveness of performance funding programs.  
Chapter III reviews the literature on policy innovation and diffusion theory.  The 
theory explains the causes of state policy adoption and the key components in policy 
diffusion.  Being the fundamental factor in policy diffusion, information is usually fluid 
and unstable, which has direct influence on policy-oriented learning.  In public 
10 
 
policymaking, legislators are confronted with time constraints and electoral 
considerations, therefore it is critical for policy agents to frame issues in order to attract 
legislative attention.  In Chapter III, I focus particularly on policy information supply 
and demand, and how such two-way communication facilitates policy diffusion.  I also 
discuss how the lack of communication can potentially hinder policy diffusion.  At the 
end of the chapter, I propose four expectations about the contributing factors to policy 
non-adoption. 
Chapter IV details the descriptive information regarding the enactment of 
performance funding policy from 1979 through and including 201464.  In this chapter, I 
conduct a quantitative analysis of diffusion variables in leading to states’ adoption of 
performance funding.  The Event History Analysis models are reviewed to analyze how 
the previously identified determinants perform in the case of performance funding 
diffusion.   
Chapter V presents case study comparing two states: Alabama and Mississippi.  
Guided by my hypotheses, the chapter investigates comprehensive data collected from a 
variety of sources.  Both information supply and information consumption are discussed 
in detail regarding policy making.  
Chapter VI summarizes the dissertation, highlights the key findings, and 
proposes future research efforts.   
  
                                                          
64 The final year of observation is 2014 due to the data availability for some of the variables.  This is 
discussed in further detail in Chapter IV. 
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Chapter II. Performance Management in Higher Education 
Introduction 
The share of jobs requiring a college degree has doubled since the 1970s, 
spurring significant increase in the number of student enrollment at two- and four-year 
postsecondary institutions (Aldeman and Carey 2009).  Consequently, states face the 
stress of building stronger higher education systems to meet such demand.  Graduation 
rates, however, have persistently remained low.  The stubbornly low higher education 
graduation rates fail to keep up with the societal need for a more educated citizenry.  
The average public college graduates less than 60 percent of its students within six 
years, and graduation rates for minority groups are even lower (Carey 2008).  In 2008 
only 26 percent of first-time beginning community college students attained a degree or 
certificate within five years (U.S. Department of Education 2011).  This 
underperformance has led skeptics to question the accountability of higher education 
and prompted a series of attempts to improve institutional performance.  In the 
meantime, state legislators have become preoccupied with squeezing more revenues out 
of an already tightened budget.  Tightened budgets forces state officials to think more 
strategically about resource allocation and encourage performance-focused 
management.   
This chapter reviews the history of performance management reform and 
explains how it spurs the popularity of performance funding in higher education.  The 
discussion begins with the definition of performance accountability and how 
performance management fulfills the objective of performance accountability.  Then it 
12 
 
reviews performance funding in higher education, the mechanisms of such a strategy, 
the adoption of performance funding among states, and empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of performance funding programs.  
1. Performance Accountability and Performance Management 
Accountability constitutes a fundamental concept in democratic theory because 
its purpose is to achieve public policy that remains responsive to public preferences.  
This responsiveness is achieved by ensuring that public officials act in accordance with 
the preferences and expectations of citizens (Dunn 2003).  Performance accountability 
is the byproduct of the nationwide movement that took place in the 1980s to increase 
accountability in the operation of public sector agencies (Willoughby and Melkers 
2001).  During the 1980s, declining tax revenues, coupled with state budget deficits and 
mandatory spending in many public sectors (i.e., healthcare, education, and welfare) led 
government officials to seek new strategies to make government more efficient and 
responsive.  Under the performance movement, government agencies refer to the 
private sector for governance and management ideas.  One such strategy—performance 
management—held that government agencies could increase their effectiveness by 
setting performance goals for service delivery (Klein 2005).  
Performance management is defined as a system that (1) generates performance 
information through strategic planning and performance measurement routines, and (2) 
connects this information to decision venues, where the information influences a range 
of possible decisions (Moynihan 2008).  Performance management doctrines claim a 
variety of benefits, including improved resources allocation, improved responsiveness 
13 
 
of bureaucrats to elected officials, enhanced accountability to the public, and improved 
efficiency.  Performance management intends to change the nature of accountability as 
performance information provides a transparent explanation of how well the 
government is doing (Moynihan 2008).  This effort to blend private-sector planning and 
management concepts into public sector governance entailed shifting local program 
oversight from traditional process-oriented, input-based compliance monitoring to more 
results-oriented, outcome-focused strategies (Blalock and Barnow 2001; Klein 2005).  
Beginning in the late 1980s, state legislators started to exercise management 
controls by introducing performance reporting systems to track the operation of 
government agencies.  Public managers are asked to justify their actions not just in 
terms of efficiency but also by the outcomes they produce (Moynihan 2008).  
Performance reporting requires public agencies to report on a set of priority indicators 
identified by state.  The purpose of such a strategy is to closely monitor publicly 
financed agencies.  However, this initial approach does not specify fiscal consequences 
attached to performance (Burke and Minassians 2003).  Soon legislators came to the 
realization that the absence of fiscal incentives in performance management failed to 
motivate better outcomes.   
Beginning in the 1990s, performance-based funding systems increasingly have 
been integrated into state and federal government programs as a means of holding 
public agencies accountable for improving the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of 
program services (Ingraham and Moynihan 2001).  Performance-based accountability 
has incorporated fiscal incentives into government program management, motivating 
14 
 
institutions to become more productive in attaining predetermined objectives in annual 
appropriations.  Linking performance to funding has become one of the primary ways to 
manage accountability at both the federal and state levels. This idea is particularly 
attractive because it communicates to the public that government officials share their 
frustration with inefficient public agencies and bureaucracy.   
The federal Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which required 
federal agencies to clarify their missions and establish long-term strategic goals, was 
one manifestation of this evolving approach to accountability (Radin 2002).  In the 
public domain, state-level accountability and performance management have become a 
widely-adopted measures to meet accountability demands in the 1990s.  By the late 
1990s, 31 states had legislative requirements creating performance information systems, 
and 16 states had similar administrative procedure fulfilling similar goals (Moynihan 
2008).  State legislators have directed government entities, including public higher 
education, to explicitly state their goals and report results as a form of accountability.   
2. Performance Accountability in Higher Education 
Soon public colleges and universities that receive government dollars came 
under such scrutiny as well, as performance reporting measures were extended across 
state agencies (Noland, Davis, and McClendon 2000).  In response to the demand for a 
more educated citizenry, states find the need to create a more effective higher education 
funding system.  Campaigns to improve student success have vocally expressed 
concerns about higher education performance.  Consequently, much attention and 
energy have been directed to “new accountability” as an approach to hold higher 
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education accountable and evaluate university performance.  Different from the 
traditional accountability that looks at the input end, new accountability focuses on the 
outputs higher education institutions produce (National Commission on Accountability 
in Higher Education 2005).   
By 1994, roughly one-third of states had instituted some form of performance 
reporting system in higher education, although these systems had no fiscal 
consequences linked to outcomes or allocations (Ewell 1994).  Higher education 
performance reporting generates performance reports for policymakers and the public 
indicators on institutional and statewide performance.  Performance reporting relies “on 
information and publicity rather than funding or budgeting to encourage colleges and 
universities to improve their performance” (Burke and Minassians 2003, p. 5).  The 
periodic performance reports that recount the performance of public higher education 
institutes are usually sent to governors, legislators, and campus leaders, and sometimes 
the media.  Performance reporting without fiscal consequences failed to motivate public 
higher education institutions to improve academic outcomes. 
Traditionally, state funds to public universities and colleges are mostly 
determined by the input end (i.e., enrollment, incremental funding increases).  State 
funding to universities was not linked to explicitly specified results (Crellin, Aaron, 
Mabe, and Wilk 2011).  Under accountability regimes, higher education institutions are 
called upon to make a compelling case to the general public and to political leaders that 
the overall value of a college education is real, and universities and colleges are 
deserving of state financial support (Albright 1998).  Officials from system, 
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coordinating, and governing boards have decided that they must work with legislators 
and governors to substantially change the budgetary status quo.  Many states started 
building performance-funding formulas as a means to improve the performance and 
efficiency of their higher education institutions.   
Performance-based funding was initiated by the Tennessee Higher Education 
Commission in 1978 and officially adopted by the same state in 1979.  Under 
performance-based funding, a university will be eligible to receive a designated amount 
of state funding only if it meets required institutional performance criteria.  
Performance funding relies on financial incentives to influence institutional behavior.  
Performance funding was enacted by an increasing number of states through the 1990s, 
following the trend of performance management reform at the national level.   
In the 1990s, state performance reporting indicators were refined; states were 
able to use higher education data to link performance to fiscal eligibility (Klein 2005).  
Legislators’ newfound capacity to link institutional financing to performance—using a 
common set of indicators across state campuses—contributed to the restructuring of 
state higher education funding formulas.  In these new funding formulas, outcome-
based criteria were more closely aligned with state educational priorities, which, in turn, 
helped drive institutional funding levels.  These new higher education funding systems 
took two forms (Burke and Minassians 2003; Klein 2005): 
• Performance budgeting that enables state governments or postsecondary 
coordinating boards to consider institutional performance as one factor when 
calculating resource eligibility.  However, funding levels are not directly linked 
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to performance, meaning that institutional allocations can be unpredictable and 
discretionary. 
• Performance funding that ties state funding directly and tightly to the 
performance of public campuses on individual indicators.  Performance funding 
directly links state allocations to institutional results.  For each outcome 
achieved, an institution receives a specific amount of money predetermined by 
the state. 
As mentioned earlier, traditionally, higher education institutions are funded 
through a fee-for-service approach, a financing system that essentially focuses on input 
factors such as enrollment rate or student/faculty ratios.  In allocating money to higher 
education, most funding systems do not consider state educational goals or program 
effectiveness.  This emphasis on the input end fails to provide incentives for 
institutional performance and student outcomes.  Performance funding, coming in as a 
new funding strategy, has required higher education institutions to pay more attention to 
academic performance outcomes.  Performance funding programs aim to improve 
institutional performance, particularly with respect to student outcomes on important 
indicators including graduation rates, student retention, cost-efficiency, job placement 
after graduation, and passage of mandatory courses. 
Performance requirements have mainly emanated from state governments.  
“Performance-based accountability is implemented by establishing institutional 
objectives and periodically assessing progression toward these goals (Alexander 2000, 
p. 419)”.  The goals of these measures include motivating internal improvement, 
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encouraging institutions to address state goals, and deregulating higher education by 
strengthening consumer information about institutional performance (Wellman 2001).  
The accountability measures intend to encourage higher education personnel to change 
their priorities to devote more effort into student learning and institutional performance.  
In 1997, the State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) conducted a survey to 
learn more about the use of performance measures in the budgetary process.  The 
survey results indicate that more than half of the states are planning on using 
performance measures in their budget process.  The SHEEO study shows that officials 
have become more aware of the importance of performance measures. 
3. Performance Funding Policy Adoption among States 
As indicated, this dissertation explores the research question: why does policy 
diffusion succeed in some states but fail in others.  Before proceeding any further, it is 
important to identify which states have adopted performance funding and the exact year 
each adoption occurred.  However, from an investigative perspective, it is very difficult 
to determine which states have established performance funding and the exact year of 
each state’s initial enactment of the program, as Dougherty and Natow (2015) noted.  
Surveys of state officials indicate that those officials frequently disagree about what 
performance funding is and whether their state even has it.  To determine which states 
have adopted performance funding and the years of initial adoption, I have drawn from 
a wide variety of sources (Burke & Minassians 2000, 2002, 2003; Dougherty and 
Reddy 2013; Dougherty and Natow 2015; Dougherty, Natow, Hare, Jones, & Vega, 
2013; Friedel et al. 2013; Gorbunov, 2013; Rabovsky 2013; McLendon et al., 2006; 
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National Conference of State Legislatures 2016, 2017; personal interviews with state 
higher education officials).  Various surveys yield conflicting results on which year 
exactly a state established performance funding and which states actually have adopted 
performance funding.   
For example, Burke and Minassians (2002, 2003) conclude that state of 
Louisiana adopted performance funding in 1997.  Friedel and associates (2013), 
however, consider that Louisiana adopted the program in 2010.  In Dougherty and 
Reddy’s (2013) report, Louisiana enacted the program in 2008.  Another state that has 
been discussed inconsistently is Idaho.  Scholars cannot reach agreement on whether 
Idaho actually adopted performance funding.  According to McLendon et al. (2006), 
Idaho started funding public universities based on performance in 2000; but Friedel et 
al. (2013) do not recognize Idaho as an adopter.  Dougherty and Reddy (2013) think 
that there is still some question about whether Idaho has indeed adopted performance 
funding. 
Due to these inconsistencies and disagreements, it is important to define 
performance-based funding policy and government policy adoption before proceeding 
any further.  Thomas Dye defines public policy as “anything the government chooses to 
do or not to do” (Dye 2002, p.1).  Concerning government decision- and public policy-
making, James E. Anderson (2014) considers the most prominent feature of policy 
decision to be legitimacy.  Policy decisions are accepted as legitimate, as being made in 
proper way and hence binding on all, and this legitimacy is activated through officials 
who have legal authority to act and meet accepted procedural and substantive standards 
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in taking action.  Quite similarly, Sabatier and Weible (2014) define public policy as 
decisions of a government or an equivalent authority; examples of public policies 
include, but are not limited to, statutes, laws, regulations, executive decisions, and 
government programs (p. 4).  In higher education, a few states have enacted 
performance funding through state statute because higher education appropriation has to 
go through the legislative process in these states.  In other states, higher education 
appropriation decisions are made by a governing board without the intervention of the 
state legislature; these states can implement performance funding without legislative 
approval.  In this dissertation, I consider states as performance funding adopters as long 
as the adoption decision is made either by the state legislature or the higher education 
governing body.   
3.1. Higher Education Governance at the State Level 
Higher education governance and management can be categorized into three 
types of structures: consolidated governing boards, coordinating boards, and planning 
agencies (Colorado Department of Higher Education 2017; McGuinness, Epper, and 
Arredondo 1994).  Currently, 24 states have consolidated governing boards—a single 
statewide governing board that legally manages and controls the responsibilities for all 
public institutions of higher education (Colorado Department of Higher Education 
2017).  Consolidated governing boards have all the rights and responsibilities of a single 
corporate entity as defined by state law, including strategic planning, budgeting, and 
allocation of resources between and among institutions within the board’s jurisdiction 
(Connecticut General Assembly 2010).  Twenty-three states have coordinating 
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boards—a single agency other than a governing board that has the responsibility for the 
statewide coordination of many policy functions (e.g. planning and policy leadership, 
program review and approval, and budget development and resource allocation) 
(Colorado Department of Higher Education 2017).  Coordinating boards do not govern 
institutions, they do not usually have any role in the appointment of institutional chief 
executives or in developing faculty personnel policies (Connecticut General Assembly 
2010).  Two states have planning agencies and no organization with authority beyond 
making plans for higher education.  Lastly, Michigan is the only state that does not have 
a state-level coordinating or governing agency for postsecondary education (Education 
Commission of the States 2007).  This information is summarized in Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2.1: Authority of State Boards and Agencies of Higher Education (Sources: 
Colorado Department of Higher Education 2017; Connecticut General Assembly 2010; 
Education Commission of the States 2007; McGuinness, Epper, and Arredondo 1994; 
The National Center for Higher Education Management Systems 2017) 
Type 
of 
Board 
Consolidated 
Governing 
Boards 
Coordinating 
Boards 
Planning Agencies No State Higher 
Education Board or 
Agency 
States Alaska 
Arizona 
Florida  
Georgia  
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Iowa  
Kansas  
Maine  
Massachusetts 
Minnesota  
Mississippi  
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hampshire  
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Oregon  
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Utah 
Vermont 
Wisconsin  
Wyoming  
Alabama 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Alaska65  
Delaware 
Minnesota66  
New Hampshire67 
Pennsylvania 
Michigan 
Total 
States 
24 23 5 1 
                                                          
65 Alaska has a Board of Regents, which is constitutionally founded, and consists of 11 members 
appointed by the governor and approved by the Legislature; and the Commission on Postsecondary 
Education, the coordinating agency for all postsecondary institutions and programs (Education 
Commission of the States 2007). 
66 Minnesota has two statewide, multi-campus governing boards: (1) the legislature-appointed, 12-
member Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota with constitutional authority for the four public 
senior universities; and (2) the governor-appointed, 15-member Board of Trustees of the Minnesota State 
Colleges and Universities (Education Commission of the States 2007). 
67 New Hampshire has two institutional governing boards with complete authority for governing and 
planning, budget review and recommendation, and program approval: The Board of Trustees of the 
University of New Hampshire System and The Community Technical College System (Education 
Commission of the States 2007). 
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Beyond these distinctions, five states—Florida, Idaho, Michigan, New York and 
Pennsylvania—have state education boards with some responsibilities for all levels of 
education, early childhood through postsecondary.  Due to the wide range of board 
responsibilities in these five states, the boards’ higher education legislation authority 
varies substantially.  For instance, the Idaho State Board has governing authority for the 
state higher education institutions, and New York’s board lacks any budget authority.  
Among the 23 states that have coordinating boards, some boards exercise significant 
budget authority, while some have limited or no budget authority.  Also, coordinating 
boards may oversee subsystems of institutions with homogeneous missions, as in 
California, or multi-campus subsystems with heterogeneous missions, as in New York.  
Some governing or coordinating boards coordinate primarily small subsystems or single 
campuses, as in Illinois or New Jersey, or mixed single-campus and multi-campus 
institutions, as in Texas (Richardson, Bracco, Callan, and Finney 1998).   
In addition to the distinctions among state higher education governance, state 
policy environments and the interface between higher education and state government 
also weigh in as vital factors in higher education policy-making.  The distribution of 
authority between states and higher education reflects the interests articulated by groups 
inside and outside of government (Clark 1979).  Regardless of their policy-making 
discretion, some governing and coordinating boards make policies under direct 
influence from the state legislature and/or the governor.  These boards align higher 
education goals with the fundamental political priorities of the state.   
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For example, in September 1992, the president of the Arkansas Higher 
Education Council and the director of Arkansas Higher Education Department jointly 
appointed the Institutional Productivity Committee to develop performance funding 
metrics as an attempt to improve Arkansas college graduation rates.  After Governor 
Jim Guy Tucker took office, he strongly supported the idea.  With the governor’s 
endorsement, the Institutional Productivity Committee fully committed to the project.  
Arkansas officially adopted performance funding under the support of the governor and 
the state legislature in 1994.  When Governor Tucker was replaced by Lieutenant 
Governor Michael Huckabee, the fate of performance funding took a different turn.  
The new governor observed that performance funding was politically unpopular on 
campuses.  Once the external support of the governor and legislature for performance 
funding vanished, the internal support from the coordinating board disappeared, too. 
For another example, the Arizona Board of Regents—a consolidated governing 
board—expressed interest in performance funding in April 2010.  After a few months’ 
study of this funding strategy, the Arizona Board of Regents proposed linking 
distribution of state funding to university performance on measures related to the 
growth and the diversification of the Arizona economy.  The purpose of the proposal 
was to increase productivity and efficiency among the state’s universities, demonstrate a 
commitment to enhanced performance, and establish fairness to students throughout the 
system (Office of the Washington State Auditor 2016).  After this initial proposal, in the 
same year Arizona Revised Statute 15 Education §15-1626, through SB 1618, required 
the Arizona Board of Regents and universities under its jurisdiction to collaboratively 
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develop and adopt a performance funding model by July 1, 2012.  This session law was 
continued in the FY 2014 Higher Education Budget Reconciliation Bill, as well as the 
General Appropriation Act (Laws 2013, 1st Special Session, Chapter 1).  In the case of 
Arizona, although the board has a great deal of legislative authority, the state legislature 
played a critical role in the adoption of performance funding.  
3.2. Criteria of Performance-Based Funding Policy Adoption 
To decide whether a state has adopted performance funding, I use the three 
criteria developed by Dougherty and Natow (2015).  First, adoption of performance 
funding can occur not just in the form of state statute but also in the form of other 
governmental authoritative decisions.  As elaborated above, higher education 
governance and management varies in each state.  Under the structure of consolidated 
governing boards, all public postsecondary institutions are organized under the 
statewide governing board.  Consolidated governing boards have all the rights and 
responsibilities of a single corporate entity as defined by state law.  Typically, a 
consolidated governing board has the responsibility of making budgetary plans and 
allocating resources between and among institutions within the board’s jurisdiction.  In 
this sense, a state is considered as an adopter if the performance funding decision is 
made by either the state legislature or its higher education governing entity.  
The second criterion of deciding whether a state has adopted performance 
funding is that the program must specifically focus on institutional outcomes.  For 
example, the state of Connecticut has had a funding formula that rewarded colleges for 
becoming representative of the state population in their enrollment but did not reward 
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student outcomes.  Programs like this could possibly be mistakenly counted as 
performance funding since colleges were rewarded financially for how well they 
perform, but the focus was not institutional performance as defined in this dissertation.  
Third, the initial adoption is determined by when the program was first 
authorized and not when the funding began to flow to the state higher education 
institutions.  This is important to point out because diffusion is defined as “the process 
by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time”, it is a 
kind of social change—“the process by which alteration occurs in the structure and 
function of a system” (Rogers 1995, p. 5).  This criterion acknowledges states’ 
acceptance of a policy idea and the success of policy diffusion. 
Due to the variation in state higher education governance and management, 
performance funding was enacted through different paths.  For instance, in 2000 the 
Idaho State Board of Education passed the initiative to allocate five percent of state 
funding to higher education based on campus results on a comprehensive list of 12 
indicators.  The Idaho State Board of Education serves as a single constitutional board 
for all public education, including elementary, secondary and postsecondary levels.  
According to the state Constitution and the statutes appearing in Title 33 et seq. of the 
Idaho Code, the State Board of Education is the designated policy-making body for the 
institutions and agencies under its governance (Idaho State Board of Education 2008).  
Therefore, I consider the state as an adopter and year 2000 as the official year of 
adoption. 
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Among the coordinating boards, some have significant budgetary authority, and 
others have limited budget authority.  For example, the South Carolina Commission on 
Higher Education (SCCHE) serves as the coordinating board for the state’s 33 public 
institutions of higher learning.  According to the South Carolina State Legislature, “the 
budget request for the public higher education system shall be submitted by the 
commission to the Governor and appropriate standing committees of the General 
Assembly in conjunction with the preparation of the annual general appropriations act 
for the applicable year.”  If SCCHE is to make changes to the state higher education 
funding formula, “the new funding formula also must be contained in regulations 
promulgated by the commission and submitted to the General Assembly for its review 
in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act” (South Carolina State 
Legislature 2017).  In 1996 the State Legislature of South Carolina passed Bill 1195, 
Act 359, mandating that all funding for public higher education institutions be based 
solely on performance.  To evaluate public higher education performance, the South 
Carolina General Assembly prescribed 37 indicators including time to degree and 
graduates’ first-time passing rates on professional licensure examinations.  In the case 
of South Carolina, it is clearly an adopter and it first enacted the policy in 1996. 
Differently, in Oklahoma, the coordinating board has the decision-making 
authority on higher education funding allocation.  In the state of Oklahoma, the state 
system is comprised of 25 colleges and universities—including two research 
universities, 10 regional universities, one public liberal arts university and 12 
community colleges—and 11 constituent agencies and two university centers.  The 
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State System is coordinated by the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, and 
each institution is governed by a board of regents.  In Oklahoma, the State Regents 
prescribe academic standards of higher education, determine functions and courses of 
study at state colleges and universities, grant degrees, and approve each public college’s 
and university’s allocations, as well as tuition and fees within the limits set by the 
Oklahoma Legislature (Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education 2017).  
Performance funding for higher education first came in 1997 in the form of a program 
named “Brain Gain”—an initiative to improve higher education performance and 
graduation rates.  The initiative explicitly states that state financial help to higher 
education should be determined by institutional outcomes such as graduation and 
retention rates.  Therefore, I consider Oklahoma as an adopter and year 1997 as the 
official year of adoption.   
As of January 2017, 32 states have a performance funding formula in place; 
historically 41 states have experimented with performance funding.  Because I am 
interested in policy adoption and non-adoption, I include all the states that have enacted 
performance funding regardless of their current higher education funding strategies.  In 
other words, as long as the state has had performance funding at some point, I include it 
in my dataset.  Table 2.2 below reports the initial years of enactment of performance 
funding and a brief description of the decision-making institutions involved in the initial 
adoption. Table 2.3 below reports the initial years of state adoption of performance 
funding. 
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Table 2.3: Concise Summary of States Experimentation with Performance-Based 
Funding (1979-2015) 
Year States Adopting Performance-Based Funding 
1979 Tennessee 
1985 Connecticut 
1991 Missouri 
1994 Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Arkansas 
1995 Ohio 
1996 South Carolina 
1997 Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington 
1998 California 
1999 Kansas, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas 
2000 Idaho, Pennsylvania 
2005 Virginia 
2007 Indiana 
2011 New Mexico, Michigan, Mississippi 
2012 Arizona, Illinois 
2013 Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin 
2014 Iowa, Wyoming 
2015 Vermont 
 
As elaborated in the Table 2.2, although states delegate varying levels of higher 
education legislative authority to either consolidated governing boards or coordinating 
boards, state legislatures are heavily involved in the adoption of performance funding in 
most states.  In most cases, higher education governing boards either work closely with 
the state legislature and/or the governor in developing performance funding measures, 
or follow the lead from the superior officials in designing the performance funding 
formula; adopting performance funding largely reflects the agenda of the governor 
and/or the legislature.  
4. Effectiveness and Impacts of Performance Funding 
Performance funding has been around since 1979.  Most states have 
experimented with this funding strategy, with the hope of enhancing higher education 
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accountability and improving academic performance.  Scholars have exhibited much 
interest in investigating the effectiveness of performance funding both qualitatively and 
quantitatively.  Practically, policymakers and higher education experts have deep 
concerns about performance funding and its intended and unintended consequences.  
Despite the contention that performance-based funding intends to enhance higher 
education institutions’ performance accountability, many studies argue that states which 
adopted performance-based accountability did not see a noticeable increase in 
institutional performance (Burke and Serban 1998; Burke 2002; Shin 2010; Rabovsky 
2013; Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015).  Other studies have examined colleges and 
universities as units of analysis to find that numbers of graduates are not significantly 
related to performance funding policies (Sanford and Hunter, 2011; Shin and Milton, 
2004). 
For instance, in 2009, Shin analyzed graduation rates at 467 institutions that 
participated in performance-based budgeting and performance funding from years 1997 
to 2007.  The results suggest that states that adopted performance funding did not 
experience any significant improvement in student outcome (Shin 2009).  In Tandberg 
and Hillman’s (2014) quasi-experimental research, they observe that performance 
funding has little to no impact on associate or baccalaureate degree completions, on 
average.  In Tandberg and colleagues’ (Tandberg, Hillman, and Barakat 2014) study on 
community college completions over the period of 1990 to 2010, the authors conclude 
that six states that enacted performance funding (Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, South 
Carolina, Texas, Virginia) reported a negative impact on student outcome.  Similarly, 
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Hillman and colleagues (2015) suggest that performance funding has little immediate 
effect on retention rates or associate’s degree productivity in Washington community 
colleges.  
Worse still, in order to meet the performance requirements and earn state 
funding, some community colleges deliberately changed degree requirements to make it 
easier for students to graduate (Dougherty and Hong 2006).  Hillman et al. (2014) 
observe that graduation rates “can easily be gamed and manipulated at the campus 
level” because “a campus could increase its graduation rate by admitting students who 
are most likely to graduate even if this means shrinking the size of the incoming 
freshman class” (p. 835).  Colbeck (2002) found that a Tennessee university sought to 
maximize its performance funding award by limiting enrollment “to preserve better 
student/faculty ratios and to better ensure a quality education for its students” (p. 16).     
To meet certain performance standards, higher education institutions may even 
restrict admissions.  Dougherty et al. (2014) interviewed a senior administrator at a 
public Indiana university who stated that the institution was “less likely to offer 
admission to ‘weaker’ students ‘because if they are weaker . . . there is a chance they 
will bring down your performance numbers’” (p. 27).  If public higher education 
institutions are responding to performance funding by admitting fewer and more 
qualified students, many minority students are at a great disadvantage to be accepted by 
institutions.  This would limit admission rates of groups of students who have shown to 
be less likely to graduate and increase admission rates of students who are more likely 
to graduate, regardless of institutional resources (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005).  
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Although this may make logical sense within the institution and help with the goal to 
obtain more state funding, this could potentially contribute to the problem of higher 
education inequality.  Umbricht et al. (Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2017) closely 
investigated performance funding in Indiana and found that performance funding 
decreased admissions, increased selectivity, and may have further marginalized 
underrepresented minority and low-income applicants.   
Campus actions may include limiting the visibility of undesirable behaviors, and 
shielding themselves against the state’s demands by asserting a lack of information to 
respond, thereby shifting responsibility away from the institution (Dougherty, Natow, 
and Vega, 2012).  A common example is a college claiming that it does not have the 
information needed to know how to improve student completion rates, that more 
resources are needed to create the type of change that state policymakers want, and by 
criticizing the nebulous connection between incentive funding and institutional 
behaviors in ways that blame the state (Li 2014).   
Ironically, extensive research has concluded that performance information is 
seldom used by elected officials for planning or decision-making purposes (Brudney et 
al 2001; Joyce 1999; Moynihan 2008; Newcomer 2007; van Thiel and Leeuw 2002; 
Thurmaier and Willoughby 2001; Willoughby and Melkers 2001).  Performance data in 
the realm of higher education is no exception.  The implementation of the policy has 
turned out to be incomplete because the collected performance information is rarely 
accessed or utilized (Aldeman and Carey 2009; Rabovsky 2013).  According to 
Aldeman and Carey (2009), in performance funding implementation, “performance 
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information is gathered, published, and then it sits there, on a Web site for whoever 
might want to look. In many cases, few people do. Having looked, fewer take action (p. 
6).”   
Conclusion 
Under the nationwide performance management trend, performance-based 
funding has become a popular strategy to hold higher education accountable and 
motivate better institutional outcomes.  Performance funding uses a clear formula to tie 
the allocation of state appropriations to institutional-level student outcome metrics.  
Perceiving this funding strategy as a potentially helpful mechanism to stimulate better 
higher education outcomes, many states adopted the policy.  Although performance 
funding claims to enhance student success, practitioners and scholars have raised 
concerns about its lack of effectiveness and unintended negative policy consequences.  
The following chapter details the theory of policy innovation and diffusion and explains 
the policy decision-making of enacting performance funding. 
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Chapter III. Philanthropic Foundations and Public Policy Diffusion 
Introduction 
The key purpose of this dissertation is to investigate policy diffusion success and 
failure.  In the previous chapter, I provide an overview of performance funding policy, 
and discuss its background and origin.  Performance funding in higher education was 
first introduced in 1979.  The policy was initiated to enhance institutional performance 
and improve higher education accountability.  Many states have experimented with this 
funding idea and as of January 2017, 32 states have a performance funding formula in 
place.  The funding strategy has been popular among many states, but others have not 
yet jumped on the performance funding bandwagon.   
As revealed in the second chapter, in higher education policy-making, states 
delegate varying levels of legislative authority to either consolidated governing boards 
or coordinating boards.  Among all forms of higher education governance systems, 
consolidated boards have the highest level of legislative discretion, and planning 
agencies have no policy-making authority.  Regardless of the governance type, state 
legislatures are heavily involved in the adoption of performance funding in most states.  
In most cases, higher education governing boards either work closely with the state 
legislature and/or the governor in developing performance funding measures, or follow 
the lead from the superior officials in designing the performance funding formula.   
To further examine performance funding policy and explore the causes of policy 
diffusion failure, this chapter reviews the literature on policy innovation and diffusion 
theory.  The theory explains the causes of state policy adoption and the key components 
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in policy diffusion.  Being the fundamental factor in policy diffusion, information is 
usually fluid and unstable, which has direct influence on policy-oriented learning.  In 
public policymaking, legislators are confronted with time constraints and electoral 
considerations, therefore it is critical for policy agents to frame issues in order to attract 
legislative attention.  I focus particularly on policy information supply and demand, and 
how such two-way communication facilitates policy diffusion.  I also discuss how a 
lack of communication can potentially hinder policy diffusion.  At the end of the 
chapter, I propose four expectations about the contributing factors to policy non-
adoption.    
1. Policy Innovation and Diffusion 
States rarely adopt new policies in isolation; state level policy making is a part 
of “a national system of emulation and competition” (Walker 1969, p. 893).  
Competition among states fosters innovation in policy design and implementation.  
States in America have become “laboratories of democracy”, in Justice Louis 
Brandeis’s words.  The policy discretion available to states in the American federal 
system creates an opportunity for states to learn from one another by observing the 
consequences of a policy in another state before adopting the policy themselves 
(Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011).   
1.1. Information Framing in Policy Diffusion 
Because diffusion is “the process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers 
1962, p. 5), information is fundamental in policy diffusion; without information, policy 
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diffusion can hardly occur.  Studies report that policy agents can actively energize the 
diffusion process by communicating policy innovations to state legislators.  A policy 
innovation can be diffused through the activities of policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom 
1997; Mintrom and Norman 2009), regional associations (Balla 2001), and advocacy 
coalitions (Haider-Markel 2001).  With the knowledge of the innovation, state 
lawmakers process the information, evaluate the idea, and make final decisions to either 
adopt or reject the innovation.   
Essentially, policymaking is affected by both time constraints and electoral 
considerations (Karch 2007a).  Elected officials face far more problems than what they 
can possibly address due to limited resources, time, and attention.  In the meantime, 
legislators also pursue reelection (Mayhew 1974).  Therefore, the kind of information 
legislators receive ultimately determines the political agenda and legislative actions.  A 
policy innovation that is presented as electorally friendly and beneficial in improving 
state higher education accountability is perhaps more likely to be adopted than if framed 
otherwise.  
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that policy change is rooted in policy 
image shift.  Policy image refers to the interaction of beliefs and values concerning a 
particular policy (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).  A policy idea can be described in a 
positive or negative light, which determines the image of the policy.  How an issue is 
framed and defined will dictate its place on the agenda and the legislative response.  For 
example, in 2004, the Kansas legislature passed House Bill 2008, a bill that grants 
undocumented students in-state college tuition status.  Normally, such bills would not 
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likely achieve majority support in a conservative state like Kansas, yet, due to the 
framing of this problem as a public education concern instead of an immigration matter, 
the bill successfully survived (Reich and Mendoza 2008).  Given that policy images to a 
large extent determine the outcome of legislative action, policymakers and political 
actors attempt to manipulate them (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).   
Policy issues do not frame themselves.  Policy entrepreneurs who take 
advantage of the initial policy framing and issue definition may have a better chance to 
achieve their goals later on.  Policy entrepreneurs are individuals who seek to initiate 
dynamic policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1984).  This goal is 
usually achieved through activities that help promote policy ideas such as identifying 
problems, networking in policy circles, shaping the terms of policy debates, and 
building coalitions.  The presence of policy entrepreneurs and their actions can 
considerably raise the probability of legislative consideration and approval of policy 
innovations.  Studies reveal that policy entrepreneurs spend a good amount of time 
networking in and around government to learn the “world views” of members of the 
policymaking community (Mintrom 1997).  This type of networking not only helps 
policy entrepreneurs build their credibility, but also allows them to determine what 
arguments will persuade politicians to support their policy ideas (Mintrom 1997).   
The importance of policy entrepreneurs in policy diffusion is reflected in two 
aspects: setting the agenda and framing the issue.  Political scientists have concluded 
that policy entrepreneurs set the policy agenda by making lawmakers aware of certain 
policy ideas that are novel to them and bringing these policy innovations to 
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governments’ attention (Mintrom 1997; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Mintrom and 
Norman 2009).  Within and surrounding public policy issues, information is always 
value laden and intertwined with the ideologies and interests of its producers and 
consumers (Hale 2011).  Because of their strong intention to create policy change, 
policy entrepreneurs will not simply make a policy report to legislators; rather, they 
help translate the idea into legislation (Roberts and King 1991), which creates much 
leeway for them to frame the issue to their benefit.   
This assumption is applicable to performance-based funding policy because the 
program can fit into multiple issue areas.  First, the policy specifies a formula that 
dictates a state government’s funding amount to higher education institutions.  For 
example, in Oklahoma, the performance factors are: overall first-year retention, first-
year retention for Pell recipients, 24 credits in first academic year, cohort graduation 
rates anywhere in the system, degrees granted, and program accreditation (see NCSL 
2017).  The amount of public funding Oklahoma universities will receive is dependent 
on the institutional performance in these required areas.  Hence, the policy can be 
interpreted as a budgeting program.  Second, performance funding policy also fits 
neatly in the realm of accountability.  Connecting funding with performance is one 
typical approach of ensuring external accountability and regulating internal 
management.  Third, the policy directly aims at increasing university academic 
performance, which is also a matter of postsecondary education.  Due to the multi-
dimensional feature of this policy, it is possible that policy entrepreneurs have 
manipulated the presentation of the issue.  
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As argued above, legislation is limited by two constraints: time and electoral 
consideration.  Hence, how the information is delivered and framed can shift 
lawmakers’ reactions.  Elected officials are more prone to respond to issues that can 
boost their reelection chances.  If a policy is framed in a way that favors the electoral 
effort once enacted, legislators will be more willing to adopt it.  For example, although 
case studies have found that performance funding policy does not induce the desired 
results in many states (Burke and Serban 1998; Burke 2002; Sanford and Hunter 2011) 
or restructure financial incentives in higher education (Rabovsky 2013), if a state 
government’s attention is directed to the symbolic meaning of the policy, then 
performance funding can be a good idea.  After all, performance accountability speaks 
for governments’ “rational, efficient, and results-oriented manner” (Moynihan 2008. p. 
68), which is electorally friendly.  
An outstanding piece of evidence of issue framing is the fact that the adopting 
states have very uneven features in various aspects.  Among the 32 states that currently 
have performance funding policy in place, some states had high educational attainment 
rates prior to adopting the policy (e.g., Massachusetts, Virginia); while some were 
behind in higher education (e.g., Mississippi, Arkansas).  These states also fall in both 
ends of the political ideology spectrums (conservative states like Mississippi and 
Oklahoma versus liberal states like Massachusetts and Washington) and have varying 
financial capacity (wealthy states like Virginia and Massachusetts versus less wealthy 
states like New Mexico and Utah).  The wide range of distinguishable features among 
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adopting states implies that policy agents may have framed the policy information in 
particular ways that seems acceptable to officials from various states. 
Information involved in policy diffusion can be categorized into two types: 
information about policy and information about political consequences (Mooney 2001; 
Gilardi 2010; Seljan and Weller 2011).  The former mainly refers to the quality of a 
policy accrues over time after it is implemented, and the latter concerns the political 
value of a policy.  As indicated in the previous chapter, performance funding has 
drawbacks in its implementation.  Despite the contention that performance-based 
funding intends to enhance higher education institutions’ performance accountability, 
many studies argue that states which adopted performance-based accountability did not 
see a noticeable increase in institutional performance (Burke and Serban 1998; Burke 
2002; Shin 2010; Rabovsky 2013; Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015).  Other studies 
have examined colleges and universities as units of analysis to find that numbers of 
graduates are not significantly related to performance funding policies (Sanford and 
Hunter, 2011; Shin and Milton, 2004). 
If the policy fails to have a successful track record in its implementation, policy 
entrepreneurs are more likely to emphasize its political viability than its effectiveness.  
Information about a policy’s popularity and positive political consequence is important 
for both elected officials and policy entrepreneurs proposing the policy.  For politicians, 
a policy’s popularity may affect reelection chances; for policy entrepreneurs, the 
policy’s popularity is a requisite for getting the policy adopted (Seljan and Weller 
2011).  Uncertainty regarding popular support for a policy can lead state officials and 
 56 
 
policy entrepreneurs to look to other states for information.  One potential source of 
information about the prospects for an initiative is the result of similar initiatives in 
similar states (Boehmke 2005).  “If the characteristics of voters in other states are 
similar, then whether those states already have the policy might provide some clues as 
to how voters in the group’s state might respond to the initiative” (Boehmke 2005, 
p.39). 
In his case studies on state enactment of performance management programs, 
Moynihan (2008) notices that to elected officials, the symbolic benefits of performance 
management overweigh the instrumental benefits.  Graham et al. (2013) confirms that 
“policymakers may be concerned with learning about the policy’s political viability and 
public attractiveness, about implications for reelection and reappointment, or about 
whether a glitzy modification of the policy could serve as a vehicle in the pursuit of 
higher office” (p. 691).  In the case of performance funding, Rabovsky (2013) found 
that the enactment of performance funding is usually politically and ideologically 
driven.  This adds extra evidence of information framing in the diffusion of 
performance funding. 
Being the prerequisite of policy diffusion, information is usually unstable.  
Changes in information regarding a policy innovation influences policy-oriented 
learning (Mooney 2001), which shapes adoption decisions.  For example, lawmakers 
may change their minds about a previously preferred program after hearing negative 
comments on it.  Mooney (2001) further provides evidence that policy-oriented learning 
can either enhance or diminish the chances of diffusion when the information changes 
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(also see Rogers 1995; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).  Therefore, the adoption or non-
adoption decision is the product of the constantly updated learning effect.  
In addition, lack of information about a policy innovation is also a possible 
explanation for policy non-adoption (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Ingle, Cohen-Vogel, 
and Hughes 2007).  In Ingle et al.’s (2007) research on the diffusion of postsecondary 
merit aid programs, they found that adopters did possess elements that favor diffusion 
such as positive economic climates, little lobbying against the policy, favorable political 
conditions, regional policy network affiliations, and so forth.  In contrast, they conclude 
that the “hold-outs” (non-adopters) barely showed signs of a policy-adoption friendly 
environment, either internally or externally.  Most hold-outs had few formal policy 
networks, poor fiscal health, and unfavorable socioeconomic and political conditions 
(Ingle, Cohen-Vogel, and Hughes 2007).  Also, in their interviews with state 
policymakers, some legislators did not even speak of visits from policy entrepreneurs or 
involvement with regional associations. 
1.2. Legislative Attention in Policy Diffusion 
Generally speaking, policymakers are bombarded with information because 
information is usually readily available.  Interest groups, conferences, various 
administration reports, academic studies, think tanks, policy analysts, and various non-
governmental organizations supply abundant information to policymakers 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  Therefore, information 
oversupply rather than undersupply seems to be the reality, and the general oversupply 
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of information in politics leads to information prioritization, which requires decision 
makers to focus their attention on a small set of issues (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). 
Centrally, policymaking is affected by both time constraints and electoral 
considerations (Karch 2007a).  In this sense, policymakers are constantly under the 
pressure of making important policy decisions in a short time frame.  In the meantime, 
they consider reelection in their legislative decision making.  Legislators attempt to 
leave constituents with the positive impression that they actively represent the people’s 
interest by enacting policies that solve societal problems.  However, there are far more 
problems and concerns than legislators could possibly address given the limited 
resources (Etzioni 1967).  Limited legislative resources and time constraints force 
decision makers to filter received information through their attentiveness in a biased 
manner because it is humanly impossible to distribute attention to every single piece of 
information on complex legislative issues.  Therefore, attention is another significant 
variable in policymaking (Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 
2014).  
Issues compete for precious legislative attention to be adopted on the 
government agenda, which will potentially lead to possible policy change.  For 
example, in Nelson’s (1986) research on child abuse, she concludes that achieving state 
level and congressional attention contributed to the adoption of reporting laws among 
all 50 states in a short period of time.  In Breunig’s 2011 study on budgeting matters, he 
confirms that attention shift and institutional arrangements led to the punctuations in 
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public budgets.  The arrangement of attention affects policymakers’ responses and 
reactions to policy demands (May, Workman, and Jones 2008).  
Attention, however, is not randomly distributed to various issues.  Instead, 
attentiveness and attention is changeable based on the information received (Jones 
1994).  Workman and associates (Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009) summarize two 
fundamental elements of information processes at the system level: the prioritization of 
information and the supply of information.  On the demand side, legislators face time 
constraints; therefore, their attention is directed to issues with significance and salience.  
Given its limited space, attention to new concerns can crowd out other issues and lead 
to legislative response to the new concerns, which explains policy change.  On the 
supply side, numerous policy coalitions, interest groups, lobbyists, policy entrepreneurs, 
and other sources try to frame and manipulate information to their benefit for legislative 
consideration.  Given the limited attention and oversupply of information, decision-
makers sift through all the messages they receive and prioritize what they consider as 
important matters (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  
The multidimensional feature of political issues consequentially leads to 
competing interpretations and prioritizations.  This multidimensionality allows policy 
entrepreneurs to put forward different dimensions of a given issue to manipulate 
legislative attention and influence policy change (Workman, Jones, and Jochim 2009).  
In order to increase decision-makers’ attentiveness to a problem, policy entrepreneurs 
often inject values into their description of the issue.  Therefore, information and 
attention are closely connected. 
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2. Private Foundations and the Diffusion of Performance Funding Policy 
State government decisions to adopt policy innovations can be influenced by the 
information gained by state officials through interactions with other states, 
organizations of government officials, policy networks, and non-governmental 
organizations (Hale 2011; Mintrom and Vergari 1998).  Information connections 
between governmental and non-governmental actors are a principal aspect of state level 
policy making, as non-governmental organizations have become an important source of 
policy information (Hale 2011).  As argued earlier, the presence and the presentation of 
information are critical in facilitating policy diffusion.  Information is rarely neutral; if 
policy advocates distort information, or highlight the aspects of a complex situation that 
benefit them, they are more likely to succeed in getting favorable policies from 
government (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).  In order to deliver the crafted message to 
state elected officials, the information source has to have access to the key decision 
makers and the capability to provide the attention-catching information.  
2.1. Private Foundations in Public Policymaking 
In the diffusion process, policy agents play a critical role in communicating 
policy innovations among state governments.  In addition to the previously identified 
policy agents—policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom 1997; Mintrom and Norman 2009), 
regional associations (Balla 2001), and advocacy coalitions (Haider-Markel 2001)—
private foundations can also attract busy legislators’ attention by taking advantage of 
their money power and privately funded research.  Private foundations—or 
philanthropic foundations—are defined as nongovernmental and nonprofit 
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organizations with funds (usually from a single source, either an individual, a family, or 
a corporation) and programs managed by their own trustees or directors, established to 
maintain or aid social, educational, charitable, religious, or other activities serving the 
common welfare, primarily through the making of grants (Foundation Center 2006).   
Scholars describe philanthropic foundations as “private institutions which 
dispose of private funds for a public purpose” (Douglas and Wildavsky 1978), “private 
powers for the public good” (Lagemann 1983), and “public bodies privately organized” 
(Ylvisaker 1987).  Fundamentally, foundations are non-governmental and not-for-profit 
philanthropic bodies run by small groups of trustees and officials (Bulmer 1995).  Most 
of the larger and well-known foundations in the U.S. have usually been set up by one 
individual or the members of a family; these foundations have the ability to disperse 
large or small sums of money to individuals and to organizations such as educational 
institutions, libraries, museums, and so on to carry out a wide variety of activities or 
programs enjoying the favor of the donors or their successors (Kiger 2000).  
Private foundations are classified as tax-exempt, 501(c)(3) organizations by the 
IRS (Foundation Source 2017).  There are two types of charitable nonprofit entities that 
are exempt under Section 501(c)(3): public charities and private foundations.  Unlike 
private foundations, public charities are organizations that receive support from a 
relatively large number of donors (i.e., the public) or from government (IRS 2018).  
Public charities are granted some degree of lobbying.  The definition of lobbying refers 
to the attempt to influence legislation including action by Congress, any state 
legislature, any local council, or similar governing body (IRS 2018).   
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Private foundations are limited by law in the ways they can and cannot seek to 
influence public policy.  Private foundations are prohibited from participating or 
intervening in partisan political campaigns and from expressing views on specific 
legislation to legislators or issuing a “call to action” in communications about 
legislation with the general public (Independent Sector 2016).  If foundations spend 
funds on lobbying, they may lose their tax exemption (IRS 2018).  The Internal 
Revenue Code, however, excepts the following activities from the definition of 
prohibited private foundation lobbying: (1) nonpartisan analysis, study, and research; 
(2) technical advice or assistance; (3) decisions affecting the powers, duties, etc., of a 
private foundation; and (4) examinations and discussions of broad social, economic, and 
similar problems (IRS 2018). 
Despite of the lobbying restriction, private foundations may participate in many 
forms of advocacy activities and may fund advocacy (Bolder Advocacy 2018).  
Lobbying is only one type of advocacy and there are many permissible advocacy 
avenues for private foundations.  Bolder Advocacy (2018)—an initiative of the Alliance 
for Justice, which is a national association of more than 120 organizations that are 
united by a commitment to a fair, just, and free America, identifies a list of activities 
private foundations can legally engage in:  
• Influence the adoption of agency regulations that interpret existing laws 
• Build relationships with legislators or help grantees build and sustain these 
relationships 
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• Convene nonprofits and decision-makers to discuss a broad topic (e.g., how to 
balance the economy, development, and the preservation of endangered species) 
• Educate legislators about a broad range of issues, without referencing a specific 
legislative proposal 
• Meet with legislators to discuss the scope and impact of the foundation’s work 
• Conduct public education campaigns that do not include calls to action or 
mention specific legislation 
• Offer technical assistance to legislators in response to a written request for oral 
or written testimony from a legislative body 
• Produce a comprehensive, accurate study or analysis of an issue (often referred 
to as a “nonpartisan analysis study or research report”) that is widely distributed 
and provides enough information about the issue to allow the reader to draw 
their own conclusions, even if the report contains specific legislative 
conclusions 
Although private foundations’ lobbying freedom is legally restricted, they are 
uniquely flexible in identifying and analyzing social problems in America and in 
formulating solutions through the utilization of research-based knowledge (Backer, 
David, and Saucy 1995).    Foundation-funded research activities have led to greater 
interest today in strategies for the diffusion of innovations (Backer, David, and Saucy 
1995).  Private foundations have been consistently offering financial support for think 
tanks such as the Social Science Research Council and the Brookings Institution to 
conduct research that provides the intellectual underpinning for public policy decisions 
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(Magat 1995).  In the health policy domain, for example, a few major philanthropic 
foundations have contributed to the public health policy development during the 1980s 
and 1990s.  The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation was among the earliest institutions 
that made financial commitments for further medical research on AIDS and invested 
nearly five million dollars in 1986.  The foundation sponsored research was quoted at 
the congressional hearings in the same year (Knott and Weissert 1995). 
Among all policy issues, education has long been one of the central policy 
venues in which private foundations have taken root.  In 2004, frustrated with partisan 
gridlock that prevented the state’s public education reform, six independent non-
partisan foundations in Oregon came together and founded the Chalkboard Project that 
conducted polling and telephone interviews, held more than 400 neighborhood 
meetings, and met with community leaders in an effort to expand the conversation about 
public education beyond the traditional players.  These foundations then convened 
consultants, education experts, and representatives from teacher unions and school 
administrators to construct a set of policy proposals, which then were presented to the 
state legislature (Abramson, Soskis, and Toepler 2012).  The project is still in existence 
and working to better Oregon’s K-12 public schools.   
At the national level, a few large foundations—the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and Ford Foundation— 
traditionally have funded a wide array of educational enterprises and invested in a series 
of campaign of public education reform.  These foundations possess massive 
endowments, are firmly committed to the use of strict metrics, and are willing to spend 
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huge sums to transform U.S. education policy, often embracing market-based 
approaches such as competition, choice, deregulation, and incentives (Abramson, 
Soskis, and Toepler 2012).   
2.2. Private Foundations and Performance Funding 
Private foundations in the U.S. vigorously participate in policy networking and 
information sharing (Gugerty and Prakash 2010).  Private foundations can and do play a 
significant policy role at both the national and state levels.  It has been documented that 
in the realm of education legislation, private foundations are invested actors.  
Foundations have been extensively involved in public education, including colleges and 
universities.  In her book Foundations and Public Policy, Joan Roelofs (2003) argues 
that “it is hardly an exaggeration to say that foundations have been the source of almost 
all innovations in education, using their normal methods of influence: ideology, grants, 
litigation, policy networks and think tanks, and the revolving door (p.70).”  Some of the 
largest foundations, such as Carnegie, Ford, Mellon, and Rockefeller, traditionally have 
funded a wide array of educational enterprises, both in elementary and secondary 
schools as well as in higher education (Dobbs 1989).  According to Inside Philanthropy 
(2017)—a news website about large philanthropic foundations and wealthy donors—
higher education grants comprise the most significant portion of education philanthropy 
in the United States. There exists a variety of supported issues, which include capital 
campaigns, bolstering educational programming, access and retention, college financial 
planning projects and financial aid.   
 66 
 
Studies have shown that wealthy private foundations have a major influence on 
higher education legislation (Parry, Field, and Supiano 2013; Mangan 2015).  In the 
case of performance funding, several private foundations have exhibited much interest 
in pushing for state adoption of performance funding measures.  The traditional 
“enrollment-oriented” financing model has come under increased scrutiny in recent 
years from state governors and legislators as well as from certain philanthropic 
organizations (Tandberg and Hillment 2013).  When the program was initially 
introduced, the Tennessee Higher Education Commission received funding from the 
federal Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education, the Ford and Kellogg 
Foundations, and an anonymous foundation in Tennessee to finance the pilot of the 
performance funding program (Dougherty, Natow, Bork, Jones, and Vega 2011).   
For another example, California has made two attempts to develop performance 
funding.  The first one was through the Partnership for Excellence (1998-2004), a 
funding structure for community colleges that carried an option of creating performance 
funding that was not exercised.  The second was SB 1134, a bill introduced in 2010 to 
establish performance funding for community colleges on the basis of course 
completions (Dougherty et al. 2011).  SB 1143 was partially stimulated by the support 
of the Hewlett Foundation, and supported by a few state organizations including the Los 
Angeles Chamber of Commerce, The Campaign for College Opportunity, and Long 
Beach City College (Dougherty et al. 2011). 
Scholars observe that private foundations at both the national (e.g., the Lumina 
Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) and the state level (e.g., the Texas 
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Public Policy Foundation) have been aggressively promoting performance funding by 
encouraging governors and state legislators to commit to this type of measure 
(Dougherty and Natow 2015; Fryar 2011).  For example, both the Lumina and Gates 
Foundations have vocally expressed their endorsement for performance funding and 
reached out to state officials to promote this policy idea.   
In 2009, the Lumina Foundation’s Making Opportunity Affordable (later 
renamed as College Productivity) initiative provided financial support for performance 
funding reform in Tennessee because the state had demonstrated its commitment to tie 
public funding to increasing the overall number of college graduates (Dougherty, 
Natow, Hare, Jones, and Vega 2011).  The initiative sought to improve college 
completion rates in various states through grant funding and the encouragement of 
policies that promote higher education completion (Dougherty, Natow, Hare, Jones, and 
Vega 2011).  In the same year, the Lumina Foundation funded the Indiana Chamber of 
Commerce and the Indiana Commission for Higher Education to widen support for 
performance funding programs (Indiana Chamber of Commerce 2009; Indiana 
Commission for Higher Education 2009).  In addition to their provision of financial 
support, the Lumina Foundation also serves a major information source to their targeted 
officials.  For example, in October 2013, Jamie Merisotis—the President and CEO of 
the Lumina Foundation—spoke at the Association of Community College Trustees 
Leadership Congress in Seattle, Washington about supporting performance funding 
strategies (Lumina Foundation 2014).  In March 2014, the Lumina Foundation 
sponsored the SXSWedu Conference in Austin, Texas.  The conference brought 
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together higher education professionals, business leaders, entrepreneurs, policymakers, 
and legislators to create change in education.  According to the Foundation news, 
Lumina Strategy Associate Sean Tierney joined a panel on performance funding 
formulas at the conference (Lumina Foundation 2014).   
In addition to the Lumina Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
has also actively reached out to state legislators with attempts to remake the higher 
education system (Parry, Field, and Supiano 2013).  Founded in 2000, the Gates 
Foundation is the largest private foundation worldwide.  One of the foundation’s 
Postsecondary Success strategies is to provide “powerful incentives that move 
campuses and systems to adopt and integrate solutions for student success and/or 
remove barriers to those efforts.  These include the use of data to highlight success gaps 
and measure the effectiveness of solutions, as well as financing mechanisms such as 
outcome-based funding and financial aid for students.  They also include policy 
advocacy at the federal and state levels (Focus states for the Postsecondary Success 
strategy include: California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington.)” (Gates Foundation-Postsecondary Success 
2017). 
On higher education issues, the Gates Foundation is a strong supporter of 
performance funding.  The Gates Foundation publicly urges states to finance higher 
education institutions based on student performance metrics such as access, graduation, 
and employment outcomes (Fain 2015; Gates Foundation 2015).  The foundation has 
set an ambitious goal “to ensure that all low-income young adults have affordable 
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access to a quality postsecondary education that is tailored to their individual needs and 
educational goals and leads to timely completion of a degree or certificate with labor-
market value” (Gates Foundation 2017).  To further advance the argument and advertise 
performance funding, the Gates Foundation has kept its reform goals on the national 
agenda by supporting news organizations that cover higher education (Long 2013). 
The Gates Foundation has encouraged state lawmakers to allocate spending 
more efficiency by rewarding institutions that graduate more students (Humphreys 
2012).  In 2009, the Gates Foundation helped start Complete College America (CCA), a 
nonprofit advocacy organization, with an $8 million grant and an introduction to other 
philanthropies to help the group raise more money.  CCA began to lobby state 
governments to adopt a series of higher education reforms.  CCA dedicated their effort 
to “increasing the nation’s college completion rate through state policy” (Complete 
College America 2011).  CCA has worked to recruit states into their alliance, by 
encouraging governors and state legislators to commit to change the way higher 
education is governed by moving higher education policy to a more performance-based 
culture (Fryar 2011).  As of November 2010, 24 states have joined in the effort to 
incorporate core principles from the CCA agenda, which includes a strong push towards 
performance funding, into their public systems of higher education (CCA 2010).  As of 
May of 2011, 29 states were on board with this idea; the number increased to 35 in 
2017.  CCA’s agenda calls for streamlining or eliminating remedial classes, providing 
more academic support in credit-bearing courses, and providing colleges with financial 
incentives to graduate more students.  The Gates Foundation has since awarded an 
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additional $1.2 million to the organization, and the foundation’s support makes up about 
60 percent of CCA’s annual budget.  CCA has also received $1.7 million from the 
Lumina Foundation for the cause of promoting performance funding in higher 
education.  In 2010, the Gates Foundation invested $34.8 million over five years to help 
dramatically increase the graduation rates of community college students.  The Gates 
Foundation’s Completion by Design program will award competitive grants to groups 
of community colleges to devise and implement new approaches to make the college 
experience more responsive to today’s student (Gates Foundation 2010).   
2.3. The Lumina Foundation and Performance Funding 
This section details the Lumina Foundation’s role in performance funding 
because it solely focuses on education issues, particularly higher education success; 
whereas the Gates Foundation’s primary concern is to globally enhance healthcare and 
reduce extreme poverty, with education being a means to such ends. 
The Lumina Foundation is an independent, private foundation committed to 
sponsor an outcome-based approach that focuses on helping design and build an 
equitable, accessible, responsive, and accountable higher education system while 
fostering a national sense of urgency for action to achieve Goal 2025 (Lumina 
Foundation 2017).  The Lumina Foundation for Education was created in 1997 as the 
USA Group Foundation, the research and philanthropic division of the USA Group, 
which was the nation’s largest student loan guarantor and administrator at the time.  On 
July 31, 2000, the USA Group sold most of its operating assets to Sallie Mae, another 
education loan provider.  The proceeds of the sale were transferred to the USA Group 
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Foundation.  In early 2001, the Foundation adopted a new name—the Lumina 
Foundation for Education.   
The Lumina Foundation’s goal is to increase the proportion of Americans with 
high-quality postsecondary degrees and credentials to 60% by the year 2025, which the 
foundation terms “Goal 2025”.   The Lumina Foundation has publicly expressed its 
endorsement for performance funding by arguing that higher education institutions 
should be funded based on performance factors such as whether students finish courses 
and hit certain milestones leading to a degree or postsecondary credential; and whether 
degrees or certificates are ultimately earned (Lumina Foundation 2009).  McLendon and 
Hearn (2013) observe that “the Lumina Foundation funded quality-improvement efforts 
in eleven states, each featuring substantial commitment to what is being termed 
‘Performance Funding 2.0,’ a systematic effort to tie state funding explicitly and 
significantly to quality improvements on various dimensions of campus performance” 
(para. 13). 
Table 3.1 below reports activities concerning performance funding the 
foundation has taken part in from 2002 through 201468. 
3. General Expectations 
Legislators possess finite time and resources; in the meantime they are 
confronted with infinite problems and frustrations, therefore legislators are motivated to 
spend their legislative effort as efficiently as possible.  In this information rich 
                                                          
68 The report ends in 2014 to match the time range of my quantitative data.  This is explained further in 
Chapter 4. 
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environment, various political actors tend to deliver crafted information to grab 
legislative attention.  Lobbyists, think tanks, policy advocates, and interest groups 
enthusiastically compete for legislative attention by delivering framed messages to key 
decision makers.  Reelection-seeking legislators respond differently to a wide array of 
signals.  Moynihan (2008) suggests that performance management programs are 
electorally friendly in their internal value—to improve service efficiency and enhance 
overall performance outcomes.  Such benefits are also present in performance funding 
policy, given that states enact performance funding mainly for political and ideological 
reasons (Rabovsky 2013).  
The two best known private foundations, the Gates and Lumina Foundations, 
have loudly spoken of their endorsement of performance funding on various occasions.  
They attend conferences, distribute information on performance funding approaches, 
and broadcast the policy ideas to state governments.  The two Foundations spend great 
deals of time networking around government officials and maneuvering their way into 
the legislative process.  This above discussion leads me to four general expectations.  
First, changing information that causes negative policy image shift contributes to non-
adoption of performance funding policy.  Second, lack of interactions with private 
foundations that support performance funding in higher education contributes to the 
non-adoption of the program.  Three, lack of participation in policy networks 
contributes to the non-adoption of performance funding.  Lastly, lack of interactions 
with other policy agents contributes to the non-adoption of performance funding in 
higher education.  The next chapter presents quantitative results of how previously 
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identified diffusion variables contribute to states’ adoption of performance funding.  
Based on the quantitative findings, I identify two states (Alabama and Mississippi) that 
share similar scores on the significant variables but made opposite decisions on 
performance funding for hypotheses testing.
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Chapter IV. Quantitative Findings 
Introduction 
This dissertation investigates the diffusion and non-diffusion of performance 
funding in higher education.  In the previous chapter, I propose four general 
expectations that explain performance funding non-adoption: changing information that 
causes negative policy image shift, lack of interactions with private foundations that 
support performance funding, lack of participation in policy networks, and lack of 
interactions with other policy agents.  This chapter details the descriptive information 
regarding the enactment of performance funding policy from 1979 through and 
including 201469.  In this chapter, I conduct a quantitative analysis of diffusion variables 
in leading to states’ adoption of performance funding.  The Event History Analysis 
(EHA) models are reviewed to analyze how the previously identified determinants 
perform in the case of performance funding diffusion.     
1. Event History Analysis (EHA) 
Performance funding was first officially adopted by Tennessee in 1979; to this 
day (May 2018) 41 states have experimented with this program.  As of January 2017, 
32 states have performance funding formulas in place and five states are transitioning to 
performance funding.  Because state policy adoption occurs over both space and time, 
EHA is the appropriate method to study such occurrences.  EHA allows the user to trace 
the dynamics of policy adoption and incorporate both internal and external factors that 
                                                          
69 The final year of observation is 2014 due to the data availability for some of the variables.  This is 
discussed in further detail later in this chapter. 
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may have led to the adoption decision.  EHA estimates the hazard rate of a state’s 
adoption of a policy innovation in a certain year.  The hazard rate is defined as the 
probability that an individual will experience an event during a particular time period, 
given that the individual is ‘at risk’ of experiencing the event at that time (Allison 1984; 
Berry 1994).  Applied to the diffusion and innovation of performance-based funding 
policy, the hazard rate reveals the probability that a state will adopt such a policy.  
In an EHA dataset, each state in each year is a case.  After the event occurs—
meaning a state adopts performance funding—no more years are observed for that state, 
therefore the adopter drops out of the dataset.  States included in the dataset for a 
particular year make up the risk set for that year, that is, those states that could adopt the 
policy that year.  The size of the risk set varies by year depending on the number of 
states that have previously adopted the policy.  This discrete-time analysis assumes that 
the policy events of interest are non-repeatable.  The risk set, therefore, potentially 
shrinks in size with each passing year, while the hazard rate fluctuates annually with the 
number of states (out of the total remaining in the at-risk set) actually experiencing 
events.  
2. Research Design and Data Collection 
2.1. Comparison with McLendon et al.’s 2006 Study 
As briefly discussed in the introduction chapter, McLendon et al. (2006) 
conducted a similar study on determinants of state adoption of performance 
accountability policies from 1979 through 2002.  In their research, they hypothesized 10 
independent variables that may have potentially led to states’ enactment of three 
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performance accountability programs including performance funding, performance 
budgeting, and performance reporting.  Their independent variables are—states’ 
educational attainment, change in gross state product, legislative professionalism, 
percentage of Republicans in the legislature, gubernatorial power, Republican 
gubernatorial control, change in tuition at state flagship universities, change in public 
higher education enrollment, the presence of consolidated governing boards, and the 
percent of bordering states with similar policies.  After evaluating their EHA findings, 
the authors conclude that Republican legislative strength (measured by an annual time-
dependent variable that indicates the proportion of major party legislators across both 
chambers of a state’s legislature that are Republican) and whether the state has a 
consolidated governing board are significant predictors of states’ likelihood to adopt 
performance funding policy.  More specifically, higher percentages of Republican 
legislators in a state and the absence of a consolidated governing board increased the 
probability of a state adopting such a policy in a given year. 
My study loosely replicates McLendon et al.’s model but is more robust in three 
ways.  First, McLendon et al.’s study was conducted over 10 years ago and the authors 
studied performance funding adoption from 1979 to 2002.  In my research, I have 
included additional 12 years’ worth of data (1979-2014).  Second, McLendon et al. 
didn’t define the criteria for performance funding policy adoption.  As I elaborate in the 
second chapter, I look into the adoption of performance funding for every state and 
define the adoption of performance funding using three criteria.  Third, McLendon et al. 
include three variables for measuring government ideology (percent Republican 
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legislature, gubernatorial power, and Republican governor).  I consolidate government 
ideology into one variable using Berry et al.’s (2012) measure.  These differences are 
discussed in detail below. 
2.2. Dependent Variable 
In this dissertation, I employ a particular type of EHA, a discrete-time logit 
model because policy initial adoption is a discrete, non-repeatable event.  The 
dependent variable is the adoption decision of performance funding policy, coded as 
0 representing non-adoption or 1 representing adoption.  The year of the decision is 
recorded as the initial year of adoption.  This study uses Walker’s (1969) original 
definition of policy innovation: “a program or policy which is new to the states adopting 
it, no matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have adopted 
it” (p. 881).  Using the definition and criteria I explain in Chapter 2, any type of higher 
education performance funding policy enactment is regarded as an innovation.  My 
dataset begins with the first year a state adopted performance funding in higher 
education, which is 1979.  My dataset ends in 2014 due to the availability of data.  The 
investigation in this dissertation excludes Alaska and Hawaii due to their non-contiguity 
to the mainland states and the potential bias on the horizontal diffusion hypothesis.   
 As defined in detail in the second chapter, state adoption of performance 
funding in higher education has to meet three criteria (Dougherty and Natow 2015).  
First, adoption of performance funding can occur not just in the form of state statute but 
also in the form of other governmental authoritative decisions.  Second, the program 
must specify a focus on institutional outcomes.  Programs that do not specify 
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connecting funding directly to institutional performance are excluded in this research.  
Third, the initial adoption is determined by when the program was first authorized and 
not when the funding began to flow to the state higher education institutions.  As of 
January 2017, 32 states have a performance funding formula in place; historically 41 
states have experimented with performance funding.  Because this study focuses on 
policy adoption and non-adoption, I include all of the lower 48 states regardless of their 
current higher education funding strategies.  Table 4.1 below reports the initial years of 
enactment of performance funding and the current status of the policy in each state. 
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Table 4.1: State Adoption of Performance-Based Funding in Higher Education (1979-
2014) (Sources: Burke & Minassians 2000, 2002, 2003; Dougherty and Reddy 2013; 
Dougherty and Natow 2015; Dougherty, Natow, Hare, Jones, & Vega, 2013; Friedel et 
al. 2013; Gorbunov, 2013; Rabovsky 2013; McLendon et al., 2006; National Conference 
of State Legislatures 2016, 2017; official state government websites; official state higher 
education board websites) 
State Year of 
Initial 
Adoption 
Current Status 
Still 
Effective 
(January 
2017) 
In Place at 
Two-Year 
Institutions 
In Place at 
Four-Year 
Institutions 
In Place at 
Both Two-Year 
and Four-Year 
Institutions 
Alabama Non-
adoption 
No    
Arizona 2012 Yes  X  
Arkansas 1994  Yes   X 
California 1998  No X   
Colorado 1994 Yes   X 
Connecticut 1985 Yes   X 
Delaware Non-
adoption 
No    
Florida 1994 Yes   X 
Georgia 2013 Yes   X 
Idaho 2000 No  X  
Illinois 2012 Yes   X 
Indiana 2007 Yes   X 
Iowa 2014 Yes  X  
Kansas  1999 Yes   X 
Kentucky 1994 No   X 
Louisiana 1997 Yes   X 
Maine 2013 Yes  X  
Maryland Non-
adoption 
No    
Massachusetts 2013 Yes   X 
Michigan 2011 Yes   X 
Minnesota 1994 Yes   X 
Mississippi 2011 Yes  X  
Missouri 1991 Yes   X 
Montana 2013 Yes   X 
Nebraska Non-
adoption 
No    
Nevada 2013 Yes   X 
New 
Hampshire 
Non-
adoption 
No    
New Jersey 1999 No   X 
New Mexico 2011 Yes   X 
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Table 4.1 (Continued): State Adoption of Performance-Based Funding in Higher 
Education (1979-2014) 
State Year of 
Initial 
Adoption 
Current Status 
Still 
Effective 
(January 
2017) 
In Place at 
Two-Year 
Institutions 
In Place at 
Four-Year 
Institutions 
In Place at Both 
Two-Year and 
Four-Year 
Institutions 
New York 1999 Yes X   
North 
Carolina 
1999 Yes   X 
North 
Dakota 
2013 Yes   X 
Ohio 1995 Yes   X 
Oklahoma 1997 Yes   X 
Oregon 1999 Yes  X  
Pennsylvania 2000 Yes  X  
Rhode 
Island 
Non-
adoption 
No    
South 
Carolina 
1996 No    
South 
Dakota 
1997 Yes   X 
Tennessee 1979 Yes   X 
Texas 1999 Yes X   
Utah 2013 Yes   X 
Vermont 2015 Yes   X 
Virginia 2005 Yes   X 
Washington 1997  Yes X   
West 
Virginia 
Non-
adoption 
No    
Wisconsin 2013 Yes X   
Wyoming 2014 Yes X   
Note1: Alaska and Hawaii are excluded. 
Note2: Seven states (Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
and West Virginia) have never adopted performance-based funding. 
Note3: The detailed information for each state is available in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 4.1 bellow illustrates what the diffusion literature often refers to as the 
“S-shaped curve of innovation diffusion” (Rogers 1983), which depicts the innovation 
adopters graphed over time by the number of the total population adopting.  In policy 
diffusion, an “S-shaped curve” summarizes the relative speed with which an innovation 
is adopted by states.  At first, only a few states adopt the innovation in each year; these 
are the innovators.  But soon the diffusion curve begins to climb, as more and more 
states adopt.  Then the trajectory of the rate of adoption begins to level off, as fewer and 
fewer states remain that have not yet adopted.  Finally, the S-shaped curve reaches its 
asymptote, and the diffusion process is finished (Rogers 1983).  Many innovations have 
an S-shaped rate of adoption.  But there is variation in the slope of the “S” from 
innovation to innovation; some policy programs diffuse relatively rapidly, and the S-
curve is quite steep.  Another innovation may have a slower rate of adoption, and its S-
curve will be more gradual, with a slope that is relatively flat (Rogers 1983). 
 Figure 4.1 below resembles a pair of S-shaped curves with two periods of 
innovation: 1979 to early 2000s, and early 2000s to 2014.  The trajectory from 1979 
through 1993 is rather flat, indicating few adopting states.  The line picks up in 1993 
and falls flat again in the early 2000s.  The second takeoff appears in the early 2010s. 
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To better demonstrate the pair of S-shaped curves, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below 
present the curves for 1979-2002 and 2003-2014.  The reason for such cutoff is due to 
the different justifications for state adoption of performance funding in the two periods.  
As shown in Figure 4.2, the first adoption of performance funding occurred in 
Tennessee in 1979 and enactments did not occur again until Connecticut’s adoption in 
1985.  In the early 1990s, a period of steady adoption began.  The peak adoption years 
were 1994 (5 states adopted) and 1999 (6 states adopted).  The line becomes flat in 
2000, marking the completion of this initial wave of policy innovation.    
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Figure 4.3 below indicates that the second S-shaped curve begins with 23 
adopting states.  The trajectory line is rather flat from 2003 through 2010 and picks up 
slightly in the beginning of the 2010s.  The peak adoption year was 2013 when 8 states 
enacted the policy, by the end of 2014, the total number of adopters reaches 40. 
 
It is necessary to examine the two curves separately because the contributing 
factors that lead to the two periods of innovations are different.  The first curve (1979-
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2002) could be explained by the nationwide performance management movement in the 
public sector.  As elaborated in Chapter Two, beginning in the 1990s, performance-
based funding systems were heavily integrated into state and federal government 
programs as a means of holding public agencies accountable for improving the quality, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of program services.  Under this performance funding 
movement, states were motivated to include public colleges and universities that receive 
government dollars under such scrutiny as well (Noland, Davis, and McClendon 2000).  
In response to the demand for a higher quality postsecondary education, states find the 
need to create a more effective higher education funding system.  Consequently, 
performance funding became a popular approach to hold higher education accountable 
and improve university performance.    
Differently, the second adoption curve (2003-2014) could be explained by the 
participation of philanthropic foundations in state level higher education finance.  As 
indicated in the third chapter, some philanthropic foundations have dedicated financial 
resources to advertise performance funding.  One of the most active nationwide 
philanthropic foundations on education issues—the Lumina Foundation, has publicly 
expressed its endorsement for performance funding by arguing that higher education 
institutions should be funded based on performance factors such as whether students 
finish courses and hit certain milestones leading to a degree or postsecondary credential; 
and whether degrees or certificates are ultimately earned (Lumina Foundation 2009).  
The Lumina Foundation’s goal is to increase the proportion of Americans with high-
quality postsecondary degrees and credentials to 60% by the year 2025, which the 
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foundation terms “Goal 2025”.  Founded in 2002, the Lumina Foundation has been 
publicly expressing their support for tying state funding to higher education outcomes 
since 2003.  The Lumina Foundation indicates on their website that “outcomes-based 
funding, although not perfect, is a significant step toward ensuring that taxpayers’ 
significant investments in higher education result in more graduates” (Lumina 
Foundation 2018).  In addition to their articulated support for performance funding, 
they’ve been distributing grants that help with the cause.  Therefore, I contend that the 
second period of innovation might be attributed to the effort from private foundations 
like Lumina70. 
As defined earlier, the risk set is the set of states that are at risk of event 
occurrence at each point in time.  For legislative consideration of performance funding 
in 1979, all 48 contiguous states appear in the risk set; since only Tennessee adopted the 
program in 1979, the hazard rate for this year is 1/48 (0.0208).  The risk set for 1980 is 
47 since only 47 states at the time were at risk of adopting performance funding; but 0 
state adopted the program, hence the hazard rate is 0.  The risk set for 1994 is 45 
because 3 states—Tennessee, Connecticut, and Missouri—had adopted the program in 
the years before, the remaining 45 states had the potential probability of becoming an 
adopter.  Five states—Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Arkansas—ended 
up enacting performance funding in 1994, therefore the hazard rate is 5/45 (0.1111).  
This information is reported in Table 4.2 below.    
                                                          
70 Given the nonexistence of Lumina prior to 2002, this explanation does not apply to diffusion that 
occurred around 2000, which explains why the cut-off year for the second period of adoption is 2003.    
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Table 4.2: Risk Set and Hazard Rate for States to Adopt Performance Funding Policy 
Year States 
Adopting 
Performance-
Based Funding 
Number of 
Adopting 
States 
Cumulative 
Adoptions 
Risk Set Hazard Rate 
1979 TN 1 1 48 0.0208 
1980  0 1 47 0.0000 
1981  0 1 47 0.0000 
1982  0 1 47 0.0000 
1983  0 1 47 0.0000 
1984  0 1 47 0.0000 
1985 CT 1 2 47 0.0213 
1986  0 2 46 0.0000 
1987  0 2 46 0.0000 
1988  0 2 46 0.0000 
1989  0 2 46 0.0000 
1990  0 2 46 0.0000 
1991 MO 1 3 46 0.0217 
1992  0 3 45 0.0000 
1993  0 3 45 0.0000 
1994 CO, FL, KY, 
MN, AR 
5 8 45 0.1111 
1995 OH 1 9 40 0.0250 
1996 SC 1 10 39 0.0256 
1997 LA, OK, SD, 
WA 
4 14 38 0.1053 
1998 CA 1 15 34 0.0294 
1999 KS, NJ, NY, 
NC, OR, TX 
6 21 33 0.1818 
2000 ID, PA 2 23 28 0.0714 
2001  0 23 26 0.0000 
2002  0 23 26 0.0000 
2003  0 23 26 0.0000 
2004  0 23 26 0.0000 
2005 VA 1 24 26 0.0385 
2006  0 24 25 0.0000 
2007 IN 1 25 25 0.0400 
2008  0 25 24 0.0000 
2009  0 25 24 0.0000 
2010  0 25 24 0.0000 
2011 NM, MI, MS 3 28 24 0.1250 
2012 AZ, IL 2 30 21 0.0952 
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Table 4.2 (Continued): Risk Set and Hazard Rate for States to Adopt Performance 
Funding Policy 
Year States 
Adopting 
Performance-
Based Funding 
Number of 
Adopting 
States 
Cumulative 
Adoptions 
Risk Set Hazard Rate 
2013 GA, ME, MA, 
MT, NV, ND, 
UT, WI 
8 38 19 0.4211 
2014 IA, WY 2 40 11 0.1818 
Note1: Alaska and Hawaii are excluded. 
Note2: The dataset ends in 2014 due to my data availability. 
Note3: AR = Arkansas, AZ = Arizona, CA = California, CO = Colorado, CT =  Connecticut, FL 
= Florida, GA = Georgia, IA = Iowa, ID = Idaho, IL = Illinois, IN = Indiana, KS = Kansas, KY 
= Kentucky, LA = Louisiana, MA = Massachusetts, ME = Maine, MI = Michigan, MN = 
Minnesota, MO = Missouri, MS = Mississippi, MT = Montana, NC = North Carolina, ND = 
North Dakota, NJ = New Jersey, NM = New Mexico, NV = Nevada, NY = New York, OH = 
Ohio, OR = Oregon, OK = Oklahoma, PA = Pennsylvania, SC = South Carolina, SD = South 
Dakota, TN = Tennessee, TX = Texas,  UT = Utah, VA = Virginia, WA = Washington, WI = 
Wisconsin, WY = Wyoming  
Note 4: Appendix A reports the 48 continental U.S. states and their bordering states. 
 
 
2.3. Independent Variables  
2.3.1. Primary Independent Variables 
2.3.1.1. Diffusion Variable 
The diffusion variable—regional influence—is measured as the number of 
adjacent states that adopted performance funding.  As the diffusion literature suggests, 
the probability of adoption increases as the number of nearby states that have previously 
adopted the same program increases (Berry and Berry 1992; Berry 1994).  Walker 
(1969, p. 890) argues that state officials “constantly look to each other for guides to 
action in many areas of policy”.  Past diffusion studies confirm that neighboring states 
are apt to influence each other because of their proximity; therefore, regional influence 
is considered as a crucial factor that determines state policy adoption (Berry and Berry 
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1990, 1992; Mintrom 1997a, 1997b; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Mooney and Lee 
1995).  Hence, I anticipate that the growing number of adopting neighbors will result in 
a state’s increasing likelihood of adopting performance funding.  This research borrows 
Berry and Berry’s (1990) conception of regional diffusion in which a state is more 
likely to adopt an innovation as the number of neighboring states which have previously 
adopted increases.  Data indicating the number of adopting neighbors are drawn from 
various sources, including Burke & Minassians 2000, 2002, 2003; Dougherty and 
Reddy 2013; Dougherty and Natow 2015; Dougherty, Natow, Hare, Jones, & Vega, 
2013; Friedel et al. 2013; Gorbunov, 2013; Rabovsky 2013; McLendon et al., 2006; 
National Conference of State Legislatures 2016, 2017; official state government 
websites; and official state higher education board websites.  The information is 
reported in Table 4.1 above.  The data is coded using the number of adopting neighbors 
the state has in a particular year.  For example, the 2014 data for the state of Alabama is 
coded as 4 because in 2014, Alabama has 4 adjacent neighbors that have enacted 
performance funding: Tennessee (adopted in 1979), Georgia (adopted in 2013), Florida 
(adopted in 1994), and Mississippi (adopted in 2011).  
Counting the number of neighboring adopters is a common measure of regional 
influence and the majority of regional diffusion models posit that governments are 
influenced primarily by other governments that are geographically proximate.  
According to Berry and Berry’s (2014) review of the diffusion literature, most of these 
models hypothesize that the probability that a government will adopt a policy is 
positively related to the number of jurisdictions bordering it that have already adopted 
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it.  In 2001, Mooney developed a different method to explore and assess regional effect 
(p. 108) which calculates a state’s average proportion of adjacent adopters.  I chose to 
use the counting measure simply because of its popularity in the diffusion literature.  
2.3.1.2. Lumina Variables 
Because I am interested in the second wave of adoption and I speculate that 
private foundations, especially Lumina, contribute to the diffusion of performance 
funding, I include two Lumina Foundation Grants dummy variables: (1) whether the 
state higher education governing board received grants from Lumina Foundation, and 
(2) whether the state received higher education related grants from Lumina Foundation 
in general.  Both variables are coded with “0” being not having received grants, and “1” 
being having received grants.  As discussed in the third chapter, Lumina Foundation has 
been extensively engaging in state higher education policy making by offering grants, it 
is reasonable to expect that states that have received financial help from the foundation 
are more likely to adopt performance funding.  The data for these two variables are 
gathered from Lumina Foundation 990 Forms—Internal Revenue Service forms that 
provide the public with financial information about nonprofit organizations, which are 
available on the Lumina website and CitizenAudit71 (2018)—a database that provides 
15 years of disclosures of IRS filings for every charity in the U.S.  The forms report the 
foundation’s financial activities for the previous year.  For example, the 990 Form from 
2014 contains the foundation’s financial transactions from 2013.  Since Lumina 
Foundation started rigorous advocating for performance funding in 2002, the data for 
                                                          
71 Link to the website: https://www.citizenaudit.org/ 
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these two dummy variables begin in 2002 and end in 2014.  To maximize the reliability 
and accuracy of information gathering for this variable, I went through the complete set 
of 990 Forms72 (2003-2015) on three different occasions approximately a couple of 
weeks apart to make sure I categorize all the grants correctly, and all three examinations 
yielded consistent results. 
The third Lumina variable is the Amount of Lumina Higher Education 
Grants distributed to the state.   This variable is measured by the dollar amount that the 
Foundation provided to each state for higher education related purposes for the year.   
The data for this variable is collected from Lumina’s 990 Forms, I went through all the 
grant money allocated in the “Grants Section” and recorded the total amount for each 
state.  I expect this variable to have positive impact on the dependent variable because it 
is reasonable to assume that states with higher levels of financial support from Lumina 
are more aware of the policy, which may indirectly increase their likelihood of 
adoption.  
2.3.2. Other Independent Variables of Interest 
In an environment of decreased taxpayer revenue and heightened demand for 
postsecondary education efficiency, tying funding to successful outcomes has come an 
appealing approach for state officials.  In budgetary decision making, state officials seek 
to find more effective budget allocation methods, and in some cases, trim budgets.  
Performance funding connects a portion of state appropriations to metrics that gauge 
institutional performance on various indicators.  Given that performance funding is 
                                                          
72 Appendix B reports the Grants Distribution from the Lumina Foundation from 2002-2014. 
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generally awarded as a bonus, which was often the first to be cut in tough budget 
environments, states are increasingly adopting performance funding both to better 
leverage existing resources and to spur improvements in student outcomes and 
institutional efficiency (Snyder 2015).  Legislative efforts to manage budget squeezes 
appears to be one of the common conditions that foster performance funding adoption 
(Dougherty and Natow 2015).  According to Quinterno’s (2012) study, budgetary 
influences have played a major role in sparking interest in performance funding as a 
way of prompting public institutions to become more efficient with scarce tax dollars.  
Therefore, it is intuitive to include state fiscal condition as a primary determinant of 
performance funding adoption.   
In some studies, state fiscal condition is measured as the difference between 
total state expenditures and total state revenues divided by total state expenditures 
(Berry and Berry 1990; Bradford and Bradford 2016; Karch and Cravens 2014).  In this 
dissertation, I measure state fiscal condition by calculating the difference between total 
state revenue and total state spending divided by total state revenue.  Positive ratios 
indicate better fiscal condition than negative ratios because positive numbers imply a 
budgetary surplus.  The purpose of calculating a surplus, or lack thereof, as a percentage 
of revenue is two-fold.  First, it shows whether the state government spending exceeded 
the revenues for the year.  Second, it demonstrates the size of the surplus or deficit in 
comparison to the amount of state income.  This measure provides me with a reasonable 
scale for evaluating fiscal condition and protects against inflation and differing costs of 
living across the states.  The data for total state revenue and total state spending is 
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available online via the U.S. Census Bureau website73 (2018).  Given the objective of 
performance funding—to enhance higher education cost efficiency, this reasoning leads 
to the prediction that states with poor fiscal conditions should have more incentive to 
adopt the program.  In other words, fiscal condition and the probability of adopting 
performance funding are negatively correlated. 
The next independent variable is state educational attainment, the percentage 
of state’s population age 25 and older that completed 4 or more years of college.  I 
consider this variable because state officials tend to adopt programs that solve societal 
problems (Karch 2007a).  Fryar (2011) suggests that one of the drivers of the 
performance funding movement in public higher education is concern over degree 
attainment.  State higher education officials may be motivated by perceptions of poor 
performance by their public higher education institutions, which can be captured by 
institutions’ historical ability to graduate students.  For example, the Illinois State 
Legislature mandated that the Illinois Board of Higher Education incorporate a 
performance funding element into the higher education system during fiscal year 2012.  
The effort attempted to link the performance funding development to the Illinois Public 
Agenda for College and Career Success (Illinois Board of Higher Education 2010)—a 
document that established statewide policy goals with raising levels of educational 
attainment being the top priority on the agenda.  Since the core purpose of performance-
based funding is to improve institutional performance and college completion, I expect 
                                                          
73 Link to the website: https://www.census.gov/ 
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states with inferior higher educational attainment to have higher likelihood of adoption.  
The data for this variable is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau website (2018).   
The next variable, higher education tuition change, refers to the percentage 
change for average state public 4-year higher education institution tuition and fees.  
Rapid growth in postsecondary tuition levels may persuade state leaders to develop a 
new performance model to ensure institutional accountability.  Historically, tuition and 
fees have represented a very small percentage of higher education budgets.  Many states 
are reviewing their policies as student-derived revenues move toward becoming the 
majority of public institutions’ revenue streams.  Additionally, some states are now 
requiring performance-based measures to be met for institutions to gain increased 
autonomy over student-derived revenues (SRI International 2012).  Hence, I expect 
states with escalating tuition levels to be more likely adopters of performance funding.   
This variable is measured by the proportion of average state 4-year institution 
in-state tuition and fees change compared with the previous year to the previous year’s 
average state 4-year institution in-state tuition and fees.  For example, the percentage of 
tuition change for 2014 is calculated by the proportion of difference between 2013 and 
2014 state average 4-year institution in-state tuition and fees to 2013 state average 4-
year institution in-state tuition and fees.  Negative results imply tuition decrease; 
positive results imply tuition increase.  I only include tuition change for public 4-year 
institutions because it is the only data I can acquire.  The data for 1987-2014 are 
obtained from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)74 (2018).  
                                                          
74 Link to the website: https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ 
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The data for 1977-1986 is gathered from state higher education department archives and 
phone calls with state higher education departments. 
In addition to tuition change, enrollment change is another important motivator 
for performance funding adoption, because enrollment increases place addition financial 
demands on the state’s budget, which can pressure officials to enact performance 
funding.  Also, it is reasonable to expect that states with enrollment increases may have 
heightened pressure to ensure the graduation rates keep up with the growing enrollment 
rates.  Under the stress of graduating more students, state officials may consider 
enacting performance funding. 
The variable is measured by the proportion of state 4-year institution total 
enrollment compared with the previous year to the previous year’s state 4-year 
institution total enrollment.  For example, the percentage of enrollment change for 2014 
is calculated by the proportion of difference between 2013 and 2014 state 4-year 
institution total enrollment to the 2013 state 4-year institution total enrollment.  
Negative results imply enrollment decrease; positive results imply enrollment increases.  
The data are obtained from IPEDS (2018). 
All the independent variables above are lagged one year because the diffusion 
literature and the definitions of the variables suggest that these are the determinants of 
policy adoption.   
The next independent variable is state government ideology.  I consider this 
variable to be critical because from a conservative-liberal ideological standpoint, 
 106 
 
performance funding appears more aligned with the conservative ideology of limited 
public spending, strong accountability, and greater efficiency in government by using 
market incentives borrowed from the private sector (Li 2017; Li and Zumeta 2015; 
McLendon, Tandberg, and Hillman 2014).  On the contrary, Democrats have 
historically been more supportive of direct funding of public services without strong 
conditions (Alt and Lowry 2000).  Since performance funding ties a portion of 
appropriations to institutions based on outcomes as a tool to promote more efficient 
spending, the policy could be more appealing to Republicans.  Recent research has 
found a preference among Republican elected officials for performance funding policies 
(Dougherty, Natow, and Vega 2012; McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006).  Since 
Democrats are less inclined to a government-accountability agenda than Republicans, I 
expect that conservative governments have higher probability of adopting performance 
funding.   
Government ideology75,76 is measured using Berry et al.’s (2012) measure which 
weighs the ideology scores for five institutional factors: the governor’s ideology; and 
Democrats’ and Republicans’ shares of power and ideology scores within a state’s 
lower and upper chambers, respectively (Berry et al. 2012).  State government ideology 
scores range from 0 to 100, with high scores indicating liberalism.  The data for this 
variable is collected from University of Alabama Political Science Professor Richard C. 
                                                          
75 In addition to government ideology, citizen ideology also shapes state legislative decisions (Lamothe 2005; 
Matisoff 2008). However, government and citizen ideologies usually correlate well because with the fear of losing 
electoral advantage, legislators respond to electorates’ needs, which reflects citizen ideology (Erkison, Wright, and 
McIver 1993). To avoid multicollinearity, this study only accounts for state government ideology. 
76 Berry et al.’s (2012) measure includes Nebraska, despite of its unique unicameral legislature. 
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Fording’s (2018) website77.  The data Professor Fording shares includes ideology scores 
for all 48 contiguous states (including Nebraska) from 1979 to 2014.  I prefer Berry et 
al.’s measure over McLendon et al.’s because the former option is more comprehensive 
and dynamic.  Berry et al.’s measure reflects variation in the meaning of party labels 
across states and goes beyond calculating the percentage of decisionmakers from either 
political party.  Also, as the authors contend, their measure embodies a realistic 
assumption about the relationship between party control and political power in state 
policy-making institutions (Berry et al. 2012). 
2.3.3. Control Variables 
The first control variable, state government legislative professionalism, refers 
to “the capacity of both individual members and the organization as a whole to generate 
and digest information in the policymaking process” (Squire 2007, p. 211).  The level of 
professionalism is a critical determinant of legislative capacity because lawmaking 
requires comprehensive knowledge and capability.  Studies have found that legislative 
professionalism is usually positively associated with greater policy innovation (Hayes 
1996; King 2000; Tandberg 2010).  Not only does legislative professionalism determine 
government’s ability to make laws, it may also affect the relationship between 
lawmakers and professional associations (Karch 2007a).  On the one hand, highly 
professional bodies may be more open to questions, and have broader and stronger 
connections with local and interstate political associations (Karch 2007a).  On the other 
hand, however, high professionalism also increases the amount of mixed information 
                                                          
77 Link to the website: https://rcfording.wordpress.com 
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that flows to the decision-making process, which can potentially discourage policy 
adoption.  Therefore, this variable could either encourage or hinder state adoption of 
performance funding.   
Legislative professionalism is a metric combining salary levels, legislative 
session length, and staff size.  The index does not have a range, but higher values 
indicate a higher level of professionalism.  Squire (2012) has published the state 
legislative professionalism indices for years: 1979, 1986, 1996, 2003, and 2009.  The 
data for the remaining years is available from Harvard Dataverse created by Bowen and 
Greene (201478).  The Harvard Dataverse (2018) legislative professionalism data is 
constructed mainly following Squire’s coding rules with some deviation79, however 
Bowen and Greene (2014) conclude that their results are consistent with Squire’s.  
Therefore, I believe that it is appropriate to use Bowen and Greene’s (2014) data for the 
remaining years. 
Next, I include state higher education governance as my second control 
variable, coded with “0” representing not having a consolidated higher education 
                                                          
78 Link to the website: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/27595 
79 The Squire method (2007) measures legislative professionalism based on three components: legislator 
salary and benefits (i.e., salary from legislative service and retirement or health care benefits), the number 
of days state legislatures meet (both calendar days and legislative days), and legislative staff resources 
(i.e., the number of permanent staff, session-only staff, and total staff during the session).  Bowen and 
Greene (2014) measure each of the primary components of Squire’s index separately and follow Squire’s 
coding rules for the legislator salary and session length.  Unlike the Squire measure of legislative time 
demands which only account for regular sessions, Bowen and Greene add the days from special sessions 
because some states use special sessions to circumvent statutory and constitutional limits constitutional 
limits on the number of days the legislature can meet during a regular session. 
The authors further evaluate the internal consistency of professionalism components over time, and the 
relationship between components and the Squire Index.  They conclude that there is simultaneously 
enough commonality and enough variation between professionalism components to support the Squire 
Index (Bowen and Greene 2014). 
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governing board, and “1” representing having one.  It is important to include this 
variable because higher education governing structure determines the degree to which 
there is autonomy or centralization in governance (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2003).  
Consolidated governing boards play an active role in developing and implementing 
policy and they have all the rights and responsibilities of a single corporate entity as 
defined by state law, including strategic planning, budgeting, and allocation of 
resources between and among institutions within the board’s jurisdiction (Connecticut 
General Assembly 2010).  Consolidated boards sometimes are theorized to increase the 
likelihood of a state “innovating” because such boards provide policymakers an 
abundance of analytic resources (i.e., more professional staff holding expertise in higher 
education policy and finance) with which to search for new ideas and solutions 
(McLendon et al. 2006). 
Some studies have reached different conclusions on the influence of higher 
education governance structures on state higher education policy adoption.   Hearn and 
Griswold (1994) conclude that higher education governance structure is largely 
unrelated to higher education policy innovation, broadly defined.  McLendon, Heller, 
and Young (2005) find weak empirical support for the influence of governance on 
propensity to adopt financial innovations.  The authors further indicate that states with 
strong and centralized control of higher education are slightly more likely to adopt 
innovative postsecondary finance policies than those with weaker control; however, 
they find no connection between governance and propensity to adopt new 
accountability policies (McLendon, Heller, and Young 2005).  In 2006, McLendon and 
 110 
 
colleagues conducted another study on state adoption of performance accountability 
programs and reached a differing conclusion, finding that governance structure did have 
a statistically significant influence on state adoption of performance funding 
(McLendon et al. 2006). 
Therefore, it is unclear whether having a more centralized governance is 
associated with states’ likelihood of adopting performance funding.  It is also unknown 
how strong the association may be.  The data for this variable is obtained from the 
National Center for Higher Education Management Systems80 (2018).  Table 4.3 below 
summarizes the variables and the predicted relationships with the dependent variable.  
Table 4.4 below shows the comparison between my measures and McLendon et al.’s 
(2006) measures for all the variables.  
                                                          
80 Link to the website: http://nchems.org/ 
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3. Quantitative Results 
Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 below report the descriptive statistics of the cases.  
The dataset contains 1265 cases in total, 1002 of which are from 1979-2002 and 263 
from 2003-2014.  The data is complete for all variables81.   
 
Table 4.5: Consolidated Governing Board 
Whether the State Has a 
Consolidated Governing 
Board 
Yes No 
States Arizona 
Florida  
Georgia  
Idaho 
Iowa  
Kansas  
Maine  
Massachusetts 
Minnesota  
Mississippi  
Montana 
Nevada 
New Hampshire  
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Oregon  
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Utah 
Vermont 
Wisconsin  
Wyoming  
Alabama 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Michigan  
Missouri 
Nebraska 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Pennsylvania  
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Total States 22 26 
 
                                                          
81 Results for multicollinearity check are reported in Appendix C.  Overall, given the relatively low levels 
of correlation between my independent variables, it appears that multicollinearity is not a notable problem 
in my models.   
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Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics (1979-2014) 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.  
Year 1265 1979 2014   
Adopt 1265 0 1 0.032 0.175 
Regional Influence 1265 0 5 0.894 1.152 
Fiscal Condition 1265 -0.773 0.872 0.072 0.107 
Educational Attainment  1265 0.079     0.394 0.205 0.054 
Tuition Change 1265 -0.476 1.161 0.079 0.066 
Enrollment Change 1265 -0.183 0.224 0.019 0.033 
Government Ideology 1265 0.000 99.170 50.410 25.189 
Legislative Professionalism 1265 0.027 0.659 0.194 0.127 
 
 
 
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics (1979-2002) 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.  
Year 1002 1979 2002   
Adopt 1002 0 1 0.023 0.150 
Regional Influence 1002 0 4 0.531 0.836 
Fiscal Condition 1002 -0.320 0.872 0.088 0.072 
Educational Attainment  1002 0.079 0.347 0.192 0.047 
Tuition Change 1002 -0.260 0.500 0.081 0.058 
Enrollment Change 1002 -0.183 0.204 0.0169 0.031 
Government Ideology 1002 0.00 97.92 49.04 23.273 
Legislative Professionalism 1002 0.034 0.659 0.205 0.132 
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Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics (2003-2014) 
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Std. 
Dev.  
Year 263 2003 2014   
Adopt 263 0 1 0.065 0.246 
Regional Influence 263 0 5 2.278 1.144 
Fiscal Condition 263 -0.773 0.378 0.011 0.175 
Educational Attainment  263 0.148 0.394 0.255 0.049 
Tuition Change 263 -0.476 1.161 0.074 0.090 
Enrollment Change 263 -0.065 0.224 0.026 0.036 
Government Ideology 263 3.896 99.167 55.636 30.936 
Legislative Professionalism 263 0.027 0.461 0.153 0.096 
Lumina Higher Education Grants 263 0 1 0.247 0.432 
Lumina Grants in General 263 0 1 0.574 0.495 
Total Amount of Lumina Higher Education 
Grants Distributed (millions of dollars) 
263 25 97 45.67 12.678 
 
An event history analysis was conducted using logistic regression in R and the 
results are reported in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 below82.  The tables present both coefficients 
and average marginal effects.  Marginal effects reveal how much the likelihood of 
adoption in each year changes given a one-unit change in the variable in question.  With 
binary independent variables83, marginal effects measure discrete change, meaning how 
predicted probabilities change as the binary independent variable changes from 0 to 1 
(Williams 2018).  With continuous independent variables84, marginal effects reveal how 
                                                          
82 Per a request from one of my committee members, I reran the model for both time frames of 
performance funding diffusion.  Appendix D presents the coefficients between the dependent and 
independent variables from 1979-2014.  Throughout the entirety of performance funding diffusion, 
regional influence (p<0.001), educational attainment (p<0.01), and government ideology (p<0.05) are 
statistically significant.  In other words, states that have more adopting neighbors, higher educational 
attainment rates, and conservative governments are more likely to adopt performance funding.  Tuition 
and enrollment changes are both marginally significant (p<0.1) and negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable, which indicates that more likely adopters tend to have less tuition and enrollment 
increases.  
83 Binary variables occur in one of two possible states, often labelled 1 and 0.  For example, whether the 
state has a consolidated board—1 representing yes and 0 representing no.  
84 Continuous variables are variables that are not restricted to particular values (Baron and Kenny 1986).  
For example, tuition change, enrollment change, and fiscal condition. 
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one unit increase or decrease in the value of the independent variable will increase or 
decrease the probability of the dependent variable—the state’s probability of adopting 
performance funding, in this study.  Marginal effects are an informative means for 
summarizing how change in a response is related to change in a covariate (Williams 
2018).  Positive marginal effects imply the variable increases the likelihood of adoption 
in a given year; contrarily, negative marginal effects imply the variable decreases the 
likelihood of adoption.   
In the first set of models tested (reported in Table 4.9), an analysis was 
conducted to determine how the previously identified diffusion variables perform in 
predicting states’ adoption of performance funding policy from 1979-2002 and 2003-
2014.  The results are revealed in the first and second models respectively.  
The second set of models (reported in Table 4.10) concerns Lumina 
Foundation’s financial influence in the diffusion of performance funding from 2003-
2014.  Model 3 incorporates the dummy variable of whether states’ higher education 
governing agency received grants from Lumina Foundation in a given year.  Model 4 
incorporates the dummy variable of whether states received higher education grants in 
general from Lumina Foundation in a given year.  Model 5 reflects whether the total 
amount of annual Lumina higher education grants contributes to the diffusion of 
performance funding in a significant way.  
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Table 4.9: State Adoption of Performance Funding (Models 1-2) 
 Model 1: 
1979-2002 
Average 
Marginal Effect 
Model 2: 
2003-2014 
Average 
Marginal Effect 
Regional Influence 0.404# 
(0.223) 
0.009 0.429 
(0.307) 
0.022 
Fiscal Condition 4.532* 
(2.079) 
0.096 -1.238 
(1.853) 
-0.062 
Educational 
Attainment  
9.456* 
(4.812) 
0.200 8.518 
(6.672) 
0.427 
Tuition Change -7.300# 
(4.188) 
-0.154 -4.923 
(4.048) 
-0.248 
Enrollment Change -0.288 
(7.878) 
-0.006 -29.822** 
(10.894) 
-1.494 
Government Ideology -0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.0003 -0.021# 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
0.372 
(1.679) 
0.008 4.498 
(3.042) 
0.225 
Consolidated 
Governing Board 
-1.024* 
(0.505) 
-0.022 0.502 
(0.638) 
0.025 
Intercept -5.095*** 
(1.244) 
-0.108 -5.276* 
(2.115) 
-0.264 
Pseudo R2 0.134  0.225  
N 1002  288  
Note 1: Model 1 replicates McLendon et al.’s (2006) analysis of state adoption of performance 
accountability policies from 1979-2002.  The key difference is how the government ideology 
variable is measured.  McLendon et al. accounted for three factors “% Republican legislature”, 
“gubernatorial power”, and “Republican governor”.  In this dissertation, I measure government 
ideology using Berry et al. (2012) comprehensive government ideology scores. 
Note 2: Coefficients are from an event history analysis using logistic regression, two-tailed  
Note 3: Robust standard errors for cluster sampling data in parentheses 
Note 4: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; # p<0.1  
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Table 4.10: State Adoption of Performance Funding (Models 3-5) 
 Model 3: 
2003-
2014 
Average 
Marginal 
Effect 
Model 4: 
2003-
2014 
Average 
Marginal 
Effect 
Model 5: 
2003-
2014 
Average 
Marginal 
Effect 
Regional Influence 0.417 
(0.309) 
0.021 0.403 
(0.310) 
0.020 0.380 
(0.324) 
0.019 
Fiscal Condition -0.777 
(1.927) 
-0.038 -1.236 
(1.889) 
-0.061 -1.347 
(1.840) 
-0.067 
Educational 
Attainment  
9.901 
(6.611) 
0.398 8.084 
(6.755) 
0.401 8.024 
(6.743) 
0.400 
Tuition Change -4.725 
(4.076) 
-0.232 -5.335 
(4.138) 
-0.265 -4.610 
(4.243) 
-0.230 
Enrollment 
Change 
-26.235* 
(10.912) 
-1.291 -
33.490** 
(11.726) 
-1.663 -28.213* 
(11.312) 
-1.407 
Government 
Ideology 
-0.021# 
(0.011) 
-0.001 -0.023* 
(0.011) 
-0.001 -0.022# 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
6.401# 
(3.290) 
0.315 3.481 
(3.196) 
0.173 4.631 
(3.024) 
0.231 
Consolidated 
Governing Board 
0.673 
(0.668) 
0.033 0.407 
(0.646) 
0.020 0.528 
(0.644) 
0.026 
Lumina Higher 
Education Grants  
-1.577 
(1.156) 
-0.078     
Lumina Grants in 
General 
  0.681 
(0.662) 
0.034   
Total Amount of 
Lumina Higher 
Education Grants 
Distributed 
    0.010 
(0.020) 
0.0004 
Intercept -5.429* 
(2.121) 
-0.267 -5.135* 
(2.126) 
-0.255 -5.512* 
(2.178) 
-0.275 
Pseudo R2 0.245  0.233  0.227  
N 263  263  263  
Note 1: Coefficients are from an event history analysis using logistic regression, two-tailed  
Note 2: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Note 3: ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; # p<0.1  
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3.1. State Adoption of Performance Funding: 1979-2002 
As shown in Model 1, from 1979 through 2002, regional influence, fiscal 
condition, educational attainment, tuition change, and whether a state has a consolidated 
governing board are significant factors that lead to a state’s probability of adopting 
performance funding.  The elements that are associated with higher probability of 
adoption are: more adopting neighbors, better fiscal condition, higher educational 
attainment rates, tuition decreases, and absence of a consolidated governing board.  
Regional influence and tuition change are marginally significant variables both at the 
level of p < 0.1 (with marginal effects equal to 0.009 and -0.154, respectively).  Fiscal 
condition, educational attainment, and higher education governance are significant 
variables all at the level of p < 0.05 (with marginal effects equal to 0.096, 0.200, and -
0.022, respectively).  Surprisingly, the results are contrary to the predicted effects for 
fiscal condition, educational attainment, and tuition change.          
In McLendon et al.’s (2006) research (their results are presented in Table 4.11 
below), government ideology and consolidated governing board are both statistically 
significant independent variables.  My results agree with these authors that (1) 
Republican governments tend to enact performance accountability programs, and (2) 
states without consolidated governing boards were more likely to adopt performance-
funding.  However, government ideology does not appear to be statistically significant 
in my replication.   
In McLendon et al.’s (2006) research, both tuition and enrollment changes are 
positively associated with state adoption of performance funding, implying that states 
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with more tuition and enrollment changes are more likely adopters (however, neither of 
the variables are statistically significant).  My findings indicate the opposite.  This is 
discussed further in the Discussion section below.   
 
Table 4.11: McLendon et al.’s (2006) Findings on State Adoption of Performance 
Funding (Source: McLendon et al. 2006, p. 17) 
Variable Exp(B) Coefficient Standard Error 
Educational Attainment  0.936 -0.066 0.057 
% Change in Gross State Product 1.106 0.101 0.076 
Legislative Professionalism 1.004 0.004 0.016 
% Republic Legislature 1.033* 0.032 0.014 
Gubernatorial Power 1.318 0.276 0.574 
Republican Governor 1.575 0.454 0.742 
% Change in Tuition 1.043 0.042 0.026 
% Change in Public Enrollment 1.171 0.158 0.122 
Consolidated Governing Board 0.111** -2.198 0.078 
Diffusion 0.984 -0.016 0.024 
Note: In the McLendon et al. (2006) paper, the authors only report the odds ratios and standard 
errors for the predictors.  The coefficients in this table are converted from the odds ratios. 
 
3.2. State Adoption of Performance Funding: 2003-2014 
As Model 2 demonstrates, from 2003 to 2014, enrollment change (p < 0.01, 
marginal effect = -1.494) and government ideology (p < 0.1, marginal effect = -0.001) 
stand out as the most statistically significant factors that motivated state governments to 
adopt performance funding.  Government ideology is a marginally significant variable.  
States with declined college enrollment and conservative governments appear to be 
more likely adopters.  My prediction on the correlation between the dependent variable 
and enrollment change turns out to be incorrect.  
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3.3. Lumina Foundation and Performance Funding Adoption: 2003-201485 
The results from Models 3 and 4 suggest that the financial help Lumina 
Foundation offered to states did not have strong influence on states’ decision to fund 
higher education based on institutional performance; nor does the amount of Lumina 
higher education grants, as Model 5 indicates.  The statistical significance of enrollment 
change and government ideology remains with the Lumina variables added.  
4. Discussion 
A few quantitative findings are worthy of further discussion.  First, the effects of 
a couple of predictors (fiscal condition and consolidated governing board) on the 
dependent variable are inconsistent for the two time frames.  Fiscal condition is 
positively associated with state adoption of performance funding from 1979-2002, but 
the direction of the association flips to the negative side from 2003-2014.  The 
associations imply that states with good fiscal condition are more likely to be adopters 
from 1979-2002; but states with poor fiscal condition are more likely to be adopters 
from 2003-2014.  Fiscal condition is statistically significant from 1979-2002 but 
insignificant from 2003-2014.  Also, the correlation between state fiscal condition and 
the dependent variable turns out to be contrary to my prediction.  I anticipate states with 
poor fiscal condition to be more likely adopters.  
                                                          
85 Per a request from one of my committee members, I reran the model with an additional independent 
variable, the cumulative Lumina grants to the state.  Appendix D reports the influence of regional 
diffusion, other independent variables of interest, and control variables on states’ likelihood of adopting 
performance funding when the cumulative Lumina funding to the state is considered.  Interestingly, the 
cumulative Lumina money a state has received has a statistically positive influence on its probability of 
adopting performance funding (p<0.05).  Adding this variable, however, flips the correlation between 
educational attainment rate and the dependent variable.  I intend to look into how cumulative grants affect 
states’ adoption decisions in my future research.   
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This could be explained by the two versions of performance funding.  
Performance funding has evolved since it was first introduced, the details of particular 
funding programs have changed over time.  Two kinds of performance funding 
programs can be usefully distinguished.  Unlike the early funding formula (often 
referred to as “performance funding 1.0”) that takes the form of a bonus on top of the 
base state funding for higher education, the new form (often referred to as “performance 
funding 2.0”) is embedded into the base funding itself.  Performance funding 1.0 
programs usually tie between one percent and five percent of state appropriations to 
performance metrics; performance funding 2.0 programs typically tie a larger portion of 
state appropriations to institutional performance (Dougherty et al. 2014).  Between 1979 
and 2000, most of the programs took the form of 1.0, in which performance funding 
was established as bonus money over the above regular state funding for higher 
education (Burke 2002; Dougherty and Reddy 2013; McLendon et al. 2006).  In the 
second wave of adoption that began in 2007, most of the performance funding programs 
have taken the form of 2.0, under which performance funding is no longer a bonus to 
the based state funding (Dougherty and Reddy 2013; Jacobs 2012).  It makes sense that 
wealthier states are more likely to adopt 1.0 since they have more dollars to spare on 
higher education.  On the other hand, states with poor fiscal conditions are more prone 
to enact 2.0 to reduce expenses on higher education. 
The other inconsistent effect on performance funding adoption is higher 
education governance structure.  From 1979-2002, the association is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that states without a consolidated board are more 
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likely to be performance funding adopters.  The statistical significance disappears and 
the correlation changes to negative from 2003-2014.  This is not a surprising finding 
since studies have yield different conclusions on the influence of higher education 
governance structures on state higher education policy adoption (Hearn and Griswold 
1994; McLendon et al. 2005).  Previous studies reveal that politics may be a critical 
explanation of higher education policy decisions (Forest, Hearn, and Marine 1997; 
Zusman 1986).  Forest and associates (1997) suggest that how states deal with higher 
education may be governed more by concerns and issues that are only about higher 
education per se.   
In the case of performance funding, most states have enacted performance 
funding through the governor’s direction or the legislative decision, regardless of 
whether the state has a consolidated board, as explained in Chapter 2.  Dunn (2003) 
argues that higher education performance accountability programs have generally 
emanated from state governments, with both governors and legislatures taking the 
initiative in establishing new policy for higher education.  In Gittell and Kleiman’s 
(2000) study of higher education politics in three states (California, North Carolina, and 
Texas), the authors confirm that politics matter in higher education policymaking and 
state politics has a considerable impact on major policy decisions.  They further observe 
that political leaders, particularly the governor and top elected legislative 
representatives, play a significant role, often dominating design and implementation 
(Gittell and Kleiman 2000).  With politics serving as a vital element in state adoption of 
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performance funding, state higher education governance arrangement may not matter 
much. 
The next unanticipated finding is states’ higher likelihood of enacting 
performance funding when they experience decreases in enrollments and tuitions, which 
contradicts my expectations that states with growing enrollments and tuitions may be 
pressured to adopt performance funding.  It is worth pointing out here briefly despite 
tuition change being statistically insignificant.  This could partially be explained by the 
above discussion of higher education politics.  As indicated in Chapter 3, policy 
decision making is largely determined by electoral considerations.  Elected officials 
tend to enact policies that not only address legislative concerns, but also enhance the 
chance of re-election.  Performance funding fits the bill because generally speaking, 
performance accountability programs are electorally friendly in their internal value—to 
improve service efficiency and enhance overall performance outcomes (Moynihan 
2008).  Such benefits are also present in performance funding policy, given that states 
enact performance funding mainly for political and ideological reasons (Rabovsky 
2013).   
In addition to political reasons, it is also possible that public officials aim to 
improve higher education enrollment and justify tuition increase by showing their 
commitment to improving the quality of postsecondary education.  The goal of perform 
funding is to improve college and university performance, especially with regard to 
student outcomes such as persistence, accrual of course credits, degree completion, 
transfer, and job placement (Dougherty et al. 2016).  The main policy instrument of 
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performance funding is providing financial incentives that mimic the profits for 
businesses (Dougherty et al. 2014).  Applied to higher education institutions, this idea 
holds that the institutions are revenue maximizers and will make a strong effort to 
improve their performance if the amount of funding involved is significant enough 
(Burke 2002; Dougherty et al. 2014).  Performance funding symbolically pushes 
institutions to pay greater attention to outcomes, including quality control and 
“customer” (i.e., students and parents) satisfaction.  From the consumers’ standpoint, 
students and parents object to tuition increases and want assured access to quality 
educational services.  Regardless of the actual effectiveness, developing an 
accountability regime at least helps establish consumer confidence in investing in a 
college education.  Once such confidence is created, students and parents may be more 
willing to accept the increased prices for such investment.  Therefore, performance 
funding has its appeal as a symbolic function.   
Lastly, the lack of significance of the Lumina variables doesn’t imply that 
private foundations are uninfluential in the policy diffusion process.  As pointed out in 
Chapter 3, the Lumina Foundation has funded a few nonprofit organizations that are 
classified as 501(c)(3) public charities such as Complete College America, a supporter  
of performance funding in higher education.  My findings do not definitively suggest 
private foundations’ ineffectiveness in the diffusion of performance funding. 
5. Qualitative Case Selection and Criteria 
This dissertation intends to answer the question: why does policy diffusion 
succeed in some states but fail in others.  According to the quantitative analyses, 
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regional influence, educational attainment, tuition and enrollment change, and 
government ideology86 turn out to be main contributing factors to states’ decision on 
funding higher education either based on enrollment or performance.  The effects of 
these variables vary depending on the time period, and they appear to be significant 
during either 1979-2002 or 2003-2014.   
The next step is to identify states that share similar scores on these measures but 
made opposite decisions, and closely scrutinize and compare the pairs.  In the Literature 
Review chapter, I hypothesize that four factors may potentially lead to states’ non-
adoption of performance funding: (1) changing information that causes negative policy 
image shift, (2) lack of interactions with private foundations that support performance 
funding, (3) lack of participation in policy networks, and (4) lack of interactions with 
other policy agents.  The next chapter accounts for these additional variables to find out 
whether these elements lead to policy non-diffusion.  In other words, the chosen non-
adopters theoretically should have adopted performance funding since they have the 
favorable environment for such adoption, but the hypothesized factors may be the 
causes of non-adoption.   
As the statistical results confirm, states with higher numbers of adopting 
neighbors are more likely to enact performance funding in the earlier time period (1979-
2002).  This leads to the first matching criterion: the pairs should have similar numbers 
                                                          
86 I decide not to include higher education governance as part of my case selection criteria because (1) 
accounting for this variable will drastically confine my case selection given that only 22 out of the 48 
states have a consolidated governing board; and (2) as indicated in Chapter 2, in most states consolidated 
boards only play a minor role in the enactment of performance funding. 
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of adopting neighbors throughout the diffusion of performance funding.  The pairs 
should also share similar educational attainment, tuition and enrollment change, and 
government ideology.  Next, the paired cases should have similar number of public 
higher education institutions.  As explained in the previous chapters, the purpose of 
performance funding policy is to enhance higher education performance and improve 
institutional outcomes.  Therefore, it makes sense to compare states that have similar 
sizes of higher education systems.   The third matching criterion is that the selected 
adopters are states that enacted performance funding after 2002 because the data for 
private foundations is nonexistent prior to that, and private foundations are one of my 
testing variables.   
I choose to pair states that appear similar on the significant quantitative variables 
from both time frames because three of the hypothesized non-adoption variables 
(changing information, lack of participation in policy networks, and lack of interactions 
with policy agents) may occur throughout the entirety of the diffusion of performance 
funding.  Further, as indicated in Chapter 3, some private foundations have provided 
financial assistance to states’ development of performance formula since the very 
beginning.  When the program was initially introduced, the Tennessee Higher 
Education Commission received funding from the federal Fund for the Improvement of 
Postsecondary Education, the Ford and Kellogg Foundations, and an anonymous 
foundation in Tennessee to finance the pilot of the performance funding program 
(Dougherty, Natow, Bork, Jones, and Vega 2011).  Therefore, it is reasonable to select 
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states that share resemblance from significant quantitative variables from both time 
periods. 
Using these three selection requirements.  The following section details the pairs 
of adopters and non-adopters for the qualitative chapter.  The seven states that have 
never adopted performance funding are: Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.  To ensure proper matching, I did cross 
comparison for all seven non-adopters and adopters on the scales of educational 
attainment, tuition and enrollment change, and government ideology.  Among all the 
potentially matches, the closest pairs identified are Alabama and Mississippi.  The 
second closest pair of states is Maryland and Massachusetts.  The rest of the five non-
adopters do not have close matches on all the criteria.   
This project focuses only on Alabama and Mississippi given their high level of 
resemblance on the significant variables.  I had originally planned to include Maryland 
and Massachusetts also, but I was unable to because of the scheduling problem with the 
Maryland Higher Education Commission.  I reached out to the Commission in the 
spring of 2018 by sending interview request emails and making phone calls, however, I 
could not get an official to participate in this research.  Without information from the 
Commission, it would be difficult to accurately test the proposed hypotheses and make 
proper conclusions about this pair of comparison.  This is further addressed in the last 
chapter as a part of future research efforts87. 
                                                          
87 The comparison graphs between Maryland and Massachusetts on the significant variables are presented 
in Appendix G. 
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The non-adopter in my identified pair, Alabama, is certainly a unique case 
because it is surrounded by adopters, including the very first state that introduced 
performance funding—Tennessee.  The best match for Alabama is its neighbor 
Mississippi, who adopted performance funding in 2011.  As shown in Figures 4.4, 4.5, 
4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 below, the pair generally resemble each other on all the scales.  Both 
governments are on the relatively conservative end, with sporadic liberal peaks.  The 
two states also have similar educational attainment rates throughout the time frame.  
Higher education tuition changes are stable for the pair, although Alabama experienced 
a sudden drastic tuition increase in 1983.  During the bulk of the time window, the 
states’ enrollment changes are within plus and minus five percentage points.  Both state 
also exhibit resemblance in the predicted probability of performance funding adoption, 
as shown in Figure 4.8.  The predicted probability for Alabama to adopt performance 
funding increases tremendously from 2012-2014 and peaks in 2014, which makes this 
pair comparison particularly interesting. 
Regarding the size of higher education systems, Alabama has 30 public 
institutions in total88, including four large institutions (University of Alabama, Auburn 
University, Columbia Southern University, and Troy University), 24 medium 
institutions, and 12 small institutions.  Mississippi has 23 public institutions in total, 
including two large institutions (University of Mississippi and Mississippi State 
                                                          
88 There are three institutional sizes: Large institutions (>15,000 Undergraduate students), medium 
institutions (2,000-15,000 Undergraduate students), and small institutions (< 2,000 Undergraduate 
students) (U.S. Department of Education—College Scorecard 2017). 
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University), 3 medium institutions, and 18 small institutions (U.S. Department of 
Education—College Scorecard 2017). 
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Note: Mississippi adopted performance funding in 2011, therefore the data for the state is 
missing from 2012-2014 in the comparison figures 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I conceptualize the adoption of performance funding to be a 
function of various demographic and economic characteristics of the states.  Further, I 
hypothesize that government ideology, legislative professionalism, higher education 
status (i.e., enrollment and tuition changes) and governance, and educational attainment 
rate to be potential determinants of states’ decision to enact performance funding 
policy.  My results reveal that during the first time period (1979-2002) of performance 
funding diffusion, state fiscal condition, educational attainment, and higher education 
governance exhibited high correlation with the dependent variable.  Regional influence 
appears to be a marginally significant predictor of state adoption of performance 
funding.  From 2003 through 2014, enrollment change stands out as the most significant 
determinant of states response to performance funding policy, government ideology 
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turns out to be marginally significant, both in negative terms.  Statistically speaking, 
conservative governments and states with enrollment decrease are more likely to adopt 
performance funding.  In the next chapter, I take a close examination of the identified 
pair of selected cases, Alabama and Mississippi, to test the four proposed hypotheses.  
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Chapter V. Qualitative Findings 
Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on the inquiry of policy diffusion success and failure.  I 
employ a mixed-methods approach with both statistical and qualitative analyses.  The 
quantitative section applies Event History Analysis to investigate how the previously 
identified determinants perform in the case of performance funding diffusion.  The 
quantitative results indicate that regional influence, educational attainment, tuition and 
enrollment change, and government ideology contribute to states’ decision on funding 
higher education either based on enrollment or performance.  After conducting cross 
comparison for all seven non-adopters and adopters on the scales of these variables, I 
identify a close pair of states: Alabama and Mississippi.  The two states share 
resemblance on the statistically significant variables, Alabama has never adopted 
performance funding whereas Mississippi enacted the policy in 2011. 
Previously, I propose four general expectations that explain performance 
funding non-adoption: changing information that causes negative policy image shift, 
lack of interactions with nonprofits that support performance funding, lack of 
participation in policy networks, and lack of interactions with other policy agents.  This 
chapter tests these hypotheses through qualitative case studies.   
1. Qualitative Case Studies 
A qualitative method is defined as “research involves the usage and collection of 
a variety of empirical materials—case study; personal experience; introspection; life 
story; interview; artifacts; cultural texts and productions; observational, historical, 
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interactional, and visual texts—that describe routine and problematic moments and 
meanings in individuals’ lives (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p. 3).”  Case studies are 
common approaches of qualitative research, they are usually not a methodological 
choice but a choice of what is to be studied (Stake 2005).  Qualitative case study is an 
approach to research that facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context 
using a variety of data sources.  Analyzing information from various sources ensures 
that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which 
allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood (Baxter and 
Jack 2008). 
According to Yin (2017), a case study approach is useful when (a) the focus of 
the study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the 
behavior of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions 
because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the 
boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.  Because I am interested 
in the difference of decision-making and the changing environment for such decision-
making between my paired states, conducting cases studies is an appropriate method. 
2. Research Design and Data Collection 
As noted, a hallmark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources, 
including (but are not limited to) documentation, archival records, interviews, physical 
artifacts, direct observations, and participant-observation (Yin 2017).  In this research, I 
draw data from three sources: in-depth in-person interviews, online information from 
official government websites, and LexisNexis news articles.   
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2.1. In-Depth Interviews  
2.1.1. In-Person Interviews with State Officials from Alabama and Mississippi 
The first source of information includes two in-depth face-to-face interviews89 
with officials from the Alabama Commission on Higher Education and the Mississippi 
State Institutions of Higher Learning.  I contacted potential interviewees via email 
requesting an interview in the third quarter of 2016.  All contacts responded to my 
message in a timely manner and agreed to participate.  Then I followed up with them 
over the phone and scheduled an appointment90.  The first interview involved two 
officials91 from Alabama’s Office of Operations & Fiscal Services, and the second 
interview involved one official92 from Mississippi’s Department of Finance.  The 
purpose of the interviews was to understand how higher education policymakers from 
these two states make decisions on performance funding, whether adopting or rejecting 
the policy idea.  The interviews were open-ended and semi-structured; and sought to 
‘see’ how officials react to performance funding and the relevant factors that 
contributed to such decision.   
Preliminary questions were based on an interview guide that focused on asking 
participants about their experiences with performance funding programs.  I used my 
                                                          
89 The IRB documents are available in Appendix E. 
90 To ensure productivity, prior to the interviews, I spoke with Mr. John Schmeltzer, a Pulitzer Prize-
winning journalist and senior professor from the Gaylord College of Journalism and Mass 
Communication at the University of Oklahoma who held a 35-year career at the Chicago Tribune from 
political writer during the mid-1970s to assistant business editor in 2008.  Mr. Schmeltzer provided me 
with advice on interview techniques and strategies for gathering well-rounded information. 
91 Both individuals from Alabama are senior staff members who are knowledgeable about state higher 
education finance.  One individual spoke about higher education affairs back in the 1960s during the 
scheduling process, which further helps with the credibility of the information obtained.  
92 The interviewee from Mississippi works exclusively on state higher education finance.   
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own discretion to probe and ask follow-up questions where I saw fit.  For example, one 
of the participants commented on performance funding that “the formula worked to an 
extent…”, I thought it was appropriate to ask the interviewee to define “to an extent” 
and give a clearer explanation on what they mean by using this qualifier.   
The interviews were audio recorded with iPhone 7 Voice Memos application 
with the respondent’s permission, both interviews lasted approximately an hour.  Both 
interviews were conducted at interviewees’ professional office in the last quarter of 
2016.  After the completion of data collection, I transcribed both interview audio files.   
The structure of my interview is designed as follows: first, I began the interview 
with a quick presentation of the IRB documents and an overview of this dissertation.  
After each interviewee’s consent, I resumed to turn on the Voice Memos app on my 
phone and started recording.  Then I asked each interviewee to give an overall 
explanation and evaluation of performance funding in their state.  I then moved on to 
inquire about the information sources the institution referred to in making such decision 
to fund higher education based on performance.  After learning about the information 
sources, I continued to follow up on how the information was utilized in decision 
making.   
2.1.2. In-Person Interviews with Higher Education Organizations 
In the last quarter of 2016, I also interviewed four senior employees from 
Departments of Strategic Communications and Strategy at the Lumina Foundation, and 
the Senior Vice President of the Alliance for Complete College America (CCA).   
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The interviews were scheduled the same way as the interviews with higher 
education officials.  The purpose of the interviews was to investigate the activities 
higher education nonprofits have partaken in to promote performance funding, the 
information they provide to policymakers, and the states they have interacted with.  I 
chose to interview these two nonprofits because their missions focus exclusively on 
higher education and they are two of the most extensively involved organizations in 
pushing for performance funding, as elaborated in Chapter Three.   
The interviews were recorded the same way described above.  I opened the 
interview with an introduction of my IRB documents, after the participants’ consent I 
turned on the recorder and proceeded to ask them questions.  The conversations heavily 
focused on the information they provide to state officials, the states they have reached 
out to, the activities they taken part in, and the intention of their effort93, 94. 
2.2. Official Government and Higher Education Governing Agency Websites 
Since this dissertation studies policy diffusion and state policymaking, it is 
necessary to draw information from official government websites.  I visited a list of 
websites for data gathering, the list is presented in Appendix F.  
                                                          
93 To ensure productivity, before the interview I read all the news articles and publications these 
organizations put out on their websites as of October 2016.  I also closely examined all Lumina’s 990 
Forms, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
94 The reason for leaving out the Gates Foundation is twofold.  First, they dedicate rather small portion of 
resources to higher education performance, compared with the other two nonprofits.  The Gates 
Foundation tackles five program areas: global health division, global development division, global 
growth and opportunity division, U.S. division, and global policy and advocacy division (Gates 
Foundation 2018).  Their domestic division works to improve U.S. high school and postsecondary 
education and support vulnerable children and families mainly in Washington State.  Second, there was 
some scheduling issue with the potential participants. 
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2.3. Nonprofits Website Information 
According to numerous studies, the Lumina and Gates Foundations, and CCA 
are among the most vigorous advocates of performance funding, therefore, I 
downloaded all the text information (including news, referred external sources, and 
published reports) from their official websites as a part of my data.  
2.4. LexisNexis 
Next, I used the LexisNexis online searchable newspaper database, which 
contains a large volume of historical and current news information from a wide range of 
news sources.  I contend that LexisNexis is a comprehensive and reliable database to 
collect data from because it employs the latest algorithmic tools, along with computing 
power, to synthesize information from numerous sources (Kleinig et al. 2011).   
In the January and February of 2018, I did a trial study to test the feasibility and 
value of information by using different search terms.  I initially performed a search for 
media coverage on “Alabama Legislature” (from January 1st, 1979-December 31st, 
2014) and went over all 619 mentions, the results are mainly news reports that contain 
little information on legislative activities with policy agents or higher education.  Not 
being able to find much on the State Legislature, I then created a database for all the 
news articles that mention past Alabama governors and analyzed 1,144 news articles95 
                                                          
95 The breakdown of the 1,144 news articles: 234 results for Governor Fob James (in office from 1979-
1983; 1995-1999), 12 results for Governor George Wallace (in office from 1983-1987), 21 results for 
Governor H. Guy Hunt (in office from 1987-1993), 83 results for Governor Jim Folsom Jr. (in office 
from 1993-1995), 158 results for Governor Don Siegelman (in office from 1999-2003), 358 results for 
Governor Bob Riley (in office from 2003-2011), and 278 results for Governor Robert Bentley (2011-
2014).  Governor Bentley was in office from January 17, 2011 to April 10, 2017 but my search ended on 
December 31st, 2014.  I read all the mentions to eliminate duplicates.  
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using NVivo 12 Plus, a qualitative analysis computer program.  The search turned out to 
be unhelpful for this research because most of these articles are mainly about political 
elections, partisanship, local news, and policy issues that have little to do with higher 
education.  I also looked for news stories that discuss the governors’ and the 
legislature’s relationship with policy networks or education organizations, the usable 
materials are very few and far between.  This failed attempt leads me to believe that I 
should change my search terms from state legislative institutions—information 
receivers, to policy agents—information suppliers.   
Guided by my research questions and hypotheses, the next step is to identify the 
potential policy agents of performance funding diffusion.  I proceeded to list all 
organizations in the U.S. that primarily work in higher education and investigate which 
ones are involved in performance funding issues, including nonprofit and consulting 
organizations.  To compile a reliable list of these organizations, I explored multiple 
credible sources96.  Table 5.1 below is the list of organizations I have generated97.  
                                                          
96 These sources are: The Chronicle of Higher Education (2018), Hall and Thomas (2012), McQuade 
Library at the Merrimack College (2018), National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities 
(2018), Sterns Center for Teaching and Learning at the George Mason University (2018), Student Affairs 
(2018), the U.S. Higher Education System (2018), and the U.S. Department of Education (2018). 
97 I visited all the organizations’ websites and verified that the organizations are higher education related.  
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With this list in hand, I then re-visited the literature on performance funding to 
determine which ones are policy agents for diffusing performance funding.  Current 
studies have identified that performance funding has received strong support from the 
Lumina Foundation (Alstadt 2012; Blankenberger and Phillips 2014; Dougherty et al. 
2011; Dougherty and Natow 2015; Fryar 2011; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Li 
2017; Li and Kennedy 2018; McLendon, Cohen-Vogel, and Wachen 2014; Ness, 
Deupree, and Gándara 2015; Quinterno 2012; Tandberg and Hillman 2014), the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation (Blankenberger and Phillips 2014; Fryar 2011; Hillman, 
Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Ness, Deupree, and Gándara 2015; Umbricht, Fernandez, 
and Ortagus 2017), and Complete College America (CCA) (Alstadt 2012; Dougherty et 
al. 2011; Fryar 2011; Li 2017; Li and Kennedy 2018; McLendon, Cohen-Vogel, and 
Wachen 2014; Tandberg and Hillman 2014).  All these three happen to be 501(c)(3) 
nonprofits.  As documented by numerous studies, these three organizations are the most 
prominent advocates for performance funding policy98.  Therefore, I performed a search 
of all the LexisNexis mentions of these three99.     
As stated in previous chapters, the first period of adoption of performance 
funding that occurred in the 1990s is mainly attributed to the nationwide performance 
management movement in the public sector.  Performance-based funding systems were 
heavily integrated into state and federal government programs as a means of holding 
                                                          
98 I explored all the listed organizations in Table 5.1 by reading organizational missions and published 
information (i.e., news stories, blog posts, programs, events, and history) and confirmed this conclusion.   
99 As stated, Gates’s primary work area is not higher education related, therefore I only collected news 
information that is relevant to my study.  Also, LexisNexis sometimes has duplicated stories, I paid close 
attention to avoid such occurrence in my database. 
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public agencies accountable for improving the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of 
program services.  Under this performance funding movement, states extended such 
mechanism to the higher education sector.  Starting in the early 2000s, philanthropic 
foundations and nonprofits began to distribute money to establish performance funding 
in various states.  All these three organizations were established in the 21st century100, 
which explains that the policy agents portion of the data ranges from 2000-2014.  
2.5. Data Coding and Analysis 
In total, I gathered four in-depth interviews and 704 articles.  Among the 704 
articles, 314 are from the three organizations’ websites and 390 are from LexisNexis.  I 
analyzed and coded the collected data in the first two quarters of 2018 using NVivo 12 
Plus, qualitative data analysis software.  In qualitative research, data coding reliability is 
crucial.  Many strategies are available within qualitative research to protect against bias 
and enhance the reliability.  Krippendorff (2004) suggests three methods to improve 
such reliability.  First is stability where the concern is whether a coder’s use of codes 
changes over time.  Second is accuracy where a gold standard coding scheme is already 
established with high reliability and other coding schemes are developed and compared 
to it.  Third is reproducibility across coders—often called intercoder reliability—where 
the concern is whether different coders would code the same data the same way.   
Research conducted by a single researcher is limited to the perceptions and 
introspection of the author.  Taking advice from Krippendorff (2004), I prioritize 
                                                          
100 The Gate Foundation was formed in 2000, Lumina Foundation in 2002, CCA in 2009. 
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consistency in data coding and pay close attention to accuracy.  Unfortunately, I was 
unable to involve an additional researcher to test intercoder reliability.  Being fully 
aware of such limit and potential bias, I did my best to objectively investigate the data 
and constantly remind myself the importance of holding an unbiased attitude in date 
coding.   
I conducted a manual line-by-line open coding of the collected data.  An open 
code is supported by at least one unit of data, defined as “any meaningful (or potentially 
meaningful) segment” of text (Merriam 2009, p. 176).  Each unit must “reveal 
information relevant to the study and stimulate the reader to think beyond that particular 
bit of information” (Lincoln and Guba 1985, p. 345).  Manual coding not only helps me 
identify important themes, it also allows me to generate evidence-based conclusions 
rather than making assumptions.   
Data analysis began with a close breakdown of my hypotheses.  First, I focus on 
three key themes: Policy Image (whether performance funding is reported positively, 
neutrally, or negatively), Activities with State Government (the states that the 
organizations have reached out to), and Policy Agents (other policy agents associated 
with performance funding diffusion).  Table 5.2 presents examples of my coding 
strategy.  
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Second, Activities with State Government was further broken down into 
subcategories of each state.  Table 5.3 below presents examples of my such breakdown 
of subcategories.  
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Third, Policy Agents in Performance Funding Diffusion was further broken 
down into subcategories of each policy agent.  Table 5.4 below presents examples of 
my such breakdown of subcategories.   
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Information that addresses more than one theme was coded into multiple 
themes.  For example, during the interview with Alabama, one interviewee indicated 
that “(we’ve been to meetings at) SREB (Southern Regional Education Board), SHEEO 
(State Higher Education Executive Officers), NACUBO (National Association of 
College and University Business Officers), NCSL, AIR (Association of Institutional 
Researchers), most higher education entities, and some others, like I said, it’s not a new 
concept and it’s been discussed widely. We’ve attended webinars also.”  This statement 
is coded into multiple subcategories under Policy Agents in Performance Funding 
Diffusion since multiple agents are mentioned in this statement.    
For another example, Jamie P. Merisotis, Lumina’s President & CEO, addressed 
remarks to the Maryland Higher Education Commission on January 8, 2013101.  During 
the speech, he pointed out “In fact, more than 30 states now either use some type of 
performance-based funding for higher education or, as is the case here in Maryland, are 
in the process of developing and refining such models.  So this is not a new policy 
approach; it is a continuous process of aligning and matching the state’s needed student 
outcomes with financial incentives for institutions.”  This comment is coded under two 
main themes—Policy Image and Activities with State Government, because the remark 
directly discusses performance funding and it involves the higher education governing 
agency in Maryland.  It is further categorized into the subthemes of Policy Image 
(Neutral) and State of Maryland.  
                                                          
101 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/rising-to-the-college-
attainment-challenge-in-maryland 
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I also looked for unexpected themes and data found in the database.  Using 
NVivo 12 Plus, I labeled the data focusing on key terms and concepts and put them into 
groupings.  Once the concepts were identified through analysis of the data and put into 
groupings, I coded for patterns in the responses and materials.  From the 710 documents 
(704 articles and four interview transcripts), Policy Image is mentioned 308 times in 
total, Activities with State Government 4605 times, and Policy Agents in Performance 
Funding Diffusion 191 times.   
Table 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 below summarize the descriptive statistics for sub-themes 
for each main theme.  Table 5.6 demonstrates that both foundations are selective 
communicators.  They have devoted most of their attention to the states of Indiana, New 
York, Ohio, Texas, and Washington102.  The states that are leased connected with 
Lumina are: Alabama, Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.   
                                                          
102 It is unsurprising since Lumina is based in Indiana and Gates is based in Washington.    
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3. Findings 
In policy diffusion, information is a fundamental element.  With the knowledge 
of the innovation, state lawmakers process the information, evaluate the idea, and make 
final decisions to either adopt or reject the innovation.  Political communication and 
information exchange are two-way bargains, with information supply and consumption, 
therefore the findings of my qualitative analysis are presented in both directions.  On 
the receiving end, policymakers gather the information provided and make proper 
decisions in accordance; on the supply end, policy agents deliver the information 
strategically in their favor.  The following section reviews the higher education 
budgetary processes for each selected state and discusses the information state higher 
education officials receive on performance funding. 
3.1. Overview of Higher Education Finance in the Two States 
Both Alabama and Mississippi have a coordinating board that lacks 
constitutional authority to determine higher education budget.  The key difference lies 
in the authority to distribute higher education funding.  The Alabama Commission on 
Higher Education (ACHE) has a more limited role than the Mississippi Institution of 
Higher Learning (IHL) in the sense that the latter bears the responsibility to distribute 
funds to the institution it oversees.  Therefore, it is possible that the IHL plays a more 
substantial role than the ACHE in partaking in higher education finance, given that it 
implements the approved higher education budget.    
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3.1.1. Higher Education Finance in Alabama 
Alabama has 30 public institutions in total, including four large institutions 
(University of Alabama, Auburn University, Columbia Southern University, and Troy 
University), 24 medium institutions, and 12 small institutions (U.S. Department of 
Education—College Scorecard 2017).  The ACHE is the coordinating board for higher 
education in the State of Alabama.  The ACHE was created by Alabama law, Act No. 
14, Special Session, 1969, and reenacted by Act 461, Regular Session, 1979, to ensure 
that the state’s system of higher education would provide the citizens of Alabama with 
the highest possible quality of collegiate and university education (ACHE 2018).  The 
ACHE is composed of 12 members appointed by the governor, lieutenant governor and 
the speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives and confirmed by the Alabama 
State Senate.  The Alabama Code §16-5-9(b) indicates: 
“…. The Commission shall receive, evaluate and coordinate 
budget requests for the public institutions of higher education of this 
state, shall hold open hearings on the budget requests of the separate 
institutions and shall present to each institution and to the Governor and 
the Legislature, a single unified budget report containing budget 
recommendations for separate appropriations to each of the institutions.  
The consolidated budget and analysis of the Commission shall be 
accompanied by the original requests and their justifications as submitted 
by each institution.  The recommendations of the commission shall be 
derived directly from its assessment of the actual funding needs of each 
of the universities, as presented to it by the presidents, which assessment 
may include, but shall not be limited to, derived conclusions that may be 
based upon standard techniques of objective measurement, need and unit 
cost figures arrived at through the use of comparative and verified data 
secured from the various institutions, applied in an impartial and 
objective manner, and comparison shall be made not only between 
similar functions of institutions in Alabama but also between Alabama 
institutions and similar functions of institutions located in other states, 
provided that nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit any 
institutions of higher education in this state from submitting any matter 
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pertaining to the financial operation and needs of said institution to the 
Legislature or to the Governor at any time.” 
 
As prescribed by Section 16-5-9(b) of the Code of Alabama, the ACHE has no 
legal authority to determine the appropriation or allocation of higher education funds.  
The ACHE is responsible for submitting the Consolidated Budget Recommendation to 
the Legislature each year for the public two- and four-year institutions.  Although the 
ACHE can make annual budget recommendations, the Governor and the Legislature are 
under no legal requirement to use them when they make the appropriations to the 
colleges and universities.   
As prescribed in Section 123 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, “… he103 
shall account to the legislature, as may be prescribed by law, for all moneys received 
and paid out by him or by his order; and at the commencement of each regular session 
he shall present to the legislature estimates of the amount of money required to be 
raised by taxation for all purposes (Constitution of Alabama 1901).”  The actual 
allocation of funds to the colleges and universities is mainly based on a base plus/minus 
model.  Institutions start with what they received the previous year and the percent 
increase of decrease made is generally the same to all institutions with small variances 
(ACHE 2018).  The Executive Budget Office (EBO), in coordination with the Finance 
Director and Governor, prepares the Governor’s Recommended budgets for 
presentation to the Alabama Legislature. 
                                                          
103 “He” refers to the governor. 
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Once the budget is presented, the Legislature shall “modify or withhold the 
planned expenditures at any time during the appropriation period if the Department of 
Finance finds that such expenditures are greater than those necessary to execute the 
programs at the level authorized by the Governor and the Legislature or that the 
revenues and resources will be insufficient to meet the authorized expenditure levels 
(Alabama Code §41-19-10).”  
The Alabama Legislature consists of a 35-member Senate and a 105-member 
House of Representatives, whose districts are based upon population.  All legislative 
bodies operate mainly through committees in doing their work of considering bills.  The 
Governor submits the annual budgets shortly after the Legislature begins its regular 
session (Stewart 2016; The Alabama Legislature 2018).  According to the Alabama 
Constitution (Amendment 448), passage of the education and General Fund budgets 
take priority over all other legislation (The Alabama Legislature 2018).  The budgetary 
process is depicted in Figure 6.1 below. 
The EBO is also responsible for the execution of the budgets as passed by the 
Legislature, along with analyzing and approving all operating budgets and revisions.  In 
addition, the EBO estimates revenues, revising as necessary throughout the fiscal year, 
and supervises the expenditures and other fiscal operations of state agencies (Alabama 
Department of Finance 2018).  Fund allocated to two- and four-year colleges and 
universities come out of the Education Trust Fund (ETF).  Ten tax sources are credited 
to the ETF, the largest of which are the individual and corporate income tax, sales tax, 
utility tax, and use tax.  Other programs and agencies supported by the ETF include K-
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12 education, public library services, performing and fine arts, various scholarship 
programs, and the state’s education regulatory departments (Alabama Department of 
Finance 2018).   
Figure 5.1: Higher Education Budgeting in Alabama 
 
3.1.2. Higher Education Finance in Mississippi 
Mississippi has 23 public institutions in total, including two large institutions 
(University of Mississippi and Mississippi State University), 3 medium institutions, and 
18 small institutions (U.S. Department of Education—College Scorecard 2017).  The 
state institutions of higher learning are under the management and control of a board of 
trustees known as the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning (IHL).  
The Institutions of Higher Learning consist of the eight public universities: Alcorn State 
University, Delta State University, Jackson State University, Mississippi State 
University, Mississippi University for University, Mississippi Valley State University, 
the University of Mississippi, and the University of Southern Mississippi.  The Board of 
Trustees is the constitutional governing body responsible for policy and financial 
oversight of these eight public institutions.  The Board first assumed its duties in 1944.  
There are 12 board members, representing the three Supreme Court Districts, appointed 
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by the Governor and confirmed by the Mississippi Senate, the members serve nine-year 
terms (Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning 2018).   
According to the Mississippi Code of 1972, Title 37, Chapter 101, Section 15: 
“The board shall annually prepare, or cause to be prepared, a 
budget for each institution of higher learning for the succeeding year 
which must be prepared and in readiness for at least thirty (30) days 
before the convening of the regular session of the Legislature. All 
relationships and negotiations between the State Legislature and its 
various committees and the institutions named herein shall be carried on 
through the board of trustees.” 
 
The Board appoints a Commissioner of Higher Education to administer the 
Board’s policies at the eight universities.  In addition to the administrative role, the 
Commissioner prepares and submits annual statements of system planning and budget 
priorities for consideration and approval by the Board.  After the budget is reviewed, the 
Board prepares an annual report to the Legislature setting forth the disbursements of all 
moneys appropriated to the respective institutions (Mississippi Institutions of Higher 
Learning 2018).  The Governor may veto parts of any appropriation bill and approve 
parts of the same.  The major sources of revenue for the system are state appropriations, 
tuition, patient fees (UMMC), and funding from donors and governmental entities such 
as contracts, grants, and endowments. 
As indicated in the IHL Policies and Bylaws (2018): 
“… The Commissioner, after consultation with the Institutional 
Executive Officers, shall prepare and submit an annual statement of 
system planning and budget priorities for consideration and approval by 
the Board.  These priorities will then be incorporated into the Adequate 
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Funding Model to help generate the annual budget request for the several 
institutions and separately budgeted units (p. 113)” 
“… All appropriations made for the use of any or all institutions 
including the central office of the Board shall be received by the Board 
as a lump sum, with the power and authority in said Board to allocate 
and distribute the same among the institutions under its control in such 
way and manner and in such amounts as will further an efficient and 
economical administration of the institutions (pp. 113-114)” 
 
The budgetary process is depicted in Figure 6.2 below. 
Figure 5.2: Higher Education Budgeting in Mississippi 
 
In the 2011 Mississippi Legislative Session, the Legislature passed HB 875, 
which directed the Education Achievement Council to “research and develop a new 
funding mechanism for public community colleges and state institutions of higher 
learning based upon productivity goals and accomplishments as well as enrollment” 
(Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning 2014).  The 
Education Achievement Council took a two-track approach, asking the Mississippi 
Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning and the Mississippi 
Community College Board to study funding models based on productivity measures.  In 
the 2013 Legislative Session, the Legislature passed SB 2851, which provides the 
funding allocated through the model. 
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3.1.2.1. Performance Funding in Mississippi 
Mississippi’s adoption of performance funding is mainly attributed to two 
notable national trends in higher education.  The first trend has to do with declining 
state appropriations. As the economy declined, state appropriations for higher education 
throughout the nation declined as well.  However, higher education enrollment is 
counter-cyclical with increasing enrollments during times of economic uncertainty.  The 
decreasing state appropriations and increasing enrollment put significant pressure on 
university budgets.  Second, in response to concerns over maintaining quality in the 
face of declining resources, states began to implement funding mechanisms, either 
implicitly or explicitly, based on institutional or agency performance.  These 
mechanisms tend to shift the focus from equity and adequacy in funding to outcomes 
achieved with the funding received (interview with Mississippi Institutions of Higher 
Learning 2016). 
The observation of the two trends led state legislators to reconsider the 
budgetary decisions for higher education.  In the 2011 Mississippi Legislative Session, 
the Legislature passed HB 875, which directed the Education Achievement Council to 
“research and develop a new funding mechanism for public community colleges and 
state institutions of higher learning based upon productivity goals and accomplishments 
as well as enrollment” (Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher 
Learning 2014).  The Education Achievement Council took a two-track approach, 
asking the Mississippi Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning and 
the Mississippi Community College Board to study funding models based on 
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productivity measures.  In the 2013 Legislative Session, the Legislature passed SB 
2851, which provides the funding allocated through the model. 
Under the formula, the state allocates operational support to each university 
based on the factors of enrollment, number of on-campus students, number of buildings, 
acreage, number of off-site facilities and infrastructure.  The amount allocated to each 
university for operational support was determined by three-year averages in three 
categories of spending: institutional support, operations and maintenance, and student 
services.  This amount of operational support is equivalent to the based fund that is not 
influenced by institutional performance (Mississippi Board of Trustees of State 
Institutions of Higher Learning 2014).  Alcorn State University (ASU), Delta State 
University (DSU), Mississippi University for Women (MUW), and Mississippi Valley 
State University (MVSU) receive 15% of their spending in these three categories; 
Jackson State University (JSU) receives 10% of its spending in these three categories; 
Mississippi State University (MSU), the University of Mississippi (UM), and the 
University of Southern Mississippi (USM) receive 6% of their spending in these three 
categories.  Using current methodology, individual allocations for operational support 
range from a low of $2.4 million at DSU to a high of $4.6 at JSU. 
After the operational support dollars are separated from the rest of the allocable 
dollars, 90% of the allocation is based on completed credit hour production.  The 
formula measures the number of credit hours completed at each university and 
attainment outcomes, which include degrees awarded, the number of students 
graduating in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math) fields and how 
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many at-risk students are served by the university (Mississippi Board of Trustees of 
State Institutions of Higher Learning 2014). 
3.2. Hypotheses Testing 
3.2.1. Information Suppliers 
At a time when college budgets are strained from cuts, Lumina and Gates have 
urged lawmakers to allocate spending more efficiently, emphasizing the need for more 
students to graduate and remedies to facilitate such success.  As shown in Table 5.5, the 
Foundations have connections with all 50 states to varying degrees.  In particular, the 
Lumina Foundation spoke about their mission very passionately during the interview:   
“We’re opportunistic, we talk to states that have leadership that come 
forward and say hey we’ve heard about Lumina and we’re interested in 
this and that.  We roll up our sleeves and Lumina has helped create a lot 
of the organizations you hear about today that do higher education policy 
research.  We have a great network of people that we can throw a lot of 
experts and the right kind of experts at states if they have questions so 
that out brand in the marketplace of ideas and public policy and higher 
education is pretty high.” 
 
Although I did not have a chance to interview the Gates Foundation, they are 
generous donors to such cause as well.  In 2009, Gates contributed $8 million grant to 
help start CCA and encouraged other philanthropies to help the group raise more 
money.  CCA’s agenda calls for streamlining or eliminating remedial classes, providing 
more academic support in credit-bearing courses, and providing colleges with financial 
incentives to graduate more students.  Gates has since awarded an additional $1.2 
million to CCA, and the foundation’s support makes up about 60 percent of CCA’s 
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annual budget.  In addition, the nonprofit has also received $1.7 million from the 
Lumina Foundation. 
My findings overall indicate that the Foundations actively reach out to 
policymakers and urge them to move toward an outcome and performance-based 
funding approach.  Lumina consistently suggests government agencies take action to 
transform and reform the current education system by applying business models to 
higher education to produce more graduates.  According to my analysis, the three 
nonprofits generally present performance funding positively.  Both Lumina and CCA 
also commented on performance funding laudatorily during the interviews.  This 
positivity is reasonable given their advocacy for the policy. 
As indicated, since the early 2000s, lawmakers in over a dozen of states have 
passed laws tying appropriations to performance, particularly graduation rates.  At the 
center of the effort, the Lumina and Gates Foundations have sponsored policy events 
and financed various programs that argue for broad-scale changes aimed at pushing 
more students, more quickly, toward graduation.  Instead of having performance 
funding as a stand-alone idea, both Foundations set forth a sequence of activities that 
help establish and justify performance funding.   
  Among the three organizations, the Lumina Foundation is the most active 
policy agent.  The three primary areas the Foundation works in are preparation, success, 
and productivity.  Specifically, the foundation strives to help high school students 
prepare for college academically, financially, and socially; brainstorm and share ideas 
for improving higher education graduation rates; and help expand higher education 
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capacity and serve more students, especially low-income, first-generation, and minority 
students.  These three areas are designed to achieve the “Big Goal” or “Goal 2025” 
which refers to having 60% of Americans hold degrees, certificates or other high-
quality postsecondary credentials by 2025 (Interview with the Lumina Foundation 
2016; Lumina Foundation 2018).  This ambition is built on the belief that our economy 
is in desperate need of intellectual resources and the higher education system should 
step up to fulfil such need by producing more college graduates.   
For the first topic, college preparation, the Lumina Foundation has committed to 
two prominent initiatives: College Goal Sunday and KnowHow2Go.  College Goal 
Sunday, originally a joint project of the Indiana Student Financial Aid Association 
(ISFAA) and the State Student Assistance Commission of Indiana (SSACI), is a 
nationwide program that helps college-bound students and their families complete the 
Free Application for Federal Student Aid, the form necessary to qualify for many 
student aid programs to pay college expenses (National College Access Network 2018).  
Lumina’s support for College Goal Sunday has expanded the program’s reach to more 
states.  For example, on January 24th, 2004, the foundation announced nearly one 
million dollars to expand the program to five exploratory states and five implementation 
states—Alaska, Illinois, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, and Texas104.  Additionally, in January 2007 the Lumina Foundation partnered 
with the American Council on Education and the Ad Council, and launched 
KnowHow2Go, a campaign that encourages under-privileged high school students to 
                                                          
104 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/college-goal-sunday-expands-
to-help-more-low-income-families-apply-for-college-financial-aid 
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prepare for college by providing free information and financial assistance.  Through the 
effort, Lumina brings awareness to high school students to cultivate the college-going 
culture. 
Not only is it critical to encourage college enrollment, it is also essential to 
ensure that the graduation and retention rates keep up with such growth.  Completion 
and attainment is the ultimate goal of this continuous effort.  The initiatives devoted to 
the second area include performance-based (or sometimes referred to as outcome-based) 
funding and Achieving the Dream.  The Lumina Foundation firmly and repetitively 
iterates the importance of transforming the higher education funding system through 
applying business models to higher education to produce more graduates.  Particularly, 
the Foundation recommends performance funding frequently during meetings with state 
higher education agencies and legislators.   
For example, on February 23rd, 2011, Lumina’s CEO, Jamie Merisotis, made a 
testimony in front of the Arizona House of Representatives Higher Education, 
Innovation and Reform Committee.  During the speech, he commented that “There are 
also places where Arizona needs to continue to push despite—or perhaps because—of 
the new normal in state appropriations.  These are the tightly integrated areas of funding 
student success at universities and creating a need-based aid program that incentivizes 
completion.105”   For another example, on December 11th, 2013, the Lumina Foundation 
launched Strategy Labs, a new digital platform that helps states significantly increase 
                                                          
105 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/arizona-s-economic-recovery-
the-vital-role-of-colleges-and-universities 
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graduation, as a critical mechanism to promote Lumina’s state policy agenda, which is 
focused on the reforms needed to build student-centered, outcomes-based postsecondary 
education systems with the capacity to successfully serve more students106.   
The second initiative, Achieving the Dream, is a national level data-driven effort 
to improve student success at the college level.  It works on multiple fronts, including 
improvement of community college student success and through research, public 
engagement and public policy that can bolster student success.  Achieving the Dream 
aims to improve student success at community colleges by helping the colleges use data 
to analyze how their students were doing and find ways to increase student retention 
and graduation rates. 
The last area, productivity, refers to making higher education more productive 
through maximizing the outcome and performance.  The key initiative to improve 
productivity is Making Opportunity Affordable, a program designed to promote and 
support a productivity agenda for American higher education, particularly at public 
institutions.  The initiative’s agenda embraces several strategies. The most important is 
direct work with states to overhaul finance systems to stimulate productivity, increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of academic programs and administrative operations, 
and realign system capacity. 
Similar to Lumina’s set of strategies, Gates also stresses college preparation and 
student success.  Both Foundations infiltrate the education system and penetrate the 
                                                          
106 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/strategy-labs-website-
launched-to-help-states-increase-attainment 
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legislative process by providing financial support and technical information.  Both 
Foundations also attempt to fundamentally reform the American education system by 
enforcing a series of initiatives to increase enrollments and improve college graduation 
rates.  Performance funding is considered as the key to reach that final goal.  During the 
interview with Lumina, one participant stated that:  
“We had an intermediary organization called HCM Strategist that’s 
based in Washington DC, they specialize in state policy work. Our goal 
is to increase higher education productivity, we organized it into 4 areas 
which were called “Four Steps to Finishing First”.  The first step is to 
implement some kind of performance funding, the second step is help 
students to think about they can pass through their education, so they can 
get their degree and do it on time.  The third one is around business 
efficiency.  The fourth one around new models, basically a more 
efficient way to deliver education…  Through Strategy Lab, we work 
with states.  What we try to get them to do was to take a portion of their 
public funding for higher education and allocate it toward a set of 
metrics like driving increases in all attainment level in state population.  
It’s not about graduation rates but year-after-year increase in the number 
of graduates.  So that was one metric that we encouraged states to look 
at.” 
 
The interviewees at Lumina also spoke about their effort to fund research that 
closely investigate performance funding and conclude policy recommendations that go 
along with the development of performance funding formula and implantation.  When 
asked what information Lumina provides to states, one respondent said that:  
“We inform them (state officials) of what the best practices are and the 
criteria we look for in good performance funding models.  We meet the 
state where it is.  If they are interested in performance funding, we have 
consultants from HCM Strategists, our intermediary organization that 
specialized in state policy work, who can meet with them and do a 
convening, so they can gather people who’re interested in the state, we 
can bring experts across the country, and other states that have done 
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performance funding and they can talk to their peers and learn about 
what they’ve done in their example.”   
 
As discussed in the second chapter, many empirical studies conclude that 
performance funding is ineffective due to its failure in boosting institutional 
performance and the potential negative consequences.  Both foundations appear to be 
aware of the criticisms, but they generally are defensive of the flaws.  For example, in 
an article published on Jan 8th, 2013 on Lumina’s website, it states: “These and other 
example show that performance-based funding can work, and work well.  But not all 
performance-based funding is the same.  Nonpartisan researchers have looked closely at 
these funding models in several states, and they’ve compiled a list of recommendations 
for states and systems that may be considering such policies (Merisotis107 2013).”  
During the interview, when I brought up the negative study results, one respondent 
made the following counterargument: 
“I’d like them to defend why the existing system of FTE-based 
funding or base-plus funding works better than performance-based 
funding for low income students or students of color.  If resources come 
forward and say that FTE-based or base-plus funding in this country is 
the better alternative (than performance-based funding0, then I will start 
paying attention.  But all I’ve seen is that a very new type of model of 
funding formula which has been embraced by K-12 education and K-12 
funding formulas and budgets for the last hundred years in this country.  
How does that philosophy not work in postsecondary education?  It sure 
changed behavior in K-12.” 
In summary, both the Gates and Lumina Foundations have been dedicating 
tremendous amounts of financial and intellectual resources to reform the education 
                                                          
107 Jamie P. Merisotis is the President & CEO of the Lumina Foundation. 
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system.  Under the shared mission of helping expand the population with a 
postsecondary credential in the U.S., both Foundations have set forth a multi-stage plan 
to help more students enroll in college and eventually complete their degree, call 
attention to higher education productivity and performance, and encourage legislative 
effort to fulfill the cause.  In order to diffuse the policy idea and raise legislative 
awareness, both Foundations sponsor public convenings, speak at national and regional 
conferences, and reach out to state officials.  The Foundations work selectively with 
states that have expressed interest in performance funding or are in the process of 
developing a performance funding formula.  Beyond their direct involvement, both 
Foundation have dispersed dollars to mobilize other higher education organizations to 
join the effort, among which CCA is the most influential one.   
3.2.2. Information Receivers 
Section 3.2.1. discusses how policy image is presented by information providers, 
it is equally important to scrutinize the other side of the communication and see if the 
information translate to good policy image in policymakers’ eyes.  My interviews with 
higher education officials lead me to the conclusion that decision makers are fully 
aware of the idea of performance funding.  On numerous occasions, each interviewee 
spoke of their knowledge of the policy.  Their information sources, however, are very 
different.    
Neither state is fully on the foundations’ radar given their comparatively low-
level of communication among all the states Lumina has worked with, as seen in Table 
5.6.  During the interview with Alabama, both officials spoke about their full awareness 
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of performance funding and understanding of other states’ experiment with such 
funding strategy.  Both interviewees talked about the extensive research the ACHE has 
conducted in the past on performance funding by drawing information from other states.  
The ACHE’s knowledge mainly came from observation of other states and NCSL 
meetings.  Both respondents indicated that they had never attended a CCA meeting, nor 
had they been contacted directly by either of the Foundations.  Further, the ACHE 
officials didn’t appear to be impressed with performance funding, when asked if they 
believe that performance funding will help improve college performance, they both 
remained skeptical.  As discussed above, Table 5.6 shows that Alabama is among the 
least interactive states with the organizations.  The Lumina Foundation confirmed this 
by pointing out that:  
“We haven’t done much work with Alabama.  The condition has 
to be right for this.  There is no amount of money or resources we can 
provide to the states that do not want to adopt performance funding, no 
matter how good the policy might be for them.  Some states that want to 
do it, and sometimes little money can transcend and change things.  That 
money is for meetings and bringing in technical support.  They need to 
embrace the idea.” 
 
Given the limited authority of making higher education appropriation, the 
ACHE cannot make budgetary decisions.  Instead, the ACHE collects financial 
information from institutions and make budgetary recommendations to the Governor 
and state Legislature.  The interview further confirms such discretion delegation.  When 
asked whether the ACHE has any voice in higher education appropriation, the first 
interviewee responded that: 
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“Absolutely not.  The state legislature and governor decide the 
appropriation amount.  The governor will put forward his budget, which 
includes higher education, and the Legislature ultimately makes the 
decision because they pass the actual appropriation budget.” 
The second person added that:  
“We make recommendations, but these recommendations are not 
used. They never use our recommendations. The legislature makes the 
decision, and it’s basically a cost plus or minus based on what you’ve got 
the year before, all the school will get the same amount as the previous 
year with some increase or decrease based on revenues. We’re the 
coordinating board, not the board of regents. Everything is based on how 
much revenue is available.  We’ve been making recommendations since 
1969, they have never used our budget recommendations.” 
 
According to the ACHE website, the agency has a wide range of partnerships 
including Alabama State Department of Education, Alabama Community College 
System, Alabama Independent Colleges, A+ College Ready, Public Affairs Research 
Council of Alabama (PARCA), State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO), 
and Southern Regional Education Board (SREB), When asked whether members at 
ACHE have contact with other policy agents or policy networks, the first interviewee 
stated that: 
“We’ve been to meetings at SREB, SHEEO, NACUBO (National 
Association of College University Business Officers), NCSL, AIR 
(Association of Institutional Researchers), most higher education 
entities, and some others, like I said, it’s not a new concept and it’s been 
discussed widely.  We’ve attended webinars also.” 
 
All these groups the speaker mentioned have interactions with the Lumina 
Foundation.  For example, Lumina’s CEO and president, Jamie P. Merisotis, spoke at 
the 2010 SHEEO Annual Meeting addressing higher education policy agenda for states, 
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during which he called for governors and legislators to “come together in a 
comprehensive policy agenda for each state to increase attainment and reach the Big 
Goal108.”  In 2013, Merisotis again spoke at the 2013 SHEEO Annual Meeting, during 
which he emphasized that higher education funding and policies should focus on 
institutional outcomes and results 109.  The Lumina Foundation has also sponsored 
AIR110, NACUBO111, NCSL112, and SREB113 programs in the past. 
These connections help inform the ACHE of performance funding.  In their past 
budget proposals, the ACHE has referred to performance funding as a widely adopted 
funding strategy.  The information was circulated among legislators and sparked some 
formal considerations.  The respondents explained that the key reason for non-adoption 
is simply lack of legislative interest to further the initial consideration.   When asked to 
define “lack of interest”, one speaker pointed out that:  
“Alabama has less than five million people, we have 14 
universities and 26 two-year colleges114.  Some campuses in rural areas 
with smaller populations and you start pulling money away from them, 
you are going to potentially close the school.  You can’t just look at a 
school as a school, it’s an economic engine in these communities.  If you 
look at a school in a rural area, their major employer and people in the 
                                                          
108 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/reaching-the-big-goal-an-
agenda-for-states 
109 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/national-goals-and-policy-for-
higher-education 
110 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/lumina-foundation-announces-
grants-1q-2004 
111 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/redesigning-higher-education-
from-the-inside-out 
112 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/2005-grants-announced-
totaling-81-5-million 
113 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/lumina-foundation-s-adult-
degree-completion-commitment-gives-millions-of-recession-battered-americans-a-second-chance-at-
earning-a-degree 
114 This speaker may have referred to both public and private institutions.  According to the U.S. 
Department of Education—College Scorecard (2017), Alabama has 30 public institutions. 
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town basically provide service to the school.  You shut down the school, 
you destroy the local economy.  We have several rural schools with 
small student populations.  This fact plays a role in whether Alabama 
adopts certain policies or not.  People in these rural areas are not 
academically prepared as people in other areas, if schools raise 
admission standards, these people won’t have the opportunity to go to 
college, and you’re perpetuating a cycle of people not being able to 
advance.  To me, it’s complicated based on different circumstances of 
the state. Alabama is very poor and we’re predominantly rural.” 
 
The above information implies that one of the main reasons for Alabama to not 
adopt performance funding is the geographic configuration and size diversity of their 
institutions.  The state has 30 public higher education institutions, ranging from small 
schools (defined as less than 2000 students) to large ones (15,000 or more students) and 
everything in between, in urban and rural environments (U.S. Department of 
Education—College Scorecard 2017).  For instance, the University of Alabama at 
Tuscaloosa (UA) houses a record high of 38,563 for fall 2017.  More than 40 percent of 
UA’s 7,407-member freshman class scored 30 or higher on the ACT, and 38 percent 
were in the top 10 percent of their high school graduating class.  The entering class in 
2017 carries an average high school grade-point average of 3.72, with 34 percent having 
a high school GPA of 4.0 or higher (University of Alabama 2018).  Being a prestigious 
institution, it has been attracting high-performing students from all over the nation and 
has a growing population of international students.   
On the other hand, Alabama has several rural schools where admission standards 
are much lower and student populations are less diverse.  For instance, Athens State 
University, a two-year upper level public university, whose student body consists, in 
large part, of a non-traditional aged population seeking a flexible curriculum.  It is 
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difficult to hold UA and Athens State University to similar performance standards, 
given UA’s much higher opportunity of recruiting likely-to-excel freshmen.  If the state 
government was to cut funding to Athens State University, it would hurt the local 
economy since the institution has a major impact on it.  The majority of the population 
in Athens is associated with the school in one way or another, either they work at the 
institution or attend school there.  Due to the technical difficulty of determining 
performance measurements, Alabama currently does not have performance funding, 
regardless of their knowledge or perception of the policy.  The technical difficulty has 
also deterred the state government from seeking out solutions and further information.  
Different than Alabama, Mississippi enacted performance funding in 2011.  
Mississippi obtained information from a relatively wide range of sources before 
finalizing their funding formula.  Although Mississippi is not one of the main targets of 
Lumina’s work, the state has some financial connections with the Foundation.  For 
example, in 2009, the IHL received $150,000 from Lumina to support College Goal 
Sunday in Mississippi through 2011, preparing students for college, as a part of 
Lumina’s Goal 2025 to increase national educational attainment115.  In 2010, the 
Lumina Foundation awarded $800,000 to Manufacturing Institute, a Washington D.C. 
based nonprofit whose priority is to advocate for education and job training policies that 
strengthen the U.S. manufacturing workforce.  The grant was intended to support 12 
states (Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, 
Nevada, New York, Tennessee, Wisconsin) in efforts to align educational and career 
                                                          
115 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/lumina-foundation-announces-
fourth-quarter-grants-2 
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pathways with the National Association of Manufacturers-Endorsed Manufacturing 
Skills Certification System, with the aim of increasing the number of students who earn 
a postsecondary credential with value in the workplace116. 
In addition to Lumina, the interviewee spoke about how a few bills were 
proposed after state legislators’ visit with the American Legislative Exchange Councils 
(ALEC), a nonprofit organization that gathers conservative state legislators and private 
sector representatives to draft and share model state-level legislation among state 
governments.  In addition, the Academic Affairs Department worked heavily on the 
CCA initiative and attended their meetings.  The Lumina Foundation sponsored a trip 
for the Mississippi higher education officials to travel to Nashville in 2011, before the 
state undertook the funding formula.  However, the interviewee attributed their adoption 
to the state’s exchange with ALEC, their diligence and commitment, and the legislative 
support. 
The Mississippi State Institutions of Higher Learning (IHL) oversees eight 
universities and colleges with uneven levels of performance, among which three are 
historically black universities.  Some institutions are located in rural areas where they 
only attract students within certain distance, whereas other institutions may appeal to a 
bigger pool of students and even out-of-state students.  Over the years, enrollments in 
some institutions significantly increased whereas others decreased, yet the constant 
percentage allocation was still in place.  The State Legislature was caught with the 
                                                          
116 Link to the article: https://www.luminafoundation.org/news-and-views/lumina-foundation-s-adult-
degree-completion-commitment-gives-millions-of-recession-battered-americans-a-second-chance-at-
earning-a-degree 
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concern with the diverging appropriations per FTE.  It was also worrisome regarding 
the rural institutions’ lack of ability to recruit out-of-region or out-of-state students, 
while some other schools’ enrollments continued to grow.  This continued to widen the 
gap between the levels of financial needs for these states.  The Legislature came to the 
realization that the appropriations to bigger institutions were ever growing while the 
rural institutions suffered from the disadvantage to expand, which is similar to the 
problem with Alabama, as stated above.    
The initial attempt was made to tackle this problem in 2005, the IHL proposed a 
funding formula that was very similar to the one that was in Texas at the time117.  
However, there was legislative resistance to that formula, and in subsequent years the 
appropriation bills stipulated that the funds could not be appropriated based on that 
formula.   Some of the smaller universities had strong legislative contacts, they felt they 
were being treated unfairly since they did not have the resources to improve student 
outcomes.  These institutions had enough political pull to get certain language inserted 
into the appropriation bill that prohibited the IHL from using the formula, leading to a 
pause in the performance funding implementation. 
Soon after, the leadership in the Legislature changed from Democratic control to 
Republican control.  The new leadership was vocal about higher education 
accountability and granted much support to the IHL to resume the effort.  After learning 
                                                          
117 The interviewee did not clarify the decision, but I speculate that Texas is comparable in the sense that 
its institutions have uneven performance due to the diverse population.  Some universities in Texas 
mainly serve minority students and immigrant students. 
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about the details of performance funding at ALEC meetings, the Legislature directed 
the IHL to brainstorm funding formulas to tackle the challenge.     
3.2.2.1. Conclusion on the Proposed Hypotheses 
The above discussion leads to a few conclusions.  The first hypothesis, changing 
information that causes negative policy image shift contributes to non-adoption, is not 
supported.  The interviews with higher education officials reveal that the decision 
making goes much beyond the perceived policy image.  Although states receive 
lopsidedly positive information from the three organizations, they also exchange with 
other sources.  As indicated, despite the officials’ negative comments on performance 
funding, this fact is not the key contributor to Alabama’s non-adoption.  This is not to 
say that policy image is insignificant.  As elaborated, higher education finance is not the 
decision of one institution.  In Alabama, the coordinating board has very little authority 
beyond making budgetary recommendations, and the higher education finance is up to 
the Governor and State Legislature.  It is unclear how the other two institutions perceive 
performance funding and process information in their decision making.  However, I 
speculate that a positive perception of the policy alone would not necessarily lead to 
adoption due to the challenge of identifying a reasonable set of performance standards 
that can work for their diverse public institutions.  
Second, lack of communications with the three nonprofits in question can 
possibly lead to policy non-adoption.  As a non-adopter, Alabama has not been lobbied 
heavily by CCA.  Nor does it exchange with the Gates and Lumina Foundations 
frequently.  Given Alabama’s lack of interest, the Foundations may consider it a waste 
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of time and resources to continue keeping the state in the loop, which eventually could 
be the explanation of such non-adoption.  In addition, the main decision makers, the 
Governor and Legislature, have not received much financial support from the 
Foundations.  Both the Gates and Lumina Foundations work with states to help build 
performance funding formulas through higher education grants and technical support.  
Being in a relatively poor fiscal condition and having a wide performances gap from 
various institutions, Alabama could use some help from the Foundations and CCA in 
establishing and customizing their funding formula.  The Mississippi case demonstrates 
that with determination and commitment, the legislative leadership is willing to conquer 
technical difficult to develop performance funding with external help.   
One considerable distinction between the two is that the IHL oversees eight 
public institutions, whereas the ACHE is responsible for all 30 public universities and 
colleges.  It is technically much less challenging for Mississippi to come up with an 
acceptable list of performance evaluation criteria.  Historically, Alabama ranks lower 
than average on the educational attainment rate.  Rationally, it should have the incentive 
to enforce some policy to improve their education system, yet Alabama has not 
experimented with other funding mechanisms beyond the traditional enrollment-based 
approach.  In conjunction with the challenge of enacting performance funding, lack of 
external technical and financial support can further discourage the state from adopting 
performance funding.  
Lastly, lack of interactions with policy agents and policy networks does not 
appear to be a reason for non-adoption.  As indicated, the ACHE has partnership with 
 185 
 
other policy agents, and is an active members of various policy networks.  These 
connections are helpful for the state to be informed of performance funding.  As 
discussed, the awareness and knowledge of a policy innovation, however, does not 
necessarily lead to adoption.  The technical difficulty seems to defeat the attempt of 
implementing performance funding in the Alabama case.  
Conclusion 
This chapter presents the qualitative study design, data analysis, and findings.  
Although it seems that performance funding is a straightforward concept, the policy 
decision making is far from simplistic.  States have their own varying conditions and 
realities that dictate higher education budgeting.  The discussion unveils both the 
legislative and institutional explanations to policy decision making.  One noteworthy 
point to emphasize here is that higher education finance is not simply determined by 
one institution, rather, it requires the coordination and agreement among institutions—
the governing agency, the executive, the legislature, and sometimes even the higher 
education system.  The power configuration in higher education finance plays a 
considerable role in the adoption of performance funding.  The next chapter furthers this 
discussion and proposes a few future research topics. 
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Chapter VI. Concluding Comments and Thoughts on Future Research 
This dissertation examines policy diffusion failure based on the conceptual 
framework of policy innovation and diffusion.  Since 1979 when performance funding 
was first enacted, the policy has had two waves of adoption: from 1979 through 2002, 
and from 2003 through 2014.  Such division is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.  
Evidence suggests that the first period of adoption is mainly the byproduct of 
nationwide performance management reform, during which performance-based funding 
systems were heavily integrated into state and federal government programs as a means 
of holding public agencies accountable for improving the quality, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of program services.  Under this movement, states extended such 
mechanism to the higher education sector.  Performance-based funding policy merged 
as a popular funding strategy to improve higher education performance.  I contend that 
the second wave of adoption was mainly attributed to higher education nonprofits’ 
advocacy for performance funding and their effort to provide an abundance of policy 
information to state officials.   
During the second wave, many nonprofit organizations become aware of the 
importance of higher education performance and accountability, leading to their public 
endorsement for performance funding and financial efforts to help diffuse the policy.  
Among these organizations, the Lumina and Gates Foundation are the most notable 
ones.  After reviewing the literature of public policy making and how policy agents 
facilitate policy diffusion through information provision, I hypothesize that states’ non-
 187 
 
adoption of performance funding is mainly due to the negatively perceived policy image 
and lack of interactions with policy agents and higher education nonprofits.   
My findings suggest that from 1979 through 2002, regional influence, state 
fiscal condition, educational attainment, tuition change, and higher education 
governance are the main factors that lead to state adoption of the policy.  States with 
higher probability of adoption tend to have more adopting neighbors, better fiscal 
condition, higher educational attainment rates, tuition decreases, and an absence of a 
consolidated governing board.  From 2003 through 2014, states with declined college 
enrollment and conservative governments appear to be more likely adopters.   
Further, the non-adoption of performance funding is not simply attributed to the 
perceived image of the policy or the level of knowledge of the innovation.  State higher 
education finance requires collective efforts from the higher education governing 
agency, the executive, and the legislature.  Additionally, higher education institutions 
also partially determine the budgetary decisions by providing their inputs.  With a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, the results of the analysis uncover 
some intriguing findings and raise questions for future research.   
1. Additional Quantitative Variables 
1.1. Gates Foundation Variables 
The quantitative portion omits some potentially relevant contributing factors to 
policy diffusion.  Statistically, Lumina’s financial contribution to state higher education 
does not appear to be a significant factor.  It has been documented that the Gates 
Foundation is another organization that distributes large amounts of dollars to the cause 
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of performance funding programs.  It is uncertain whether Gates money is more 
effective than Lumina money in the diffusion of performance funding.    
However, I foresee that the data collection for this variable could be challenging.  
The Gates Foundation funds a wide range of projects, programs, and organizations.  
Their mission tackles five program areas: global health division, global development 
division, global growth and opportunity division, U.S. division, and global policy and 
advocacy division (Gates Foundation 2018).  Their domestic division works to improve 
U.S. high school and postsecondary education and support vulnerable children and 
families mainly in the state of Washington.  Going through the massive amount of 
information from their past 990 Forms to find higher education grants that were 
dedicated to performance accountability related effort could be daunting118.  
Another challenge is that the Gates Foundation funds many nationwide higher 
education organizations that work with various states, which makes it difficult to trace 
“how much money goes to which states.”  For example, the Gates Foundation has 
funded groups like Complete College America (CCA) and Completion by Design, as 
well as higher education association-created systems such as the Student Achievement 
Measure, the Voluntary Framework of Accountability and the Voluntary System of 
Accountability (Fain 2015).  In 2009, the Gates Foundation helped start CCA with an 
$8 million grant.  Ever since its birth, CCA has worked to recruit states into their 
alliance, by encouraging governors and state legislators to commit to change the way 
                                                          
118 The Foundation’s past 990 Forms are available at: https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Who-We-
Are/General-Information/Financials 
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higher education is governed by moving higher education policy to a more 
performance-based culture (Fryar 2011).  In 2015, Gates invested $34.8 million over 
five years to help increase the graduation rates of community college students through 
Completion by Design—a five-year Gates Foundation signature initiative that works 
with community colleges to significantly increase completion and graduation rates for 
low-income students under 26.  Completion by Design was charged with the task of 
awarding competitive grants to groups of community colleges.   
These examples show that it is no easy task to untangle these relationships and 
sort through the various states these organizations and programs work with, which 
overlap in many ways and differ in others.  However, this is an important inquiry for 
future research because the current literature does not tell us much about philanthropic 
foundations’ effort in public policy making.  Private foundations are legally limited by 
law in the ways they can and cannot seek to influence public policy.  The IRS further 
prohibits foundations from directly lobby government agencies.  Despite the restriction, 
private foundations may still participate in many forms of advocacy activities and fund 
advocacy.  In the case of performance funding, philanthropic foundations exhibit their 
influence through financial support and policy information supply.  In addition, this 
dissertation demonstrates that the Lumina and Gates Foundations’ advocacy generally 
calls upon government action to move towards a performance-focused approach in 
higher education finance rather than specific bills, which technically is not considered 
as lobbying.  Future research on this topic will not only enrich our theoretical 
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understanding of the public policy field, but also provide useful information to 
practitioners on the influence of nonprofits in policymaking.  
1.2. State Higher Education Governing Structure 
Additional critical variables that might help improve the quantitative models 
include the state higher education governing agency’s jurisdiction size and its level of 
budget authority.  In the quantitative section, I only account for whether a state has a 
consolidated governing board as a dichotomous measure.  This measure is inadequate 
because it does not capture the complicated environment in which higher education 
agencies operate.  For example, as discussed in the previous chapter, one of the factors 
that prevents Alabama from adopting performance funding is the uneven performance 
from the 30 institutions the Alabama Commission on Higher Education (ACHE) 
oversees.  Designing a set of performance criteria that fairly evaluates the enormous-
sized higher education system is extremely challenging for the ACHE.  Although the 
Mississippi State Institutions of Higher Learning (IHL) has to deal with the same issue, 
it is much more manageable for it to create a performance funding formula given its 
much smaller jurisdiction.  Therefore, the number of institutions the higher education 
governing agency oversees heavily determines how technically difficult it is to adopt 
and implement performance funding policy.   
The data for this potential variable are relatively easy to obtain: the 45119 states 
that have either a consolidated or coordinating board have official websites that describe 
                                                          
119 Table 2.1 presents the three types of higher education governing structures.  Alaska and Hawaii are 
excluded from the discussion here given their non-contiguity to the mainland.  Among all 48 states, 
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their higher education agency’s authority, responsibilities, and organizational bylaws.  
The two states that only have a planning agency—Delaware120 and Pennsylvania121, 
also have official websites that explain these agencies’ activities and discretions.    
As elaborated, higher education finance requires collective actions from the 
governing agency, the governor, the legislature, and sometimes even the higher 
education system.  Having a consolidated governing board does not necessarily mean 
that the state can effortlessly enact performance funding without the participation of 
other government institutions; and vice versa.  States delegate varying degrees of 
budget authority to their higher education agencies.  For instance, Oklahoma has a 
coordinating board—the State Regents for Higher Education.  The Board is granted 
much discretion on higher education funding allocation, and performance funding 
adoption was initiated by the State Regents without much intervention from the 
Legislature or the Governor.  Differently, Arizona has a consolidated governing board, 
but the state adopted performance funding through legislative means with the State 
Legislature and the Governor.  Therefore, looking into the state higher education 
agency’s level of decision making authority could help provide clarity on the diffusion 
of performance funding.   
For this variable, a possible measure could be an ordinal variable that ranks the 
higher education agency’s involvement in annual appropriations into three categories: 
                                                          
Michigan does not have a state-level coordinating or governing agency for postsecondary education 
(Education Commission of the States 2007). 
120 The Delaware Higher Education Office (housed under the Delaware Department of Education) 
website: https://www.doe.k12.de.us/Page/316 
121 The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency website: https://www.pheaa.org/ 
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low, medium, and high.  States with agencies that bear complete higher education 
budget authority will be coded as high level of involvement (e.g., Oklahoma), agencies 
that somewhat determines higher education budget will be coded as medium level of 
involvement (e.g., Arizona), and states with little voice in such decision will be coded 
as low level of involvement (e.g., Alabama).   
2. Other Cases and Cross Comparisons 
As mentioned in the Quantitative Findings Chapter, another identified close pair 
of states is Maryland and Massachusetts.  Appendix G presents comparisons of the two 
states on the statistically significant variables.  Maryland has never adopted 
performance funding, and Massachusetts adopted in 2013.  This pair of cases might be 
potentially helpful to further the discussion of policy diffusion failure due to their 
different higher education finance processes.  Unlike Alabama and Mississippi where 
higher education finance requires collective coordination from the three institutions and 
the coordinating board plays a minor part, in Maryland and Massachusetts, the 
executive branch appears to assume a heavier role than the other two institutions.   
This is especially true in Maryland because the development of the budget is 
primarily an executive task.  The Maryland Higher Education Commission (MHEC) 
coordinates the growth and development of post-secondary education in Maryland.  The 
Commission is required to present to the Governor and the General Assembly a 
consolidated operating and capital budget requests of the governing boards and 
institutions.  After receiving the Commission’s budget requests, the Governor 
formulates the budget and supplemental budgets.  Supplemental budgets permit the 
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Governor to correct errors or omissions in the original budget and are used to 
appropriate new spending.  After introduction of the budget but before final action on 
the budget, the Governor may reduce or increase the budget through introduction of a 
supplemental budget.   
In Massachusetts, the Department of Higher Education (DHE) coordinates 
public institutions.  The DHE is the staff to the 13-member Board of Higher Education 
(BHE), responsible for executing the Board’s policies and day-to-day operations.  The 
BHE is the statutorily created agency in Massachusetts responsible for defining the 
mission of and coordinating the Commonwealth’s system of public higher education 
and its institutions (Massachusetts Department of Higher Education 2018).  The BHE is 
responsible for reviewing institutional budget requests from these said institutions and 
preparing a comprehensive budget request for the public higher education system.  The 
BHE then proceeds to submit comments and recommendations concerning those 
requests to the Massachusetts Secretary of Education.  The Secretary then submits 
budget requests for these institutions to the Governor, who proceeds to present the 
budget to the Secretary of Administration and Finance, the House and Senate 
Committees on Ways and Means, and the Joint Committee on Higher Education 
(Massachusetts General Laws, Part I, Title II, Ch. 15A, §15 and §15B).  According to 
the DHE (2018), the Governor and the state legislature appropriate state funds to 
support public higher education.   
Massachusetts’s adoption of performance funding was mainly attributed to 
Governor Deval Patrick’s remark on the importance of linking the “middle skills gap” 
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to the need for community college system to be more responsive to workforce needs.  In 
his FY 2013 state budget proposal, Governor Deval Patrick proposed the establishment 
of a higher education finance commission, and the state Legislature established a 
special commission on higher education quality, efficiencies, and finance in FY 2014.  
The Secretary of Education was charged with serving as the chair of this Commission.  
By FY 2014, a new community college funding model was unveiled.   
The comparison between Maryland and Massachusetts can offer additional 
information on performance funding diffusion given their different higher education 
budget processes.  This difference can possibly change the motivation and path of 
performance funding adoption.  As seen in the Massachusetts case, the Governor’s 
remark was a catalyst for the DHE and the Legislature to push forward a funding 
formula.  In the Mississippi case, the change of leadership in the Legislature critically 
contributed to the development of the new funding model.   
Further, Maryland and Massachusetts have comparable numbers of institutions 
with Alabama122.  Maryland has 29 public institutions in total, including five large 
institutions (University of Maryland-University College, University of Maryland-
College Park, The Community College of Baltimore County, Montgomery College, and 
Towson University), 21 medium institutions, and 3 small institutions.  Massachusetts 
also has 29 public institutions in total, including one large institution (University of 
Massachusetts-Amherst), 23 medium institutions, and 5 small institutions (U.S. 
                                                          
122 Alabama has 30 public institutions, including four large institutions (University of Alabama, Auburn 
University, Columbia Southern University, and Troy University), 24 medium institutions, and 12 small 
institutions (U.S. Department of Education—College Scorecard 2017).   
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Department of Education—College Scorecard 2017).  The higher education governing 
agency in these three states oversee roughly the same number of institutions.  It is fair to 
conduct cross comparisons due to the similar size of their higher education systems.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, although both Alabama and Mississippi have to deal 
with wide performance gaps among their higher education institutions, the comparison 
is not necessarily fair.  Mississippi has far less institutions to work with while designing 
their funding formula.  Comparing states with similar sized higher education sections 
can at least eliminate this problem. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, the adoption of performance funding requires the decision of 
many government institutions, including the higher education agency, the Governor, 
and the legislature.  These institutions also take into account the inputs from higher 
education institutions and the state conditions.  Nonprofits’ advocacy for performance 
funding is important but appears less influential than I previously expected.   
Moving forward, I plan to expand this research by adding the above quantitative 
variables to my models.  With these added factors, I believe that I can produce more 
robust results and better-rounded answers to my research questions.  In addition, I plan 
to identify all the higher education grants the Gates Foundation has made in the past and 
investigate how these financial contributions overlap, and eventually locate the states 
that benefit from the Gates dollars.  The finding on whether Gates money influences 
performance funding diffusion will offer further information on nonprofits’ advocacy 
for performance funding.  Lastly, I aim to continue reaching out to the Maryland Higher 
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Education Commission to schedule an in-depth interview and complete the qualitative 
comparison of my second pair of nonadopters.   
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Appendix A: The 48 Continental U.S. States and Their Bordering States 
State The State’s Bordering States 
Alabama MS, TN, GA, FL 
Arizona CA, NV, UT, CO, NM 
Arkansas LA, TX, OK, MO, KY, TN, MS 
California OR, NV, AZ 
Colorado NM, AZ, UT, WY, NE, KS, OK 
Connecticut NY, MA, RI 
Delaware MD, PA, NJ 
Florida AL, GA 
Georgia FL, AL, TN, NC, SC 
Idaho WA, OR, NV, UT, WY, MT 
Illinois WI, IA, MO, KY, IN, MI 
Indiana KY, IL, MI, OH 
Iowa MO, NE, SD, MN, WI, IL 
Kansas  OK, CO, NE, MO 
Kentucky TN, AR, MO, IL, IN, OH, WV, VA 
Louisiana TX, AR, MS 
Maine NH, MA 
Maryland VA, WV, PA, DE, NJ 
Massachusetts RI, CT, NY, VT, NH, ME 
Michigan WI, IL, IN, OH 
Minnesota ND, SD, IA, WI, MI 
Mississippi LA, AR, TN, AL 
Missouri AR, OK, KS, NE, IA, IL, KY, TN 
Montana ID, WY, SD, ND 
Nebraska KS, CO, WY, SD, IA, MO 
Nevada CA, OR, ID, UT, AZ 
New Hampshire MA, VT, ME 
New Jersey DE, PA, NY, MD 
New Mexico AZ, UT, CO, OK, TX 
New York PA, NJ, CT, MA, VT 
North Carolina SC, GA, TN, VA 
North Dakota SD, MT, MN 
Ohio KY, IN, MI, PA, WV 
Oklahoma TX, NM, CO, KS, MO, AR 
Oregon CA, NV, ID, WA 
Pennsylvania DE, MD, WV, OH, NY, NJ 
Rhode Island CT, MA 
South Carolina GA, NC 
South Dakota ND, NE, WY, MT, MN, IA 
Tennessee NC, GA, AL, MS, AR, MO, KY, VA 
Texas NM, OK, AR, LA 
Utah AZ, NV, ID, WY, CO, NM 
Vermont NH, MA, NY 
Virginia NC, TN, KY, WV, MD 
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State The State’s Bordering States 
Washington OR, ID 
West Virginia VA, KY, OH, PA, MD 
Wisconsin MN, IA, IL, MI 
Wyoming CO, UT, ID, MT, SD, NE 
Note1: Alaska and Hawaii are excluded. 
Note2: AR = Arkansas, AZ = Arizona, CA = California, CO = Colorado, CT =  Connecticut, FL 
= Florida, GA = Georgia, IA = Iowa, ID = Idaho, IL = Illinois, IN = Indiana, KS = Kansas, KY 
= Kentucky, LA = Louisiana, MA = Massachusetts, ME = Maine, MI = Michigan, MN = 
Minnesota, MO = Missouri, MS = Mississippi, MT = Montana, NC = North Carolina, OK = 
Oklahoma, ND = North Dakota, NJ = New Jersey, NM = New Mexico, NV = Nevada, NY = 
New York, OH = Ohio, OR = Oregon, PA = Pennsylvania, SC = South Carolina, SD = South 
Dakota, TN = Tennessee, TX = Texas,  UT = Utah, VA = Virginia, VT = Vermont, WA = 
Washington, WI = Wisconsin, WY = Wyoming  
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Appendix B: Lumina Foundation Grants Distribution (2002-2014) 
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Appendix C: Multicollinearity Check 
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Appendix D: Additional Models 
State Adoption of Performance Funding (1979-2014) 
 Coefficient Average Marginal Effects 
Regional Influence 0.471***  
(0.141) 
0.013 
Fiscal Condition 1.746  
(1.603) 
0.050 
Educational Attainment  10.142**  
(3.710) 
0.288 
Tuition Change -5.129# 
(2.718) 
-0.146 
Enrollment Change -10.220# 
(5.760) 
-0.290 
Government Ideology -0.016* 
(0.007) 
-0.0005 
Legislative Professionalism 1.380 
(1.367) 
0.039 
Consolidated Governing Board -0.349 
(0.360) 
-0.010 
Intercept -5.341*** 
(0.949) 
-0.152 
Pseudo R2 0.154  
N 1265  
Note 1: Coefficients are from an event history analysis using logistic regression, two-tailed  
Note 2: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Note 3: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; # p<0.1 
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State Adoption of Performance Funding with Cumulative Grants Added (2003-2014) 
 Coefficient Average Marginal Effect 
Regional Influence 0.225 
(0.314) 
0.011 
Fiscal Condition -1.068 
(1.860) 
-0.051 
Educational Attainment  -0.591 
(7.836) 
-0.028 
Tuition Change -3.995 
(4.286) 
-0.193 
Enrollment Change -32.952** 
(11.559) 
-1.590 
Government Ideology -0.035** 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
Legislative Professionalism 1.340 
(3.655) 
0.068 
Consolidated Governing Board 0.366 
(0.657) 
0.018 
Cumulative Lumina Grants to the State 0.184* 
(0.073) 
0.009 
Intercept -1.826 
(2.351) 
-0.088 
Pseudo R2 0.278  
N 263  
Note 1: Coefficients are from an event history analysis using logistic regression, two-tailed  
Note 2: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Note 3: ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 
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Appendix E: IRB Documents 
Research Participation Information 
The Diffusion of Performance-Based Funding Policy in Higher Education 
Ivy Shen 
(**IRB number: 7188**) 
 
My name is Ivy Shen, I am a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at 
the University of Oklahoma. I am conducting this research titled “The Diffusion of 
Performance-Based Funding Policy in Higher Education” for my doctoral dissertation. 
The purpose of my study is to investigate state level higher education policymaking and 
nonprofits’ engagement in higher education legislation.   
The potential participants of this study are approximately 50 state government officials 
and staff members who engage in state higher education policy making; and about 50 
employees who work for nonprofit organizations that engage in higher education 
legislation. 
There will be a roughly 30-minute face-to-face interview. The interview pertains to 
state level higher education policymaking. There might be short follow-up calls if 
necessary. 
Participation is completely voluntary. If you choose to participate, I will truly appreciate 
your help. Data collected from this study will only be used for research purposes. Your 
identity will not be revealed. The information we will be discussing during our 
interview involves low levels of sensitivity. Your participation will not be compensated. 
If you would like to discontinue participation during the interview, there will be no 
negative consequences. 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, you can reach me at 405-326-
4733 or ishen@ou.edu. My dissertation committee chair is Professor Scott Lamothe 
(slamothe@ou.edu). 
The University of Oklahoma is an equal opportunity institution.  
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Oral Consent Script to Participate in Research  
Good morning/afternoon/evening. Would you be interested in participating in a research 
project I am conducting at the University of Oklahoma? I’d like you to participate 
because you either (1) work for the state government and you participate in state higher 
education legislation, or (2) work for a nonprofit organization that engages in higher 
education legislation.  
I’m conducting this research project because I am hoping to learn more about states’ 
decision to adopt or reject performance-based funding program in higher education and 
nonprofit organizations’ engagement in this policy making. Approximately (1) 50 state 
government officials and staff members who engage in state higher education policy 
making, and (2) 50 employees who work for nonprofit organizations that engage in 
higher education legislation will participate. If you agree to participate, I will be asking 
you to take part in a face-to-face interview. This should take about 30 minutes. If 
necessary, I may schedule follow-up calls. 
Your participation in this research doesn’t involve any direct risks or benefits to you. 
The information has low levels of sensitivity. Your identity will not be revealed. The 
data collected will only be used for research purposes. The data will not be shared with 
other parties. You will not be compensated for participating in this research.  
All of the information I’m collecting will be kept secure and confidential, and only I or 
the University of Oklahoma – Norman Campus Institutional Review Board will be able 
to look at it. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant or any concerns 
or complaints regarding your participation, you can contact me at 405-326-4733 or 
ishen@ou.edu. You can also direct questions to my dissertation committee chair, 
Professor Scott Lamothe, at slamothe@ou.edu, and OU’s IRB at 405-325-8110 or 
irb@ou.edu. 
During this interview, you will be asked to provide available information on 
performance funding in higher education. The interview will be recorded. The data 
collected will only be used for research purposes, your identifying information will not 
be shared with anyone else. The data collected will not be shared with anyone else. 
There might be quick follow-ups if necessary. You can quit the interview anytime you 
want. Would you like to go ahead and start this interview? 
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Interview questions: 
Interview Questions for State Government Officials and Staff: 
• Has your state government adopted performance-based funding in higher 
education?  
• When did the adoption occur? 
• When did performance-based funding first appear on the state 
government agenda?  
• What information did the government refer to in making this decision 
(e.g., state university graduation rates, state financial condition)?  
• What was the driving force for adopting this policy (e.g., federal 
pressure, observation of successful implementation of this policy in other 
states)?  
• What prevented the state government from adopting this policy (e.g., 
other priorities, limited information of this program)? 
 
Interview Questions for Nonprofit Organization Employees: 
• Does your organization support performance funding in higher 
education? 
• Is your organization particularly interested in higher education 
legislation?  
• Has your organization engaged in activities to promote such program? 
• What information has your organization publicly provided to state 
government officials regarding higher education? 
• What information has your organization publicly provided to state 
government officials regarding performance funding in higher education? 
• Is your organization currently active in advertising performance funding? 
If yes, could you please provide some details? 
• Which states has your organization delivered information to regarding 
higher education issues? 
• Which states has your organization delivered information to regarding 
performance funding? 
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Signed Consent to Participate in Research  
Would you like to be involved in research at the University of Oklahoma? 
I am Ivy Shen from the Department of Political Science and I invite you to participate in 
my research project entitled The Diffusion of Performance-Based Funding Policy in 
Higher Education. This research is being conducted over the phone. You were selected 
as a possible participant because you either (1) work for a state government and you 
engage in state higher education policy making; or (2) work for a nonprofit organization 
that engages in higher education legislation. You must be at least 18 years of age to 
participate in this study. 
Please read this document and contact me to ask any questions that you may have 
BEFORE agreeing to take part in my research. 
What is the purpose of this research? The purpose of this research is to investigate 
state level higher education policymaking and nonprofit organizations’ involvement in 
higher education legislation.  
How many participants will be in this research? About 50 state government officials 
and staff members who engage in state higher education policy making; and 50 
nonprofit employees who work for an organization that engages in higher education 
legislation. 
What will I be asked to do? If you agree to be in this research, you will be asked 
questions on state higher education legislation.  
How long will this take? Your participation will take roughly 30 minutes and there 
may be short follow up calls. 
What are the risks and/or benefits if I participate? The research involves no benefits 
or known risks  
Will I be compensated for participating? You will not be compensated for your time 
and participation in this research.  
Who will see my information? In research reports, there will be no information that 
will make it possible to identify you. Research records will be stored securely and only 
approved researchers and the OU Institution Review Board will have access to the 
records. The data collected will only be used for research purposes. Participants’ 
identity will not be revealed.  
You have the right to access the research data that has been collected about you as a 
part of this research. However, you may not have access to this information until the 
entire research has completely finished and you consent to this temporary restriction. 
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Do I have to participate? No. If you do not participate, you will not be penalized or 
lose benefits or services unrelated to the research. If you decide to participate, you don’t 
have to answer any question and can stop participating at any time. 
Audio Recording of Research Activities To assist with accurate recording of your 
responses, interviews may be recorded on an audio recording device. You have the right 
to refuse to allow such recording without penalty.  
I consent to audio recording.   ___Yes   ___ No 
Will I be contacted again? The researcher would like to contact you again to recruit 
you into this research or to gather additional information.  
_____ I give my permission for the researcher to contact me in the future.  
_____ I do not wish to be contacted by the researcher again. 
Who do I contact with questions, concerns or complaints? If you have questions, 
concerns or complaints about the research or have experienced a research-related injury, 
contact me at ishen@ou.edu or 405-326-4733. My mailing address is: Dale Hall Tower, 
Room 205. 455 W. Lindsey St. Norman, OK 73019. My dissertation committee chair is 
Professor Scott Lamothe (slamothe@ou.edu).  
You can also contact the University of Oklahoma – Norman Campus Institutional 
Review Board (OU-NC IRB) at 405-325-8110 or irb@ou.edu if you have questions 
about your rights as a research participant, concerns, or complaints about the research 
and wish to talk to someone other than the researcher(s) or if you cannot reach the 
researcher(s). 
You will be given a copy of this document for your records. By providing information to 
the researcher(s), I am agreeing to participate in this research. 
Participant Signature 
 
 
Print Name Date 
Signature of Researcher 
Obtaining Consent 
 
 
Print Name Date 
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Appendix F: Official Websites Consulted for Data Collection 
1. The Alabama Commission on Higher Education: http://www.ache.state.al.us/ 
2. The Official Website of the State of Alabama: http://www.alabama.gov/ 
3. The Alabama State Legislature: 
http://www.legislature.state.al.us/aliswww/default.aspx 
4. The Alabama Department of Finance: http://finance.alabama.gov/ 
5. The Alabama Executive Budget Office: http://budget.alabama.gov/ 
6. The Government of Alabama: https://www.usa.gov/state-government/alabama 
7. The Alabama Constitution: 
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/alison/codeofalabama/constitution/1901/toc
.htm 
8. Transparency & Accountability in State Government (Alabama): 
http://open.alabama.gov/ 
9. Alabama Department of Archives and History: http://archives.state.al.us/ 
10. Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning: http://www.ihl.state.ms.us/ 
11. The Official Website of the State of Mississippi: http://www.ms.gov/ 
12. The Mississippi State Legislature: 
http://www.legislature.ms.gov/Pages/default.aspx 
13. The Mississippi Department of Finance & Administration: 
http://www.dfa.ms.gov/ 
14. The Mississippi Legislative Budget Office: http://www.lbo.ms.gov/ 
15. The Government of Mississippi: https://www.usa.gov/state-
government/mississippi 
16. The Mississippi Constitution: 
http://www.sos.state.ms.us/ed_pubs/constitution/constitution.asp 
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Appendix G: Comparisons between Maryland and Massachusetts 
Comparisons between Maryland and Massachusetts on Government Ideology, Tuition 
and Enrollment Change, and Precited Probability of Performance funding Adoption 
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